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Book Reviews
Marginal Europe: The Contribution of Marginal Lands since the Middle Ages.
By Sidney Pollard.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1997. Pp. 327.
Sidney Pollard’s study, which he locates “on the borderline between geography and
economic history” (p. 257), is divided into two parts. The first part considers “theories”
of the margin, the way in which contemporaries and historians have understood the idea
of marginal regions in Europe. Separate chapters examine the expansion of the occupied territory of Europe since the collapse of the Roman Empire, the judgments of
observers that marginal populations were especially backward (“The Negative View”)
or industrious and self-reliant (“The Positive View”), and the idea of a complementary
linkage between marginal areas and economic centers. The second half of the book
presents a series of case studies of marginal lands: the German colonization of Eastern
Europe in the twelfth through the fourteenth centuries; the economic activities of the
Cistercian monasteries in the same period; the Central European mining regions in the
Early Modern period; and the Industrial Revolution in the marginal regions of England,
principally Lancashire and the West Riding of Yorkshire. The two parts of the book are
related, if tenuously. Pollard’s overall thesis is that marginal regions, defined less in
relation to political, economic, and cultural centers than as geographic types, have historically been the “mainsprings of European progress” (p. 220). Societies on the margins contained an identifiable set of characteristics that made them more “self-reliant”
and “adaptable.” Relatively unhampered by restrictive regulations, they became the
sites of important technological, economic, and even cultural innovation that Pollard
unself-consciously links to “progress.”
This is a bold and ambitious set of claims, and Pollard has mobilized a vast scholarship (his bibliography runs to fifty-three tightly printed pages) supporting his argument.
In truth, he is careful to limit the scope of his inquiry: the Europe in question amounts
to that part north and east of the Alps, making up a region of “relative homogeneity”
distinct from, for example, the Mediterranean regions. Given the author’s insistence on
the geographic setting as a framework of economic innovation, the conspicuous absence
of maps in this volume is problematic and at times makes it difficult for nonspecialists
of the region.
What, then, is a marginal land? Pollard carefully chooses his margins: forests,
marshes (and fens), and uplands (mountains) were marginal regions in the period when
food production dominated the economy. While the author draws a number of distinctions among these different kinds of margins, and while he recognizes some of the
difficulties in lumping them together under a single rubric, he nonetheless insists that
these geographic settings are similar enough to be grouped together, although largely
by their noneconomic characteristics (their relative inaccessibility, political marginality,
and cultural isolation). More generally, Pollard argues that these structural similarities
give rise to a “distinct societal personality or character” (p. 264), which includes not
only the traits of adaptability and self-reliance but also the strength of family loyalties,
the presence of martial characteristics, and the likelihood of embracing “extreme or
Permission to reprint a book review printed in this section may be obtained only from the author.
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superstitious forms of religion.” The result is a lapse into a kind of geographic determinism that sometimes reproduces the perspectives of contemporaries that the author so
usefully describes in the first part of his study.
More puzzling still is the move—at times understated, at times quite bold—from
economic “progress” to a more general set of claims about modernity. Pollard shows
in great detail how the German colonization of Eastern Europe involved substantial
innovations—both technological and organizational—of a “progressive agriculture”
and claims that the colonists represented “islands of modernity in a sea of backwardness” (p. 155). In the case of the Cistercians, Pollard paints a portrait of monasteries
located on marginal lands that were bastions of innovation and “pioneering activities”
in the draining of marshes, clearing of forests, and building of canals, in addition to
innovation and experimentation in agricultural methods. The monks thus achieved
methods of estate management, he argues, that were centuries ahead of their time. Concerning mining and metallurgy in Central Europe, Pollard pushes his argument further,
claiming that the “Renaissance men” who ran the mines not only “took the lead” in
producing a broad range of key technologies and scientific knowledge (in geology, minerology, and medicine) but also were culturally and artistically “advanced.” Not only
did metallurgy and mining produce scientists, artists, and intellectuals of note, but the
miners themselves could be considered “men of freedom who had emancipated themselves from the surrounding feudal order” (p. 195) and who were open to the “modernizing” influences of the Reformation. As for the Industrial Revolution itself, Pollard
rehearses the widely accepted consensus of the regionally specific location of early
industry in the more marginal northern counties, which enjoyed a tradition of low tax
assessments, a greater measure of freedom and independence, and important geographic assets (water supply, cheap land, a skilled labor force)—all features that made
the marginal lands “a key location in what turned out to be the decisive breakthrough
into modernity” (p. 233).
This unfortunate tendency to collapse economic innovation within a broader notion
of “modernity” and “progress” in the end limits the bolder claims of this book. Readers
attracted by the title of this book and anticipating an innovative contribution to the
growing literature on marginal peoples and regions will be disappointed. Interesting,
learned, and scholarly, the book’s approach is firmly grounded in a traditional master
narrative of European progress.
Peter Sahlins
University of California, Berkeley
The Artisan and the European Town, 1500–1900. Edited by Geoffrey Crossick.
Historical Urban Studies. Edited by Richard Rodger and Jean-Luc Pinol.
Hants, England: Scolar Press, 1997. Pp. xiii⫹263. $76.95.
Radical Artisans in England and France, 1830–1870. By Iorwerth Prothero.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xvi⫹424. $74.95.
Fresh winds sweep the field of European labor history. In the 1960s labor history was
driven by social history. By the end of the 1970s, culturalism and postmodernism
seemed irresistible. Now, although both social and cultural concerns remain important,
a reconfigured political history is emerging on the scene. Geoffrey Crossick’s collection
on artisans in the European town surveys current approaches to artisanal history, while
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Iorwerth Prothero’s study of Anglo-French radicalism synthesizes these approaches and
points in new directions.
An accomplished labor historian and veteran editor, Crossick excels himself here,
selecting focused case studies of urban artisan life that employ new sources in innova¨
tive ways. Ranging from Reval (Tallinn) and Malmo in the Baltic to Nantes and Bordeaux in the Bay of Biscay, Crossick includes case studies of London, Groningen, Paris,
and Vienna. Contributors have been encouraged to explore the wider consequences of
local findings. The motif here (and telltale sign of a Crossick collection) is the crisp
summary of prodigious quantities of research.
Crossick’s thoughtful introduction identifies important characteristics of artisanal
life. In contrast with so many industrial occupations that were part-time or temporary,
artisanal status was a lifetime project that involved the whole household, created a powerful social and political identity, and emphasized the masculine character of craftsmanship. Crossick reminds us that towns with a population around fifteen thousand, described by the German historian Mack Walker as “hometowns,” were hothouses for the
cultivation of artisanal identity, while large and growing cities invariably challenged
artisanal monopolies. Christopher R. Friedrich’s discussion of Reval and other Germandominated craft towns stresses that, while artisans seldom dominated urban political
life, they were rarely unimportant. Josette Pontet’s study of Bordeaux on the eve of
and during the Revolution reveals that proletarianization had already created internal
divisions that led many journeymen to welcome the dissolution of the guilds in 1791.
Most of the essays in this collection are in social history or combine social and cultural approaches. Josef Ehmer explores the migratory patterns of Viennese craftsmen
and the craft networks that linked journeymen throughout Austria and the German
states. The transformation of artisanal to industrial work, or the lack of it, still excites
´
interest. A broad survey of Hungarian guildsmen by Vera Bacskai indicates that they
were less displaced by industrialization than subordinated to it, and, in Groningen, according to Pim Kooij, young people abandoned artisanal work for better-paying industrial labor. Florence Bourillon shows that, despite industrialization and Haussmanniza´
tion, the artisanal character of the Arts et Metiers quarter did not change. Integration
into the wider Parisian market allowed artisans to redeploy their efforts along more
profitable lines.
The relationship between symbolic orderings and social categories is analyzed in
¨
interesting ways. Lars Edgren is discomfited by his findings that Malmo funeral processions reflected the social and economic order but presents speculative alternatives for
such unfashionable conclusions. Providing a valuable contest for the traditionalist urban
protests of the 1780s and 1790s, Michael Berlin demonstrates that, as late as the 1730s,
London weavers’ companies still searched the city for evidence of shoddy work done
outside the company. Elizabeth Musgrave stresses the important point that, while economic growth increased women’s role within Nantes guilds, they still were excluded
from collective rituals that continued to celebrate male comraderie. And Natacha Coquery’s wonderful study of relationships between wealthy aristocrats and their Parisian
artisans suggests the importance of the aristocratic market as well as the tensions that
ensued between lavishly spending nobles and the often hard-pressed masters to whom
they were indebted; even the richest aristocrats pursued a lifestyle that left them in debt
and brought them into conflict with artisans committed to punctual payment and respect
for commercial obligations. James Farr provides a full-blown culturalist interpretation
of the early modern period that is extremely challenging although necessarily less
grounded in concrete cases than the other essays in this collection. Farr explicitly bases
his interpretation on assumptions that “cultures are meaningful orders of persons and
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things” and that “culture subsumes all human activities” (p. 69). Those skeptical of his
assumptions will find this essay less interesting.
All the strands in Crossick’s collection combine in Iorwerth Prothero’s monumental
study of Anglo-French (plus Welsh) labor history, but Prothero uses his comparative
study to suggest an important reframing of perennial questions. Prothero builds on his
well-known and much-admired study of English artisans between 1800 and 1830 (Artisans and Politics in Early Nineteenth-Century London [Folkestone, 1979]) but now
follows the story to 1870, comparing English and Welsh with French artisans between
1830 and 1870. Prothero’s book is remarkable in integrating a command of the secondary literature of labor history with extensive archival work in both countries. The structure of Prothero’s comparison differs from most comparative national labor history, and
indeed it resembles the essays in the Crossick collection in its attention to detail and
context. Disdaining comparative studies that arrive at “a list of variables explaining the
differences between their labor politics,” Prothero prefers to consider “the wider range
of experiences and forms of reference that have to be taken on board, and the way
developments and interpretations in one case suggest ways of approaching and reinterpreting events and organizations in another” (p. 2).
Differing with those who see artisan radicalism as a direct product of artisanal work
experience, work restructuring, or economic exploitation, Prothero also disagrees with
those who see it as an entirely intellectual affair best cataloged in newspapers and periodicals. Instead, he focuses on the “interrelation between aspects of social, political and
economic life, on identities that transcended the workplace and existed as much in the
community, club, and pub, and were reinforced by political notions articulated by the
radical press and popular cultural forms.” Breaking with those who portray culture as
“shared values” and radicalism as “values, language, symbolism and forms of communication,” Prothero emphasizes the cultural and ideological diversity within radicalism
and stresses that groups and movements responded to particular “readings of the situation” (pp. 4–5).
The major targets of Prothero’s study are those who conceive of French and English
radicalism as distinctive ideologies or symbolic systems shared by the greater part of
artisans in each country and differing dramatically one from the other. Instead, Prothero’s strategy is to seize on one or another aspect of artisanal social life and to show
that artisanal political conceptions varied considerably within both countries and did so
along roughly similar lines. The difference between English and French radicalism was
not so much due to the presence of distinctive national political cultures as to “different
circumstances” and “political situation[s]” that made some alternatives plainly more
viable in one country rather than the other (pp. 315, 335). Prothero is less intimidated
by the French revolutionary tradition than many British historians, recalling that, while
French artisans did indeed make revolutions, professed revolutionaries had very little
to do with their outbreak.
Prothero’s deep archival grounding allows him to go beyond stereotypes about English trade unionism and French socialism and to propose intriguing new hypotheses.
He minimizes the traditional distinction between the flourishing of English trade unionism during the decades when French unions were illegal. Instead, he points out that
many workplace conflicts in both countries originated and terminated within informal
organizations, while wider movements were often produced by temporary organizations
that endured no longer than the conflict itself. Meanwhile, most English trades societies
concerned themselves exclusively with extraworkplace functions. He also makes a convincing case that, while the term “socialist” was more widespread in France, its most
common use was to describe a species of “ultraradicalism” thriving vigorously in both
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countries. Both French and English artisans were extremely suspicious of state intervention, and the idea of a statist socialism made its greatest inroads after 1870.
Radicalism emerges in Prothero’s study as an extremely capacious political doctrine
that, while formerly renouncing the concept of class antagonism, was perfectly capable
of making class appeals to workers. Against those who would equate class with class
language Prothero reiterates the important point that political language is never a soliloquy in which actors bare their inmost souls but a dialogic and strategic medium for
gathering allies and identifying opponents. Prothero’s chapters on religious radicalism
and culture will interest and surprise both French and English labor historians and are
among the individual highpoints of the book.
Prothero’s charting of the differences of artisanal radicalism in England and France
has led him to stress the existence of fairly similar currents of thought and political
divisions within both national groups. In order to understand why one current of
thought or political approach succeeded in one country and not in the other, it is necessary to look more clearly at the political environment. Among the forces that need analysis are “the importance of political circumstances, the extent of toleration or repression, the balance of political forces, the nature of elite politics, the strength and
confidence of a movement, the ways in which people read the situation and responded
to it, the possibilities and strategies they canvassed” (p. 315).
Here is a new agenda for labor history worth pursuing. To carry it out, we will need
a different set of tools than the ones constructed so carefully and skillfully by preceding
generations of labor historians.
Michael Hanagan
New School for Social Research
Institutions of Confinement: Hospitals, Asylums, and Prisons in Western Europe
¨
and North America, 1500–1950. Edited by Norbert Finzsch and Robert Jutte.
Publications of the German Historical Institute. Edited by Detlef Junker with the
assistance of Daniel S. Mattern.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. ix⫹369. $59.95.
The focus of this volume is the history of confinement in two specific institutions in
early modern and modern Europe and the United States, the hospital and the prison.
What distinguishes this book from others like it is its methodological balance. The
essays, which were presented in earlier versions at a conference in 1992, display a wide
variety of methodological approaches to medical and prison history: from the theoretical to the descriptive, from national histories to comparative history, from intellectual
to social history. Although few topics in the last decade have received more scholarly
attention, stimulated by the social control theory of Michel Foucault, several of the
essays are still illuminating and thought provoking. Some even contain rare moments
of comic relief. Guenter Risse describes the rather chaotic spectacle of hospital rounds
in revolutionary France during which gaggles of boisterous students trampled instructors and even climbed onto the beds of patients, breaking a few bed frames along the
way, in an effort to glimpse clinical demonstrations.
What unifies the essays in this volume is the brooding omnipresence of Foucault,
especially his idea in Discipline and Punish (French ed., Paris, 1975; English ed., New
York, 1977) of the “carceral continuum” in which the boundaries of disciplinary institutions from the prison and the hospital to the school and the factory are dissolved by a
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common normalizing reaction to deviant behavior. But, almost without exception, these
essays do not slavishly accept the Foucauldian correlation of the invention of the modern hospital and the prison with the emergence of discursive practices of disciplining.
Foucault’s thesis may not be entirely dislodged, but it is clearly decentered. The contributors to this volume restore the place of politics, culture, and historical contingency to
the history of confinement. In the process, social control shifts from being the central
and predominant force in the development of the prison, hospital, and, by implication,
other carceral institutions to being one force among many in their complex and dynamic histories.
The introduction to the book contains a useful survey by Norbert Finzsch of the
impact of Foucault’s, Norbert Elias’s, and Gerhard Oestreich’s theories of social discipline on the history of total institutions as well as a partisan overview of the history of
the prison since 1600 by Pieter Spierenburg in the spirit of Elias’s notion of the “civilizing process,” whereby a civilizing tendency in the process of modern Western state
formation imposed external and especially internal controls over conduct and sentiments, including expressions of violence (see Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process
[Swiss ed., Basel, 1939; English ed., Oxford and Cambridge, Mass., 1994]). The first
part of the book describes the development of hospitals. Most of the chapters in this
section contest Foucault’s notion of the abrupt and ensuing seamless “medicalization”
of the hospital since the Enlightenment. For example, in a finely grained essay, Colin
Jones argues that, although the care of hospital patients became increasingly medicalized by the end of the eighteenth century, nursing sisters had already provided extensive medical services in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, often displacing
physicians. Moreover, the modern hospital was not merely defined by the progressive
inclusion of medical to the inverse exclusion of nonmedical cases; several types of
unseemly medical cases—for example, those of a sexual character like syphilis and
even childbirth—were excluded from hospital populations on the insistence of charitable nursing sisters and other parties within the hospital establishment. Indeed, an
unmediated clinical relationship between doctor and patient was limited through the
nineteenth century by the intervention of hospital administrators and nurses. Other contributors demonstrate the rich and variegated expansion of clinical and anatomical
knowledge in the United States and several European countries both before and after
the turn of the eighteenth century, such knowledge being shaped, in Risse’s words, “by
distinct political ideologies, professional needs, and cultural environments” (p. 96). To
¨
borrow from Robert Jutte in his examination of hospitals for syphilitics in early modern
Germany, the consensus of the contributors to this section seems to be that medical
reforms “neither destroyed nor revolutionized the old institution” of the hospital, which
developed more or less steadily and contingently into and beyond the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries (p. 115). Even care in the modern mental asylum, argues Christina
Vanja, displayed neither drastic changes in the care of the insane nor a coherent disciplinary agenda and was subject to only a handful of modest reforms designed primarily
to enhance the professional authority of doctors.
With notable exceptions, most of the contributors to the second part of the book
dealing with the prison agree with Foucault’s periodization of the “birth of the prison”
in its emergence from a catch basin of social deviants to a penal institution in the transi´
tion from the ancien regime to capitalist liberalism. (Spierenburg dates the origins of
the prison to 1600.) But, like the contributions on the hospital, the essays on the prison
contest the primacy of discursive penal practices in the further development of the
prison in the nineteenth century. To be sure, the organization of the prison into a panopticon to facilitate and perfect the surveillance and control of inmates was actually imple-
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mented in several sites. As Luigi Cajani shows, the Casa di Correzione in Rome, opened
in 1703, with its cellular structure designed for the rehabilitation of minors, anticipated
Bentham’s panopticon by about a century. But the introduction of the “gentle punishment” of those deemed corrigible made possible by this new epistemic model in penology suffered many setbacks in the nineteenth century. As Finzsch shows in his comparative analysis of American and German prisons in the nineteenth century, corporal
punishment was reinstated in American prisons in the mid-1850s after it had been legally abolished two decades earlier. This reintroduction of arbitrary punishment signified the abandonment of the “science of punishment” and in turn the entrenchment of
class, gender, and predominantly racial biases. Sebastian Scheerer demonstrates that
solitary confinement, the mantelpiece of this new economy of punishment because of
its character-building function, was abandoned in Germany almost as soon as it was
adopted in favor of the “progressive” system that emphasized the prisoner’s resocialization through a gradated process of mutual interaction and sociability within prison walls
and various noncustodial alternatives to prison like parole and probation. But, as Patricia O’Brien argues in a compelling essay on international trends in nineteenth-century
prison reform that aims to reconcile Foucault’s and Elias’s positions, the creation of
nonconfining sanctions after 1890 was an “indication of faith in the state’s ability to
extend discipline and surveillance beyond the prison and into the community” (p. 296).
Such optimism provided the impetus behind juvenile justice systems like the German
one examined in this volume by Karl Tilman Winkler.
Although this volume takes Foucault to task, one of its results is to provide armature
to Foucault’s notion of the carceral continuum. But whereas Foucault himself dated the
completion of this process in approximately 1840, the essay by Richard Wetzell on
criminal law reform in Imperial Germany argues persuasively that it was perfected in
the first part of the twentieth century when confinement in the prison and confinement
in the insane asylum became functionally equivalent from the perspective of social
hygiene. The fungibility of the two institutions, as Wetzell argues, “made possible the
transformation of the traditionally antagonistic relationship between law and psychiatry
into the symbiotic one that came to be the hallmark of criminal justice” (p. 283). This
process, as Robert Gellately points out, was consummated in Nazi Germany, where the
difference between extralegal and legal sanctions, often assuming medicalized forms
like sterilization, became practically meaningless.
For all of its merits, in the end this volume does not generate abundant excitement.
It may reassess the legacy of Foucault, but its contributions do not deviate much from
a traditional approach to the history of total institutions. Given the recent deluge of
critical examinations of the body in the aftermath of Foucault’s writings on sexuality,
the utter lack in any of these essays of an exploration of the bodily experience of either
patients or prisoners is a bit mystifying. The hospital patient is clearly a “body in pain,”
and even the most progressive prison, for better or for worse, exacts its fair share of
physical degradation. To be sure, suffering, as Elaine Scarry has shown in The Body in
Pain (New York, 1985), is an excruciatingly elusive historical subject, but in a volume
like this confronting it would have been worth the try. In the same vein, the contributions
in this volume barely pursue either hospital or prison history from Elias’s perspective
of the history of emotion—that is, the feelings and sentiments, or lack thereof, experienced by participants and onlookers to the development of these institutions.
Perhaps the strongest suit of this volume is its contribution to comparative history. It
makes sense here to transcend national paradigms because hospital and especially
prison reform were, as several of the chapters point out, international phenomena. Unfortunately, no attempt is undertaken to compare the development of the hospital and
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prison in the liberal states of the West to that in the custodial states of the East like
Russia whose political styles and cultural values differed substantially from their Western counterparts.1 Nevertheless, I would expect this very useful volume to generate such
research projects in the future.
Gabriel N. Finder
Susquehanna University
Esau’s Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews. By
Albert S. Lindemann.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xxi⫹568. $34.95.
Daniel Goldhagen’s book, Hitler’s Willing Executioners (New York, 1996), has reopened the issue of the centrality of antisemitism in the Holocaust. Albert Lindemann,
professor of history at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and author of The
Jew Accused: Three Antisemitic Affairs—Dreyfus, Beilis, Frank 1894–1915 (New York,
1991), is convinced that antisemitism was not as pervasive, even in pre-Hitlerian Germany, as has been commonly assumed. The increase in antisemitism after 1870 was
related both to the rising numbers of Jews and to their increased economic, cultural,
and political influence, rather than being the product of pure fantasy.
Although Esau’s Tears has a ninety-six page opening section on the background of
antisemitism before 1870 and a forty-eight page epilogue devoted to the fascist era, the
book’s centerpiece is the modern period between the 1870s and the 1920s. It was during
these years that Jews were emancipated from medieval restrictions in central and eastern Europe and entered the mainstream of their respective countries’ cultural affairs,
thereby producing a hostile reaction among many Gentiles. However, in Germany, even
at the height of their popularity in the 1880s, specifically antisemitic parties were able
to win scarcely 5 percent of the vote, and no antisemitic legislation had a chance of
passing the Reichstag.
The growing importance of the Jews in Austria-Hungary was probably the most sudden and impressive in the world. They were particularly instrumental in advancing the
ideals of secularism, but, unlike in countries such as France and the United States,
where they were “only a minor contingent, [Austro-Hungarian Jews] were unquestionably a major if not the dominant element, only weakly seconded by people of Christian
background” (p. 197). Consequently, the Austrian half of the Empire produced in Georg
¨
von Schonerer a rabble-rousing antisemite who was far more convincing a proto-Nazi
than Heinrich von Treitschke or Adolf Stoecker in Germany. Likewise, by exploiting
antisemitism, the Viennese mayor, Karl Lueger, legitimized hatred of the Jews.
In turning to the Jews of Britain, France, and Italy, Lindemann argues that their small
number played a significant role in reducing antisemitism as compared to the relatively
large number of Jews in the Russian Empire and Romania. In Italy they constituted
only one-tenth of 1 percent of the population and were highly integrated into the general
population. France’s Jewish population was considerably larger than Italy’s, but constituted only one-tenth that of Germany and one-fiftieth that of Austria-Hungary. A

1
For an exploratory incentive to such a comparison, see Laura Engelstein, “Combined Underdevelopment: Discipline and the Law in Imperial and Soviet Russia,” in Foucault and the Writing
of History, ed. Jan Goldstein (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass., 1994), pp. 220–36.

This content downloaded from 132.170.015.255 on November 05, 2019 07:03:14 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

668

Book Reviews

substantial rise in the number of Jews in France and Britain, and also in the United
States, increased antisemitism, but never to the level of eastern Europe. Lindemann
believes that “the Dreyfus Affair has been over dramatized, its long-range significance
exaggerated” (p. 234). Antisemitism did increase in both Britain and the United States
around the turn of the century. However, in Britain emancipation was more gradual and
hedged with qualifications than it was in Germany. In the United States, Jewish devotion
to commercial gain was much less likely to encounter hostility than in Europe with its
aristocratic and anticommercial snobbery.
In part 4, “A Decade of War and Revolution, 1914–1924,” Lindemann shows how
the world war and revolutions in Russia, Hungary, and Bavaria enormously increased
antisemitism, especially in regions where Jews were concentrated. Above all it was the
Bolshevik Revolution that dramatically increased the “perception that revolutionaries
were predominantly Jewish and that Jews were particularly vicious as revolutionaries”
(p. 424). Few of these revolutionaries adhered to traditional ritual and belief, but a great
many did have Jewish mothers. Such Jews were especially prevalent at the very top of
the Bolshevik Party and among the Cheka, the secret police. On the other hand, the
author is also careful to point out that “the overwhelming majority of Jews in Europe
were not revolutionaries in the sense of favoring violent upheaval and . . . even among
secular Jews in Russia only a minority actively identified with the Bolshevik Party
before the autumn of 1917” (p. 424).
Even though antisemitism in the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany is not the focus
of Esau’s Tears, Lindemann makes some interesting observations. He doubts whether
antisemitism was the “ultimate driving force of fascist movements, especially of Nazism” (p. 459). On the other hand, “the eventual mass murder of Jews could not have
been accomplished without the indifference and milder forms of contempt on the part
of the general population” (pp. 459–60).
In the debate between the “intentionalists” and the “functionalists” the author comes
down firmly on the side of the latter. He doubts if Hitler could have been “clear and
precise in regard to the Jews, when in every other aspect of his political activity he was
inclined to vagueness and opportunism” (p. 518). Nevertheless, Hitler was ultimately
responsible for the Holocaust because his antisemitism was well known and his prestige
and authority were enormous.
Esau’s Tears is based almost entirely on secondary sources and contains little or no
information that will startle specialists. Rather, it is intended for the general educated
reader. Although Lindemann’s efforts to be totally objective may irritate some readers
who are committed to a particular interpretation of the Holocaust and the history of
antisemitism, he is by no means a revisionist. He merely wishes to demythologize the
Holocaust by pointing to actual developments that were of concern not only to antisemites but to many Jews as well.
I agree in general with his major point that large and rising numbers were a factor in
antisemitism. Nevertheless, Lindemann fails to note that antisemitism remained strong
in the Weimar Republic and especially in Austria while the Jewish population was declining. Moreover, the prejudice was often intense in places like the Tyrol, which had
only a minuscule Jewish population. He is correct in noting the increasing tolerance of
Jews on the eve of the First World War but perhaps underestimates the pervasiveness
of antisemitism in the immediate postwar years, especially in Austria, which he ignores altogether.
Scholars will regret the absence of a bibliography, although there are numerous footnotes and a serviceable subject and name index. The general reader is likely to miss
photographs of famous Jews and their antagonists as well as maps. Most open-minded
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readers, however, will find Esau’s Tears a well-balanced and very readable history of
antisemitism just prior to the Holocaust.
Bruce F. Pauley
University of Central Florida
Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison. Edited by Ian Kershaw and
Moshe Lewin.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xii⫹369. $54.95 (cloth); $18.95
(paper).
In the twentieth century Stalinism and National Socialism have become synonymous
with human destructiveness. Posterity remembers them on account of their victims and
their crimes. With the opening of the archives in the former Soviet Union it was to be
expected that historians would attempt to compare prewar politics and society in Germany and the Soviet Union in the light of recent theories and discoveries. At the very
least, the perennial thesis regarding the uniqueness of National Socialist crimes might
finally gain credibility from such a comparison.
In September 1991, historians and sociologists from the United States and western
Europe met at a conference in Philadelphia to discuss the topic of Germany and the
Soviet Union in the twentieth century. Thirteen papers dealing explicitly with National
Socialism and Stalinism were later published as a collection under the rubric of dictatorships in comparison. The results are disappointing.
Studies of social history and everyday life under Stalinism that have appeared in the
interval between 1991 and 1996 were not reviewed by the authors. A number of the
interpretations are based on ideas that more recent research has corrected. I would point,
for example, to the latest investigations by Sheila Fitzpatrick and Lynne Viola of the
peasantry under Stalin.1 These studies have expanded considerably our knowledge of
everyday life in the Stalinist period. Moreover, monographs and collections of documents published by Russian historians have also sharpened our picture of Stalinism.2
The present volume, however, reports only what historians and sociologists in 1991 saw
as the essence of Stalinism and National Socialism.
A more serious difficulty is that the essays are all independent of one another. They
follow no particular order and pursue no common issue. The one thing they have in
common is that they have been printed together. Some of the essays have no recognizable connection to the theme proclaimed in the volume’s title. This is the case for Bernd
Bonwetsch’s chronology, also published elsewhere, of the Red Army during the Second
World War. It is true as well of Mark von Hagen’s summary report on Soviet/Russian
historiography of the Second World War and Stalin. J. Sapir’s discussion of the Soviet
war economy is certainly enlightening, but it has nothing comparative to contribute.
1
See Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after
Collectivization (Oxford and NewYork, 1994); Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (Oxford and New York, 1996). See also the essays in
William G. Rosenberg and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, eds., Social Dimensions of Soviet Industrialization
(Bloomington, Ind., 1993).
2
See, e.g., Oleg V. Khlevniuk, Politbjuro: Mekhanizmy politickeskoi vlasti v 1930-e gody (Moscow, 1996); Pis’ma I. V. Stalina V. M. Molotovu, 1925–1936 gg (Moscow, 1995); Stalinsckoc
politbjuro v 30-e gody, Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, 1995).
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George Steinmetz’s observations about “the German exception” offer reasonable criticisms of the theoretical model of modernization employed in the Sonderweg (unique
path) theories. Steinmetz believes it is impossible to identify “normal” or, in this sense,
“modern” conditions of social subsystems, though he finds that the concept of a unique
path is serviceable for describing the peculiar post–World War II development of political culture in Germany. One may very well agree with this assessment, but what relevance does it have to the comparison of dictatorships?
Unfortunately, the remaining essays also fail to give us the promised comparison of
the two dictatorships with one another. Mary Nolan summarizes recent research into
social history, everyday life, and gender history under National Socialism. In the intervening years, numerous monographs on the history of everyday life in the Stalinist
period, many in English, have appeared. It is a mystery why Nolan never mentions
them.
Omar Bartov offers a new perspective in his investigation of the army’s blitzkrieg
strategy. In his view, the blitzkrieg was a form of military strategy designed to accommodate both the technical inferiority and the (initially) limited objectives of the attacking army. Only under conditions that allowed for successful implementation of the
blitzkrieg strategy was the military survival of the Third Reich conceivable. Bartov sees
a causal connection between the blitzkrieg strategy and the planned extermination of
European Jewry. When the blitzkrieg strategy was blunted in 1942, the technical superiority of the Allies and the greater capacity of their wartime economies became apparent.
Ronald Grigor Suny’s essay on Stalin’s role in Stalinism recounts the dictator’s rise
to power. The dictator’s despotic power came to exceed all limits during the years of
the Great Terror. He eliminated his only remaining rivals and all possible bases of resistance among the party elite. Stalinist rule and terror are related. Such conclusions are
hardly contestable, but one would gladly learn more about the dictator’s actual exercise
of power, which Suny claims to illuminate.
M. Lewin sees in Stalinism a despotism directed against the increasing autonomy of
modern bureaucracy. In Lewin’s view, Stalin instigated the terror campaigns of the
1930s to prevent the bureaucracy from becoming more entrenched and to avert its impending limitation of his personal dictatorship. Lewin sees bureaucracy as a social formation. The quantitative growth in the sheer numbers of Soviet officials is thus supposed to serve as proof of the bureaucratization of party and government administration.
I find this line of argument unconvincing. Bureaucracy, in the Weberian sense, is characterized by its functionality, by the rationality of its procedures, and not by the sheer
numbers of its personnel. The bureaucracy stands in the service of impersonal goals. It
makes its decisions according to formalized principles without regard to personal influence. It is this that distinguishes it from a mere apparatus. In the early years of the
Soviet Union such a bureaucracy did not exist. Power rested on the effectiveness of
personal networks and on quasi-feudal bodies of followers. A government of personal
alliances would be an appropriate description for this state of affairs. The destructive
potential of Stalinist terror rested on the weakness of bureaucratic procedures. That is
not to say, however, that despotism and hierarchy are mutually exclusive, as Lewin
maintains. Such a misconception is only possible when hierarchy is confused with
bureaucracy.
It is only in the essays by Hans Mommsen, Ian Kershaw, and M. Mann that the issue
of a comparison between the dictatorships is addressed at all. But even here the results
are thoroughly inadequate.
Mommsen reiterates his familiar theses regarding the cumulative radicalization of
the National Socialist regime. In Mommsen’s view, a lack of coordination and a failure
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to institutionalize the processes for making political decisions resulted in a situation in
¨
which different functional elites, each competing for the Fuhrer’s favor, adopted ever
more radical positions. Their leaders hoped, in this manner, to measure up to Hitler’s
social-Darwinist conceptions and to survive in the struggle for influence. In the course
of this process, the National Socialist elites ultimately discarded all scruples. Accordingly, Mommsen ascribes to the regime a tendency toward self-destruction. For Mommsen, it was this destructiveness and lack of perspective that distinguished the National
Socialist regime from Soviet Stalinism. Several objections may be raised against this
thesis. In the first place, the National Socialist regime collapsed because it was defeated
militarily. The Soviet Union, in contrast, fought on the side of the victors. The military
outcome of the war tells us nothing about the quality of their respective political orders.
The question as to whether or not National Socialism could have survived without Hitler is beyond the competence of the historian. In the second place, the plausibility of
Mommsen’s arguments is undermined by the economically senseless collectivization of
agriculture, by the exile and execution of tens of thousands of peasants, by the deportation of entire nationalities, by the arbitrary mass executions during the period of the
Terror, and by the always fatal conflicts, orchestrated and promoted by Stalin, between
Bolshevik officials that made a mockery of regulated procedures. Under wartime conditions, the Soviet regime, but not National Socialist Germany, summoned up a capacity
for regeneration. This fact does, by the way, remain insufficiently understood.
¨
In his article “Working toward the Fuhrer,” Kershaw follows the basic outlines of
Mommsen’s argument. For him, Stalinism and National Socialism are fundamentally
different kinds of domination. But Kershaw grounds this idea solely in a comparison
between Hitler and Stalin. Unlike Hitler, Kershaw sees in Stalin an adherent of the
apparatus, an interventionist-minded dictator who monopolized nearly all political
decision-making channels. Hitler’s power was rooted not within but, rather, outside the
traditional institutions. Anarchy and absence of system were the corollaries of Hitler’s
charismatic authority. The communist system, in contrast, could have survived without
Stalin. But by insisting on what doubtless were immense differences between the National Socialist and the Stalinist dictatorships Kershaw puts forward a distorted picture
of political rule in the Soviet Union. The idea that Stalin continually monopolized the
processes of political decision making belongs to the realm of myth. One ought not
mistake the wish for the fact. One must also take issue with the notion that personal
connections had more to do with political influence than was the case in the Soviet
Union. Stalin’s brand of rule had nothing at all to do with the rational ordering of priorities, as Kershaw insists. His assertion that there was no cumulative radicalization of
domestic politics in the Soviet Union seems to me to be simply conjured out of thin air.
Further, in Germany some ideological spaces continued to exist relatively untouched
by the destructive grasp of National Socialist domination. At one time or another this
could be said of parts of the judicial system, of the church, and of the universities. In the
Soviet Union of the 1930s, however, such islands of retreat no longer existed. Stalinist
domination was “total” in the sense that every walk of life stood exposed to the potential
threat of force.
Mann’s essay is the only one to point out the structural similarities between Stalinism
and National Socialism. He examines both regimes with respect to the theme of continuing revolution. Both differed from authoritarian dictatorships in their tendency toward
self-destruction. In Mann’s view, conflicts between the revolutionary ideology and practical, institutional needs were almost always decided by the political leaders in favor of
ideology, and in this way the growth of a true bureaucracy was forestalled. Though this
may very well be what the National Socialist and Stalinist regimes claimed, the question
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as to how far it reflects their actual practice must remain open. Research into this question would be worthwhile.
This collection of essays is silent when it comes to the main issues involved in a
potential comparison. There is no mention of the period of the Great Terror in the Soviet
Union, of the extermination of the Jews, or of National Socialist rule in the occupied
territories. In this regard, one might have attempted to compare the various techniques
of terror and extermination. Deportations, ethnic cleansing, the collective branding of
victims, the use of concentration camps, the significance of personal networks for the
functionality of the regimes, the denunciations, the commonplace acts of complicity—
all these are features that serve rather to indicate the likeness of the regimes.
Beyond the similarities, however, are the many clear differences between National
Socialism and Stalinism. National Socialism enjoyed widespread support among the
German population. The Soviet system was able to maintain itself against the will of
its subjects. Unlike the Germans under National Socialism, the inhabitants of the Soviet
Union had to endure shortages of food and other commodities. Stalinism maintained
its grip on power in the face of a sinking standard of living. The National Socialist state
permitted the existence of realms of “normality.” While it restricted the jurisdiction of
the court system, it did not attempt to abolish the independence of the legal administration. The churches, too, were able to maintain a certain degree of autonomy. Under
Stalinism, there were no institutions that escaped the ideological transformation of
everyday life. Further, Stalinist rule sought to “civilize” and to “modernize” the population of an ethnically diverse empire. Opposition from the victims of this Bolshevik
brand of cultural imperialism may serve to explain some of the violence employed by
the communists. Such a perspective is scarcely relevant to the situation in National
Socialist Germany.
A satisfactory comparison even of some partial aspects of the regimes has not yet
been published. It would certainly be worthwhile for someone to undertake the task.
¨
Tubingen

¨
Jorg Baberowski

Birth, Marriage, and Death: Ritual, Religion, and the Life-Cycle in Tudor and
Stuart England. By David Cressy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. xv⫹641.
This is a study of “customary social performance” in England from the time of the
Reformation to the reign of Queen Anne. Concentrating on rituals prescribed by the
Book of Common Prayer and shared by all classes in England, it describes practices
surrounding birth, marriage, and death as they were lived. Employing a kind of thick
description, the book is like an impressionist painting that presents the reader with a
picture made up of hundreds of colorful dots.
David Cressy has been interested in ritual and social performance for a long time. A
prolific author, his Bonfires and Bells (London, 1989) explored the evolution of public
political celebrations in the early modern period, making this new book on private rituals performed in the public sphere a continuation of his earlier interests.
The plan of this book is straightforward. Sections on each of the three major topics
succeed one another, each one following a natural pattern. Birth precedes baptism and
churching; courtship precedes marriage; and death precedes internment. Each section
has a short introduction discussing the changes that occurred over the period, followed
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by thick description of the ritual performances. These are carefully built from layers of
evidence that range from the records of church courts through letters and diaries to
belles lettres.
The section on childbirth and baptism is the most original, bringing together materials from women’s history with sacramental practices and popular beliefs. For instance,
in discussing “Baptism as Sacrament and Drama,” Cressy uses the question of what
happens to the souls of unbaptized babies to vivify both the importance of the sacrament and the confusion of the post-Reformation world. In Catholic doctrine unbaptized
infants had been consigned to limbo. But Protestant theology had abolished limbo along
with purgatory, leaving no clear, comforting answer to grieving relatives’ questions
about the fate of the innocent babe’s soul. Catholic belief in the need for the grace of
baptism to ensure the innocent’s arrival in heaven had led midwives to baptize newborns. The Protestant prayer books provided for baptism by midwives in emergencies,
but many Protestant clergy campaigned against the practice as superstitious. Souls, by
their reckoning, were either baptized and in heaven or not. Some clerics refused to bury
unbaptized children in their churchyards, while others preached that “haste in baptism,
and baptism by midwives, show a belief in popish doctrine” (p. 115). The resulting
tension called for casuistical hairsplitting, with some ministers assuring their parishioners that the faith of the parents assured the salvation of the child and others asserting
that baptism was a sign of an inward grace, not an absolute necessity. The practical
need for theological reassurance is neatly demonstrated by Cressy through diary entries,
polemics, and statistics. Matching the pain of the Reverend Isaac Archer, whose son
died unbaptized, with E. A. Wrigley’s assertion that 8 or 9 percent of babies died within
a month of birth, gives us a powerful image of the importance of baptism to people
whose babies too frequently died.
After birth comes marriage, the required prologue for future births. Cressy begins
with courtship and a series of practical questions that arise from our own assumptions
about courtship and marriage. He tells many merry tales about wooing and wiving,
based mostly on diaries and autobiographies. Unfortunately, his dependence on this sort
of evidence undermines his attempt to stretch from the Reformation to Queen Anne.
Most of his evidence is from the seventeenth century, and much of it is from the latter
part of the century. Admittedly, sixteenth-century evidence about courtship is much
scarcer and less quotable, but the reader is left with the impression that 1650 is much
the same as 1550.
One advantage of examining rituals marking the beginning and ending of life is that
many of the same religious issues are seen in different contexts. Just as the demise of
unbaptized infants demanded answers to the question about the afterlife, so, too, did
death. Burial customs enshrined theology, and early Protestants had to fight the persistent preferences for ingrained proprieties as they fought to reform religion. It was an
uphill battle, and moderate ministers found themselves caught between strong traditions
and radical reformers. All of this makes death a very fecund subject for revealing the
impact of reformation ideas and changing social custom. As Cressy shows, in death, as
in baptism and marriage, change came slowly and unpredictably as ancient local custom
and personal preferences negotiated with new theology.
Preferring to let the evidence speak for itself, Cressy does not spend much time
debating with authors who have previously explored these subjects, though he clearly
believes that the materials he has gathered refute a number of arguments about the
nature of the early modern family. Very little social theory is visible in the book, but
anyone who wants to apply social theory to early modern England will have to reckon
with the realities portrayed here. The rise of individualism, the birth of the affective
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family, the early modern gender crisis, and other convenient stereotypes dissolve in the
face of the real people Cressy has brought out of the archives.
Cressy is reluctant to engage in generalizations because the patterns that emerged
from his research do not lend themselves to simplification. Community to community,
parish to parish, minister to minister, bishop to bishop, monarch to monarch, each circumstance differed. In the end he can only conclude that, despite all the official attempts to create uniformity, a great range of variation was tolerated by the Elizabethan
and early Jacobean regimes. Although changes in theology, liturgy, and ecclesiology
clearly affected the lives of ordinary folk, they found expression in people’s lives in
local contexts. There, the leaders of the realm seemed, until the reign of Charles I,
to accommodate variations in social ritual so long as they did not encourage popish
superstition. Importantly, he suggests that the Laudians’ ceremonial precision and disciplinary inflexibility destroyed a long tradition of negotiation and accommodation about
the rituals that were at the core of people’s religious experience. The wounds this caused
festered toward civil war. After that war, when Anglican ceremonies were reinstituted,
the rituals of customary social performance were privatized, increasingly separated by
class in a new world in which the common formulas of public prayer were less and less
shared experiences.
This is an important book that all English social historians will need to digest. Luckily, given its length, it is digestible. It is packed with fascinating anecdotes, and it is
well written. Ironically, those anecdotes are at once the joy and the bane of the reader.
The ratio between argument and anecdotes is very high, so one has to stand very far
back to see the picture that is emerging from the text. I sympathize with Cressy’s reluctance to theorize, but I often longed for him to gloss his evidence a bit more. By the
same token, the anecdotes are often achronic. To make a point, Cressy sometimes relates pieces of evidence that are separated in time by a century or more. Although the
´
longue duree is an honored concept, the amount of religious and social change between
the mid-sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries sometimes made me question whether
some of the evidence was really apposite. Nonetheless, the results are fascinating and
tantalizing.
Birth, Marriage, and Death is a book to be read for pleasure and mined for evidence.
Anyone working on early modern social history will have to read it and ask him- or
herself whether Cressy’s positivism has defeated the theorists. In Cressy’s world, sweeping generalizations are less important than real life as he understands it.
Norman Jones
Utah State University
Popular Culture in England, c. 1500–1850. Edited by Tim Harris.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. Pp. xi⫹293.
Like the cultural phenomena it explores, this book can be appropriated in different ways
by different kinds of readers. The individual essays provide engaging introductions to
popular religion, medicine, gender roles, mistress-servant relations, literacy, customary
traditions of the workplace, and even regional variations in football. Taken collectively,
the essays encourage us to think hard about what “popular culture” means and where it
can be found.
The volume presents itself as an occasion to see where the field has gone since the
publication, almost twenty years ago, of Peter Burke’s seminal Popular Culture in Early
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Modern Europe (New York, 1978). As Tim Harris explains, each essay in some way
problematizes Burke’s central argument, that the elite after 1500 distanced themselves
from the cultural traditions that they had previously shared with the lower classes; by
1800, they (in Burke’s words) “had abandoned popular culture to the lower classes,
from whom they were now separated, as never before, by profound differences in world
view” (p. 1). In this collection, by contrast, popular culture is presented as being neither
monolithic and coherent nor entirely separable from the culture of the elite.
Of course, Burke said much of that, too, which makes this volume more of a friendly
emendation than a paradigm-smashing critique. In fact, the basic trajectory of Burke’s
narrative, in which the culture of the elites and the people mingle at the beginning but
split apart at the end, remains basically unchallenged here. The three essays that deal
with the nineteenth century (Patti Seleski on mistress-servant relations, John Rule on
the customary traditions of the workplace, and Bob Bushaway on the survival of alternative religious belief) firmly place upper and lower classes in distinct, even antagonistic,
cultural worlds. Roy Porter’s essay on the circulation of medical knowledge in Georgian
England is the only piece in the volume that suggests a fundamentally different narrative line. In Porter’s account, the market promotes reciprocal exchange between professional and lay, modern and “traditional” practitioners, thereby dissolving cultural distinctions and hierarchies. The Burkeian paradigm might have been more fundamentally
shaken by exploring two phenomena particular to England: the emergence of a “middling sort,” and the attempt by Laudian and Cavalier segments of the elite to identify
themselves with the traditional, popular, and festive. These, while mentioned by Harris
in the introduction, do not merit discussion in any of the essays.
It is not entirely the fault of Harris and his contributors that the Burkeian narrative
emerges largely intact. It has always been something of a moving target. Burke himself
was hazy about chronology. He declined to define precisely the relationship between
the “reform” of popular culture or “triumph of Lent” (which he identified with the early
to mid-seventeenth century) and the “withdrawal” of elites from popular culture (which
he located any time between the publication of Castiglione’s Courtier and the end of
the eighteenth century).1 Readers were left to wonder whether the culture from which
elites withdrew was one that they had reformed, failed to reform, or were about to
reform. Significantly, the important works of English social history that Harris identifies
(pp. 2–3) as deriving from the Burkeian paradigm (Keith Wrightson and David Levine’s
Poverty and Piety in an English Village: Terling, 1525–1700 [London, 1979]; Anthony
Fletcher and John Stevenson’s Order and Disorder in Early Modern England [Cambridge, 1985]; Peter Borsay’s The English Urban Renaissance: Culture and Society in
the Provincial Town, 1660–1770 [Oxford, 1989]; and Robert W. Malcomson’s Popular
Recreations in English Society, 1700–1850 [Cambridge, 1973]) all argue that popular
and elite culture were polarized, but they locate the significant turning points differently, somewhere between 1680 and 1800. The withdrawal of elites from popular culture, much like the rise of the middle class and the relegation of women to the domestic
sphere, can apparently be found in any period where the historian searches for it.
A serious critique of the Burkeian paradigm would have to start with the proposition
that the very difficulty of falsifying it, and the very ease with which it has been adapted,
might indicate the existence of a problem. This book is not that serious critique. But
such a task is inappropriate to an essay collection, where the editor cannot exercise an
iron grip. The collection does succeed well in the task that is appropriate to it, that of
1
See especially P. Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe (New York, 1978), pp.
270–81.
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showcasing a range of approaches and perspectives. It allows the methodological issues
that Burke regarded as obstacles instead to be lovingly explored.
The strength of this collection, as Harris rightly notes, lies in its capacity to open up
debates. First, it raises the question of whether the proper object of the study of “popular culture” is a set of artifacts or a set of social relationships. For Burke, popular culture
consisted of the things (festivals, songs and stories, objects, rituals) that were left over
from culture as a whole once the things available only to elites (humanistic and scholastic learning, plus “some intellectual movements which are likely to have affected only
the educated minority—the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution . . . the Enlightenment”) were subtracted.2 The contributors to this volume differ on this point. While
David Underdown defends the proposition that the study of culture must begin with the
study of objective phenomena (like sports) that can be interpreted for the values they
express, Susan Amussen and Martin Ingram suggest that the same artifact may mean
different things to different people. Ingram locates a diversity of religious cultures
within a common conformity to the Church of England; indeed, “ordinary lay people,
while experiencing and understanding certain aspects of faith and practice differently
from their clerical mentors, might nonetheless remain within the framework of orthodoxy and regard themselves as stolid conformists” (p. 96). Amussen, too, stresses the
different experience of and appropriation by men and women of shared behavioral prescriptions.
The collection also usefully alerts readers to the diversity of grids that might be used
to map cultural divisions. Contributors experiment with distinctions between lay and
clerical (Ingram), theory and practice (Amussen), expert and amateur (Porter), all of
which might or might not map easily onto that between elite and popular. In the most
methodologically self-conscious piece in the volume, Jonathan Barry casts suspicion
on several types of polarities that have been used to distinguish popular from elite culture: literate vs. nonliterate, fast or private readers vs. slow and public readers, literature
vs. “popular literature.” The equation of the popular with the “traditional” is undermined by John Rule’s account of the invention of workplace traditions by workmen as
a means of controlling conditions of work. Many of the essays emphasize the importance of “vertical” rather than horizontal axes of division, pointing to divisions of gender, geography, and religion within a single class.
One might well emerge from this volume unsure about whether “popular culture”
constitutes a coherent subject of study or useful category of analysis. But thanks to Tim
Harris’s excellent introduction, which confronts the methodological difficulties headon, this is perhaps the volume’s greatest virtue.
Rachel Weil
Cornell University
Objectivity in the Making: Francis Bacon and the Politics of Inquiry. By
Julie Robin Solomon.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. Pp. xix⫹321.
Objectivity, Julie Robin Solomon argues, is obsolete. In both its accepted senses—the
suppression of individuality in the attainment of knowledge, and the capacity of an
2

Ibid., p. 24.
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external world to underpin such knowledge—the principle has lost its air of untrammeled cultural supremacy for good. Work in a range of academic fields, including literary theory, sociology, philosophy, history, and science studies, has made its shortcomings painfully manifest. As a result, we are the first generation since the early modern
period able to perceive the principle itself, not as a timeless characteristic of reason,
but as a product of history. Solomon’s book aims to exploit this opportunity. It seeks to
explain something that hitherto would have been regarded as an oxymoron: the invention of objectivity.
Solomon joins a small but select number of investigators who have recently identified
the origin and development of modern objectivity as a legitimate historical question.
Among them, Peter Dear has done profound work on the formation of such a concept
in the practical and epistemological debates of the seventeenth century, focusing in
particular on the Jesuits’ pursuit of problems related to the place of managed experience
in natural knowledge. Lorraine Daston is engaged in a project of broader scope, to
analyze the long-term development of different aspects of objectivity in western Europe
between Dear’s period and the present. Peter Galison has cooperated with Daston in
this enterprise, taking it into the difficult but essential realm of modern physics. And
Theodore Porter’s work on nineteenth- and twentieth-century mathematization has provided a convincingly thorough account of how protocols of objectivity extended into
all aspects of modern life. Solomon’s work joins these in arguing that we must see
objectivity as something made rather than found, and made in a particular historical
moment. But she wishes to stipulate that moment far more specifically. She thinks that
modern objectivity was the achievement of King James I’s Lord Chancellor, Francis
Bacon.
Solomon’s story begins with the intellectual circumstances that made such an
achievement possible. Those circumstances came into being with the eclipse of what
she calls “Aristotelian-Thomist Scholasticism”—a mode of philosophizing that had
held sway in the medieval universities only to be subjected to devastating attack in the
Renaissance. Scholasticism, she notes, entertained no notions of “subject” and “object”
recognizable to modern eyes. Broadly speaking, the schoolmen spoke of a subject as
the essence of a thing, and hence as something independent of the mind. An object was
an element in perception, namely the presentation of an Aristotelian “species” to the
understanding. These concepts, to us so unfamiliar, were accepted virtually everywhere
in Europe. The downfall of scholasticism eliminated them but resulted in no agreed
upon replacement. Rather, Renaissance philosophy was riven by a multitude of competing philosophies, all proclaiming their ability to unify knowledge, and none managing
to achieve that end. These programs embraced a wide range of views regarding the
relation between the person and the external world. But all, Solomon suggests, fell
within a continuum, the extremes of which were personified in two types of practitioner.
At one end stood the magician, whose principle of microcosm and macrocosm exemplified the supremacy of subject over object. At the other stood the traveler, whose practice
of impersonal reporting instantiated exactly the opposite. The question of where on this
continuum a philosopher should properly be placed was the most profound problem of
knowledge to face early modern thinkers.
When Bacon began to confront the realm of learning in the last years of Queen Elizabeth I’s reign, what he perceived was therefore both a danger and an opportunity. In the
first place, countless competing candidates for knowledge—Neoplatonists, neoscholastics, mathematical scientists, magnetic philosophers, stoics, and more—vaunted themselves as intellectual authorities, and did so on the basis of apparently irreconcilable
differences in their views on knowledge, its acquisition, and its legitimation. This vari-
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ety could scarcely fail to threaten the power of the state Bacon served. But in the second
place, that confusion coincided with an extraordinary fruitfulness in contemporary
commercial, mercantile, and technological enterprises. The latter provided an opportunity; the former forced him to take it. In combination, they spurred Bacon to promote
a program to reform natural philosophy into a national, royal enterprise.
Bacon responded creatively to this peculiar combination of circumstances. He did so
by manipulating four principal resources drawn from the world in which he found himself. First, Bacon noticed that the successful merchants of Jacobean England mundanely
followed procedures that subordinated the self in the interests of their enterprises. In
particular, their accounting procedures allowed them to extract general conclusions
from unsystematized particulars, in ways independent of the particular merchant involved. These practices could usefully be adopted by a royal philosopher, and Bacon’s
schemas for what he called induction owed much to them. Second, Bacon also noticed
that merchants and others, when they traveled abroad, were taught to adopt conventional
reporting techniques that suppressed the person of the reporter in order to provide useful
testimony about their surroundings. Such “self-distancing” strategies—common to
navigators, diplomats, and, for that matter, spies—could likewise be co-opted for his
royal practice, which would make them characteristic of the licensed investigator. Third,
Bacon made use of a substantial pedagogic literature devoted to the disciplining of the
passions and the proper management of individuals’ peculiarities. This literature provided him with archetypes for a program devoted to reducing to irrelevance the differences between investigatory personnel. As he famously argued, “the business must be
done as if by machinery.” True, Solomon’s House would have a mercantile division of
labor, but the traits of individual subjects would nonetheless be eliminated from the
constitution of royal knowledge. Bacon’s fourth manipulation was then rather different.
Whereas these had all been appropriations for royal authority, he now took something
from royalism. Bacon effectively reinscribed the authority of the king onto material
particulars, vesting them with the impersonal and absolute legitimacy capable of deciding matters of knowledge for the community of observers he had stipulated. The
supremacy of things would derive from the supremacy of kings.
Solomon’s account of these steps adopts the idiom of literary criticism. It displays
many of the characteristic traits of that idiom, good and bad. On the good side, it is
unusually subtle and attentive, based as it is in admirably close readings of Jacobean
texts. Historians interested in other moments of historical change can in this sense usefully learn from her approach. The pertinent point to emerge from these readings is that
the invention of objectivity should be characterized neither as a simple imposition nor
as an appropriation. Instead Solomon represents it as a dynamic process of dialogue
between court, commerce, and the natural world, in which each reconstituted the others.
The bulk of Objectivity in the Making is devoted to the exposition of this process, and
a complex and erudite exposition it is. Although not an easy read—newcomers to this
field should probably start with Daston, Porter, and Dear—Solomon’s book is in this
sense a model of sustained reflection on profound historical questions.
Having said that, however, historians may still find cause to gripe. The book’s evidential base is rather slight given the breadth of claims being advanced, there are occasional
lapses of concentration (the mistranslation of the Royal Society’s motto, nullius in
verba, as “not in words,” comes at a particularly consequential point), and Solomon has
a tendency to belabor simple issues in excessively theoretical terms. More generally,
historians may find themselves questioning the presentism implicit in Solomon’s project. After all, she herself is forced to admit that Bacon (and everyone else in Bacon’s
time) in fact knew of no such term as “objectivity.” The concept was articulated only
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in the nineteenth century. Solomon is reduced to arguing instead about something that
she variously calls “philosophic self-distancing,” “scientific disinterestedness,” “natural
philosophic disinterestedness,” or, most commonly, “objectivity avant la lettre.” This
raises a doubt with respect to her broader historical argument. That argument is relatively simple. In the Restoration, Solomon claims, the Royal Society of London realized
in practice a “norm” of objectivity, the “discursive emergence” of which had occurred
earlier at Bacon’s hand. The Society’s fellows used that norm to create a new enterprise
of experimental science, from whence it spread to become the foundation stone of modernity itself. This is scarcely an unfamiliar tale: in fact, it is the most hoarily traditional
of modernization theses. But it nevertheless creates something of a tension in Solomon’s
text. Baconian objectivity must be an articulated concept for this story to make sense,
yet throughout the book she has conceded that in Bacon’s day it was never articulated.
Talk of “objectivity avant la lettre” therefore resembles that which so exercised Bacon’s
own amanuensis about concepts like “incorporeal substance.” In such a compound,
Thomas Hobbes insisted, “the two names of which it is composed, put together and
made one, signify nothing at all” (Leviathan [Cambridge, 1991], p. 30). A rigorously
Hobbesian reader might conclude that, in its own terms, Solomon had written a complex, erudite, and profound book about nothing.
The only reason for that, however, is that Solomon has grafted her admirable account
of Bacon’s strategies onto the wrong grand question. This is a very impressive study,
but not of modern objectivity: it is, rather, a very impressive study of something else.
Instead of claiming to discern the origins of modern objectivity itself, she should have
claimed to be analyzing the making of an objectivity (or a form of self-distancing, or—
Bacon’s own term—a cautioning of the mind). This would involve embracing an even
more radically historical view of objectivity than Solomon’s own. That being granted,
however, the fundamentals of Solomon’s argument would remain both right and important. That objectivity is a product of specific historical developments—and that its analysis is appropriately undertaken through the exercise of the historian’s craft—is one of
the most important messages currently issuing from academia.
Adrian Johns
University of California, San Diego
Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign
Policy, 1650–1668. By Steven C. Pincus. Cambridge Studies in Early Modern
British History. Edited by Anthony Fletcher, John Guy, and John Morrill.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xii⫹506. $69.95.
This scholarly and stimulating work provides plenty of food for thought and will continue to be intensively discussed for many years to come. It offers a radically new perspective on the first two Anglo-Dutch Wars of 1652–54 and 1664–67 and, in particular,
of the calculations, negotiations, and psychological atmosphere preceding the outbreaks
of these two great maritime conflicts. Steven Pincus argues that previous historians
have, by concentrating almost entirely on analysis of the reasons for economic, maritime, and colonial rivalry between the two powers, missed the real reasons that these
naval wars took place.
The work is densely written, and a lot of evidence culled from both printed and
unpublished primary sources is produced. Pincus, moreover, is certainly right, particularly perhaps with respect to the first war, that there is, at least on the English side, an
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ideological context surrounding both the outbreak and conduct of the wars. Deeply
infused with theological concerns, the English frame of mind needs to be given much
more emphasis by scholars than it has received in the past. His thesis that the first
war resulted from an “unusual alliance between apocalyptic Protestants and classical
republicans who dominated English political culture both inside and outside of Parliament” in the years 1649–54 has something to it. He is right certainly that in 1652 there
was an “increasing English Hollandophobia” that was not entirely rational and that was
far from being entirely an economic phenomenon.
But, in my view, he pushes his argument too far and ceases to be persuasive when
he claims that economic and maritime factors played very little part in generating the
two wars. For however attentive one is to the ideological context, the fact remains that
there was a serious worsening in economic and maritime relations between the two
states before both wars and a rock-solid determination on both sides to fight for economic interest. Dutch policy was not at any stage governed by popular stereotypes or
by “Anglophobia.” Indeed, the merchants who tended to have the largest influence on
the thinking of the Holland regents were, undoubtedly, chiefly concerned with commerce, including maritime and colonial issues, and would have preferred almost anything to a maritime war with England that was bound to have an extremely disruptive
impact on Dutch trade and the Dutch economy as a whole. As far as the Dutch regents
and merchants were concerned, the English could think what they liked and indulge in
any apocalyptic dreams that pleased them, but what the States General could not accept
was a full-frontal attack on their trade or any attempt to attach, or subordinate, the
republic politically to England. There would certainly not have been a war on either
occasion were it not for the extremely aggressive and harsh English policies on trade,
maritime issues, and colonies (aggression that included the seizure of New Netherland
in 1664 and the temporary capture of most of the Dutch trading posts in Africa in 1663)
that preceded both wars. English policy had a heavily negative impact on Dutch shipping in particular and, indeed, on the entire Dutch economy in the years 1650–52 and
again in 1663–64, each time preceding the onset of war. That and nothing else was
what, in the final analysis, forced the Dutch into war.
With regard to the second war, Pincus argues that the “obvious heir to Spain’s universal pretensions in Anglican Royalist eyes were the United Provinces.” This is not in the
end a very convincing argument, in particular since the Dutch possessed no large territorial empire in the Americas or elsewhere, except in Asia, which could be seen as a
territorial rival to English overseas power. Moreover, it has to be recognized that the
Dutch Republic was generally the most pacific of the European great powers of the
time. Where Louis XIV sought la gloire and the English were determined to enforce
their superiority over others, the United Provinces would fight only if their territorial
integrity or their commerce were directly challenged. Unlike France, or earlier Spain,
the English did not threaten Dutch security at all. What they attacked, and from every
possible direction, was Dutch trade.
Jonathan Israel
University College London
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Charity, Self-Interest, and Welfare in the English Past. Edited by Martin Daunton.
The Neale Colloquium in British History. Edited by Martin Daunton.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Pp. x⫹262. $55.00.
Chronicling Poverty: The Voices and Strategies of the English Poor, 1640–1840.
Edited by Tim Hitchcock, Peter King, and Pamela Sharpe.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. Pp. xi⫹248. $69.95.
On the eve of the twenty-first century, welfare studies in Britain and elsewhere are in a
state of flux. Old, Whiggish perceptions of linear progression from the Poor Law to the
Welfare State have been severely damaged by the political debates of the 1980s and
1990s that have challenged traditional assumptions about the balance between public
and private provision of medical care and of support for the needy, both young and old.
As Martin Daunton says in Charity, Self-Interest, and Welfare in the English Past, there
is “a much greater sensitivity to the wide range of possibilities in coping with risks in
society” (p. 1). In very different ways, the two volumes under review reflect this new
spirit of questioning; both challenge old verities and suggest new avenues of approach.
The volume edited by Daunton is the product of a colloquium held in February 1995,
following the annual Sir John Neale Lecture in London delivered by Richard Smith
on the subject “Charity, Self-Interest, and Welfare: Reflections from Demographic and
Family History”; this is printed as chapter 2 after the editor’s introduction. Eight more
substantive contributions, mostly about England, make up the volume, although Brian
Pullan has provided an elegant discourse on charity and public relief in early modern
Italy; the book is rounded off by some pithy “concluding reflections” by Olive Anderson. Unfortunately, as she points out, very few comments from the floor have been
published, although “at this particular colloquium the standard of live discussion was
exceptionally high” (p. 249).
Richard Smith’s essay is a thoughtful review of the way historians at the Cambridge
Group for Population and Social Structure have shifted their opinions about family
forms and support systems. The nuclear family remains dominant in early modern England although recognition of the variability of family types has grown; awareness is
also increasing that kin provided more effective support than was believed by earlier
generations of welfare historians. Pat Thane takes a similar line, although she recognizes that evidence relating to family support—especially of a quantitative nature—is
extremely elusive; we know that it existed but showing when, where, and how much is
another matter. Apart from two essays—those by Lynn Botelho on the aged poor in two
Suffolk parishes and Keir Waddington on the financing of London hospitals in lateVictorian London—the Daunton volume deals with the broad sweep and, as Anderson
suggests, the essays “provide an instructive demonstration pack of the manifold ways of
working and writing about welfare history being practised in England today” (p. 251).
The second study, Chronicling Poverty, has an evangelizing air about it. The mission
of the editors and their contributors is “to illuminate the lives and strategies, circumstances and frustrations of the majority population, ‘the poor’, in the long eighteenth
century” (p. 1). This is to be “history from below,” and in particular we are to hear the
“voices” of the poor; they are to be allowed to speak for themselves both through their
own letters and the reports of poor law officials. In addition, there is to be an investigation of the material possessions of paupers. The approach is, necessarily, anecdotal and
mostly very small scale. However, measured against the avowed aim of letting us hear
the voices of the poor, seeing the conditions in which they lived and immersing ourselves in this “history from below,” the volume is not an unqualified success. Indeed, a
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number of the essays are essentially rather old-fashioned accounts of provision for the
poor and the circumstances in which they found themselves; these often provide valuable additions to the sum of our knowledge but are not innovative in the manner signaled by the editors. In only four of the nine essays do we hear from the poor themselves, chiefly through their correspondence with poor law officials. Two of the articles,
those by Pamela Sharpe and Thomas Sokoll, refer to Essex while that by Gregory Smith
details the careers of four letter writers in a Wiltshire parish: all of these pieces have
interesting stories to tell. Nevertheless it is the study by James Taylor that really catches
the eye and imagination. He analyzes a series of early nineteenth-century letters relating
to 257 individuals and families that were sent to Stephen Garnett, a “Guardian of the
Poor” in Kirkby Lonsdale, Westmorland. Taylor suggests that four distinctive voices
can be heard in the letters: the masked voice buried deep in formal, stylized petitions;
the “informal voice,” which told of life in a distant town and reminded Garnett that
there were needs to be met; the “insistent voice,” which pleaded a case of compelling
need; and, finally, the “desperate, even threatening voice,” which insisted on action or
suggested that the pauper might return to Kirkby Lonsdale to claim his or her rights in
the place of settlement (pp. 111–12). The essay gives a thought-provoking insight into
the world of the poor in northwestern England, and many readers may wish that more
of the contributions related to the rapidly changing regions away from the south of
England (three of the essays deal with London, three with Essex, and one each with
Middlesex and Wiltshire).
Of the remaining essays, that by Peter King is perhaps the most interesting and innovative. He discusses the inventories of paupers’ possessions that were compiled for a
variety of reasons—family abandonment, bastard paternity, or rent arrears. Sometimes
they reveal a relatively rich collection of artifacts, but others “described the sparse environment of an impoverished person living out the final stage of the lifecycle” (p. 166).
Interesting though they are, stocks of possessions, often accumulated over several lifetimes, do not necessarily tell us very much about an individual’s current standard of
living. Of course, those who were well endowed with material possessions could always
sell surplus items to produce some income, but the essential problem for many of the
poor was how to reestablish an adequate stream of income when it had been interrupted
by illness, injury, unemployment, desertion by a spouse, the onset of old age, or the
death of a partner; the sale of possessions could only be a short-term palliative. It was
essential in the longer term to acquire a reliable source of regular income.
Both volumes concentrate heavily on the formal systems of poor relief that had developed since medieval times and received a great boost in the sixteenth century, although
many economic and social historians have argued that poor relief was only one of the
ways—and sometimes very much the last resort—by which the poor managed to keep
body and soul together. A number of the essays in the volume edited by Daunton refer
to the work of voluntary agencies and self-help groups that supported the poor, but only
Thane tries to place poor relief fully in context. She argues that we tend to overstress
the importance of poor relief because it was a public institution and, although its records
survive only patchily, “their survival rate is immensely greater than that of charities,
employment information and, most elusive of all, evidence of support from family and
friends” (pp. 113–14). Additionally, before the twentieth century, many rural dwellers
gained by gathering fuel and wild foods from the commons and wastes and by gleaning
and producing some of their own food from gardens and allotments. As Botelho demonstrates clearly from a small number of cases in two Suffolk parishes, dependence on
poor relief in old age often came at the end of a long period during which handouts
from the parish were occasional and relatively small, additions that were necessary to
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supplement a somewhat meager income. The old gradually drifted into almost complete
dependence on poor relief. Or did they? Obviously, those who entered the workhouse
relied totally on public support, but it is highly unlikely that the great majority of those
who remained in their own homes, apparently dependent on outdoor relief, had only
the one source of income. Even Botelho’s pensioners may have had other small sources
of income or free assistance. In the late sixteenth century some of her Suffolk pensioners received an average of £1 5s. in relief a year, or less than 1d. a day; a century later
the average in the same parish was £2 7s. 9d., or about 1 1/2d. a day. In her other parish,
pensioners were getting no more than 1d. a day at the end of the seventeenth century.
We are remarkably ignorant about how much it cost the old to maintain themselves
in the community in early modern times, but it seems highly likely that these pensioners
could not have survived had they been forced to purchase all their needs on the market.
When we come to speculate about their strategies for survival we flounder around with
barely a shred of evidence. Were they in receipt of occasional charity from the church
or casual gifts of food and perhaps money from neighbors and kin? Did a kind neighbor
agree to till the garden, perhaps for a share of the produce? Did the vicar pass on his
old clothes and worn footwear? We shall never know, but it seems certain that small
crumbs of additional income found their way to the tables of the aged poor. For the rest
of the population it is evident that the public purse rarely provided complete support
for those outside the workhouse. Some measure of the need for other sources of income
would be gained if the total expenditure on poor relief in any year for a particular place
were divided by the total number of recipients; this would give us some idea of the gap
between the value of the poor relief and the cost of total support that had to be closed
by one means or another.
Both of the volumes under review bear witness to the enormous interest in welfare
in past times. Detailed investigations of the type featured in Chronicling Poverty will
continue to attract historians because the records are there, seductively inviting further
intimacy. But it is time to stand back and ask ourselves whether or not poor relief could
have played such a central role in supporting the poor as some historians have suggested. This broader probing is more apparent in the volume edited by Daunton, and
especially in his introduction and the thoughtful essays by Thane and Paul Johnson.
Indeed, in Daunton’s own words, historians will continue to grapple with the problem
“as politicians pursue their own labour of restructuring the welfare state” (p. 17). Both
parties are right to recognize that a simple answer is not to be found; indeed, it is highly
unlikely that a fully satisfactory conclusion will ever be reached.
Donald Woodward
University of Hull
The Solidarities of Strangers: The English Poor Laws and the People,
1700–1948. By Lynn Hollen Lees.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xii⫹373. $64.95.
In the past few years, British social historians have experienced an odd sensation of
´`
deja vu. Those quaint phrases we have grown accustomed to encountering in old documents, “less eligibility” and “poor law abolitionism,” have suddenly reappeared on our
television screens in a new translation as “workfare” and “the end to welfare as we have
known it.” How will the history of the welfare state look different once we cease to
presume its necessary evolution as the logical outcome of enlightened social policy
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and begin to recognize that it was a contingent (perhaps even atypical) episode in the
development of the modern capitalist state? In her broad, sweeping reexamination of
English poor law history between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, Lynn Lees
has made an important contribution to this revisionist enterprise.
Lees begins her account circa 1700, when poor relief was mandated by the central
government but was organized, financed, and distributed at the parochial level. Under
this system, the relief of poverty involved a face-to-face encounter between “deserving”
paupers who were accepted members of the community and the local property owners
who supported the system financially as ratepayers and who administered its benefits
as overseers of the poor. Widows, the elderly, the unemployed, the underemployed, and
the disabled were either relieved through allowances or given the institutional care their
circumstances required. Vagrants, sturdy beggars, or thriftless profligates, on the other
hand, were whipped, incarcerated, or removed from the parish if a legal right to settlement could not be proved. Following E. P. Thompson and his students, Lees depicts
this localized, paternalist system of poor relief as part of a larger “moral economy” that
the freeborn plebeians of England regarded as their national birthright. The deference
that elites exacted through this modest redistribution of economic resources provided
the glue that made the eighteenth-century community cohere.
Between the 1780s and the legislative reforms of 1834, this parochial system of relief
and redistribution broke down. Relief expenditures exploded as population grew, mobility increased, and the cost of living skyrocketed. Policy makers became obsessed
with the need to reduce costs, to eliminate wage supplements, and to force the pauper
either to eschew public relief or to accept incarceration in the workhouse. In fact, as
Lees demonstrates, the great majority of those who were relieved after 1834 remained
either impecunious elders or women with dependent children, most of whom were
granted minuscule pittances of 1s to 2s per person, per week. Institutionalization was
reserved primarily for the disabled minority who were unable to care for themselves.
In practice, the vaunted principle of “less eligibility” was primarily directed at ablebodied adult men, who were forced to accept whatever work, at whatever wage, the
labor market would allow. Nevertheless, over the long run, the stigma attached to pauper
status rendered the poor law odious to the English people. With the advent of full democratization in the twentieth century, the “residualist” system of means-tested benefits
was gradually replaced by a more egalitarian, “universalist” income support structure
that reached its apogee under the Labour Government of 1945.
While none of this story is entirely new, Lees retells it in a manner that effectively
incorporates much of the specialist research that has accumulated during the last twenty
or thirty years. Her own most original contribution, presented primarily in chapter 6,
uses settlement examinations to profile the pauper population: the needs that drove its
members to apply for public benefits, the age and gender categories into which they
were classified, and the attitudes that they exhibited toward the prospect of dependence
on public relief. Not least among the merits of this book is its multitude of personal
vignettes and individual examples through which we see the poor not merely as anonymous numbers but as tragically afflicted, flesh-and-blood human beings.
Drawing on several recently published, specialist studies, Lees correctly emphasizes
the gender bias of the nineteenth-century poor law (continued in the twentieth century),
which was designed to reflect (and to reinforce) the male breadwinner wage. Equally
striking but more problematic is her conclusion that poor law history “cannot be circumscribed within a story organized around the concept of class interest.” It may well
be, as Lees asserts, that “coalitions rather than classes negotiated the specific forms of
British welfare legislation” (p. 351), but the problem of poverty (and the history of the
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poor law) was inextricably embedded in the trajectory of class exploitation in a developing industrial capitalist society. Lees’s neglect of this aspect of the poor law story
results in a book that is much better at describing and delineating the successive phases
of welfare provision than it is at characterizing their integration into the larger economy
and society or explaining the process whereby one phase led to the next.
Lees is correct in her contention that “the [old] poor laws created the effective boundaries of their communities” (p. 46). Nevertheless, she passes up a golden opportunity
to demonstrate the exact role of the poor law (and its concomitant laws of settlement)
in the “great transformation,”1 whereby this traditional community was destroyed by
the mighty forces of proletarianization, labor mobility, protoindustrialization, mechanization, urbanization, and the advent of a high fertility demographic regime. How far
was poor law reform the product of any or all of these interconnected socioeconomic
transformations? In what ways did the particular outcome of poor law history affect the
way these processes actually played themselves out?
The introduction of the New Poor Law into the industrial north during the late 1830s
precipitated a string of violent popular revolts. These struggles (partly, but not entirely,
class struggles) receive scarcely a mention in Lees’s account. They constitute, however,
an essential backdrop to the questions raised in the second half of her book. How do
we explain the docility and resignation with which poor people accepted the humiliations of the poor law during the mid- and late Victorian periods, when their parents had
responded a generation earlier with such outrage to what they clearly regarded as the
breach of a paternalist social contract? How do we explain the sudden groundswell of
popular opinion against the punitive stigmatizations of “pauperism” that fueled the passage of old age pensions or national insurance and that informed the deliberations of
the Royal Commission on the poor laws during the first decade of the twentieth century?
Lees is acutely aware of these questions, but she eschews the wider interpretative framework within which they might have been resolved.
In the wake of today’s fin de siecle delegitimation of the welfare state that these early
twentieth-century social reforms inaugurated, another great, synthetic, socioeconomic
history of the English poor laws remains to be written. Until it is, Lees’s carefully
crafted and synoptically sweeping volume will more than suffice.
Theodore Koditschek
University of Missouri, Columbia
The Fall and Rise of the Stately Home. By Peter Mandler.
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997. Pp. viii⫹523. $45.00.
In contrast to the experience of continental lands, the hallmark of the institutional history of modern Britain has been gradual change and an often remarkable degree of
continuity. With regard to Britain’s aristocracy, that is the implicit moral of such books
as John Habakkuk’s Marriage, Debt, and the Estates System: English Landownership,
1650–1950 (New York, 1994) and—more surprisingly—David Cannadine’s Decline
and Fall of the British Aristocracy (New Haven, Conn., 1990). It was such a sense of
1
The phrase is Karl Polanyi’s. See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and
Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, 1947), pp. 77–110, which still remains, arguably, the best
account of the undoing of the old and the advent of the new poor laws in late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century Britain.
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continuity that was dramatically evoked by the well-publicized Treasure Houses of Britain exhibition at Washington, D.C.’s National Gallery in 1984–85. The exhibition catalog described the aristocratic English country house as the symbol of an unchanging
“English arcadia” and as “a ‘vessel of civilization’ carefully constructed by the aristocracy and revered by the people, holding ‘a central place . . . in the British national
consciousness’ ” (p. 414).
It is Peter Mandler’s comprehensively documented conclusion that the notion that
such houses were central to Britain’s “national heritage” became widely accepted only
in the course of the past three decades. During the previous two centuries, both Britain’s
aristocracy and its commoners experienced several significant changes of attitude as to
what aspect of the past and which style of architecture of the past, if any, warranted
veneration. Indeed, for significant numbers of nineteenth-century radicals, aristocratic
homes represented “fortresses of barbarism” rather than “symbols of the common national history shared by all classes” (p. 4)—and landowners regarded their property as
strictly private. Mandler (of London’s Guildhall University) divides his lavishly illustrated overview of the subject into four distinct chronological parts (1815–80, 1867–
1914, 1914–39, 1939–74) to which he has added both a prelude and an epilogue. Each
part is subdivided into topical chapters and subchapters.
The aristocratic owners of eighteenth-century houses often deliberately cut themselves off from both the past and the people around them and sought to live in as “modern” a fashion as technology and a plenitude of domestic servants allowed. A concern
with the people of the island’s past emerged in the early nineteenth-century celebration
of “Olden Times” (perceived to be c. 1400–1640), and, by the mid-Victorian years,
illustrated guides and the railway had familiarized a significant minority of Britons not
only with the Tower of London and Hampton Court but also with the interiors of a
number of gigantic private homes. With Georgian architecture at a discount, Warwick
Castle was much preferred to Chatsworth and Blenheim. What Mandler calls “the first
age of mass visiting” to aristocratic parks and even houses took place during the 1850s
and 1860s on the basis of the noblesse oblige of their owners, but during the later 1870s
there was a reaction, as “English culture became less interested in history and more
hostile to the aristocracy” (p. 109).
At a time of agricultural depression and a subsequent movement to raise inheritance
taxes sharply, public criticism grew not only of “landlordism” in general but also of the
purchase of aristocratic art by the National Gallery. As Reynold’s News protested in
1884, “the working classes of Great Britain at this moment want bread, not pictures”
(p. 166). The number of stately homes regularly open to the public declined by half between the 1880s and the 1920s. The early post–World War I era, with its confiscatory
taxes, its numerous property sales, and its much curtailed domestic staffs, inaugurated
what Mandler terms “the nadir of the country house” (p. 225). Increasing numbers of
cyclists and ramblers saw the countryside as a playground but took little interest in the
surviving homes. In the self-consciously modern interwar era, aristocrats were more
likely to be viewed as figures of fun than as guardians of the beauty of the countryside
and its amenities. Numerous country houses were sold to schools and government departments.
Only during the late 1930s and during the Labour ministry of 1945–51 did the English state begin a process of deliberate tax-exemption and state support in order to
protect both the countryside and surviving stately homes—even the Georgian and, mirabile dictu, the Victorian examples. In that effort, the state imbibed the Country Life
spirit and cooperated with the nonprofit National Trust for Places of Historic Interest
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or National Beauty. The latter organization had been founded in 1899, but only between
1945 and 1990 did its numbers increase from seven thousand to two million members.
The author takes issue on particular points with other historians. Thus he argues that
David Cannadine in The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (New Haven,
Conn., 1990) has unduly neglected the minirevival of the aristocracy during the 1960s
and an enhancement of the country house that “depended rather more on private wealth
than public enthusiasm” (p. 355). Renewed agricultural prosperity and a boom in property prices enabled a postwar generation of aristocrats to refurbish their family homes.
Mandler also takes issue with Martin Wiener’s contention, in English Culture and the
Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850–1980 (Cambridge, 1981), that Prime Minister
Stanley Baldwin was “the man most responsible for fixing national identity firmly in
the rural past” (p. 241). Whatever his skills as a politician, counters Mandler, Baldwin
“was careful not to allow rural nostalgia to gum up the works of modern society”
(p. 241).
The author’s own purpose, very well accomplished, would seem less to be to engage
in historiographical debate than to provide a pioneering synthesis of the changing ways
in which the English country house has been viewed and treated in the course of the
past two centuries. The result is a fascinating compound of cultural, aesthetic, social,
and political history. In the process of such change, Mandler acknowledges as well that,
notwithstanding significant examples of demolition in the 1920s and early 1950s, the
vast majority of stately homes have survived; even now, indeed, half of them retain
family connections more than a century old. His study also constitutes a model of book
production on the part of the Yale University Press.
Walter L. Arnstein
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Democratic Royalism: The Transformation of the British Monarchy, 1861–1914.
By William M. Kuhn. Studies in Modern History. Edited by J. C. D. Clark.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Pp. xii⫹180. $59.95.
This book represents a timely contribution to scholarly research on a topic of great
interest and fascination. Indeed, in the light of the recent explosion of interest in the
British monarchy, it is now apparent that some sort of modernization of the institution
has been proceeding since at least the later eighteenth century. Furthermore, we now
know that many of the traditions associated with the British monarchy had been functioning, developing, and maturing for decades. They were certainly not “invented” in
the later nineteenth century, as recent writers, critical of the monarchy, have argued.
Oddly, this idea of the “invention” of tradition seems to have endeared itself to many
historians and thus to have become one of the most casually accepted orthodoxies in
modern British history. Yet this interpretation of “invented” tradition has always seemed
a little too slick to be true. For one thing, it reduces royal ritual to cynical manipulation
by politicians on the right wing of politics in the later nineteenth century. Yet this does
not square with the facts. As William M. Kuhn argues convincingly, the emergence of
royal ritual in this period fed on its own momentum, depended on essentially nonpartisan implementation, and relied on cross-party support. Furthermore, it interacted powerfully with newer democratic forces. “Democracy survived and prospered alongside
of monarchy in Britain, as it was apparently impossible for it to do in either Germany,
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Austria or Russia. . . . The most important thing about Britain’s monarchy was that it
was not abolished in the cataclysm of the First World War. Instead, to large numbers of
British people, the monarchy appeared to be allied and not opposed to Britain’s democratic system” (p. 8).
The main feature of Kuhn’s book is that he actually studies the people responsible
for the monarchy’s involvement in popular ritual in this period. “The ceremonies they
devised helped transform the monarchy from an institution with dwindling political
power into a tremendously attractive centrepiece of national identity” (p. 10). The ceremonies treated are the thanksgiving for the recovery of the Prince of Wales in 1872, the
jubilees of 1887 and 1897, and the coronations of Edward VII in 1902 and George V
in 1911. The method employed is to devote a chapter to each of five major players on
this royal stage.
Walter Bagehot authored the classic vindication for ceremonial monarchy, arguing
that it is a system of government that is universally understood by all sections of the
population, that is sanctified by religion, and that generates a positive moral influence
throughout the nation through widespread imitation. Most of all, it acts as a cloak. “It
enables our real rulers to change without heedless people knowing it” (p. 22). In other
words, Bagehot’s justification for monarchy is not that monarchy is any aid to governance but that it provides spectacle for the ruled. This is not to argue that the mass of
the people need to be mindlessly entertained by artificial and meaningless acts of theater. Bagehot insists on dignified spectacle that will act as much on the middle as the
lower classes. “Bagehot set the stage for the monarchy’s transformation from awkward
vestige of the old regime into a popular symbol of the modern British state” (p. 31).
William Ewart Gladstone appears in the book because of Gladstone’s role in the celebrations for the Prince of Wales’s recovery in 1872. So successful was the occasion that
republicanism in England died out for several generations. It also marked the newfound
fashion for large-scale royal ceremonies in Saint Paul’s or Westminster Abbey. “Gladstone’s ceremony had both awakened a national memory and helped create a new taste
for such ceremonies” (p. 55). Lord Esher is a less surprising inclusion, closely involved
as he was in the jubilee of 1897, the queen’s funeral in 1901, and the coronation of
1902. His determination that the queen should drive back to the palace in 1897 through
the poorest districts in London was a master stroke. His further perception that the
monarchy could act as the unifying symbol of the British empire inaugurated an age of
royal visits whose vestiges continue to this day. As for Archbishop Randall Davidson,
it was he who helped to channel the public demand for celebration into religious spectacle amid patriotic and imperial euphoria. Both in 1902 and 1911 Davidson ensured
that the coronations avoided excessive pomp and bombast through highlighting their
religious and reverential qualities. His proposal that Edward VII should lie in state in
1910 captured the public imagination. “It was a return to public spectacle more characteristic of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” (p. 103). Finally, the fifteenth Duke
of Norfolk was responsible for the revival and preservation of ancient customs. As Earl
Marshall, he was determined to inject elements of traditionalism into these great popular ceremonies, thus enhancing the timelessness of the institution of monarchy.
These men “developed a new rationale for maintaining the monarchy in the modern
democratic era.” By retaining the monarchy in this new age, “they purchased stability,
consensus and a sense of historical place” (p. 140). In tying national identity to the
monarchy, to its capacity for mystery, theater, and ceremony, they sought to evoke standards of service and selflessness that would shore up the newly emerging democracy.
This is an engaging thesis, researched in a scholarly fashion and presented simply
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and straightforwardly. Indeed, in some ways it is presented rather too simply. While it
is useful to be told about those who designed the artifices of the new monarchy, it is
regrettable that so little attention is given here to the effectiveness of all these endeavors,
to the processes they inspired, and to the reception they generated among members of
the public—surely vastly different among different social groups and in geographically
diverse areas of the country. There is, in fact, disappointingly little about the ceremonies
themselves and precious little analysis of their ritual status. Furthermore, it seems to
me at least that the undeniably important developments that form the subject of this
book are not placed in an overall historical setting that takes in the important innovations of, say, a century earlier. Very little is said about them, and so the reader is bereft
of a structured narrative of the development of the monarchy in the modern era. This
makes it a little difficult to accept the novelty of the “democratic” thesis. Indeed, there
is very little evidence of any democratic intent at all among the five major players on
this royal stage. Furthermore, insofar as these royal experiments highlighted traditional,
and even antique, social symbolism, they are a little difficult to square with the democratic thesis. Might not some, at least, of the material in this book support a thesis very
different from the democratic argument presented here, namely, that these experiments
in popular monarchy were pretty minimal, amounting to little more than necessary adaptation, and that they tended rather to limit and to discipline democracy rather than to
enhance it?
Frank O’Gorman
University of Manchester
Victorian Science in Context. Edited by Bernard Lightman.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. Pp. viii⫹489. $70.00 (cloth); $22.50
(paper).
Thomas Huxley brought to the task of extending the sway of science in Victorian society the same vigorous zeal that he deployed in defending the Origin of Species, where
he earned the title “Darwin’s Bulldog.” Writing to Joseph Dalton Hooker (botanist at
Kew), Huxley declared: “The English nation will not take science from above, so it
must get it from below. We, the doctors, who know what is good for it, if we cannot get
it to take pills, must administer our remedies par derriere” (p. 257). In his contribution
to this exemplary collection of essays on Victorian science, Paul Fayter excavates this
epistolary gem—excised, not surprisingly, from Huxley’s turn-of-the-century Life and
Letters—and notes that it points to what might be called the “suppository theory of
popular science education.” Scatological humor aside, the image—a passive body politic receiving, by hook or by crook, doses of efficacious science—goes a long way toward capturing a curiously pervasive way of thinking about the relationship between
science and culture: science gives, culture takes. Victorian Science in Context, twenty
essays that emerged from a conference held at York University in 1995, can be understood as a set of diverse and spirited refutations of Huxley’s infelicitous witticism.
Conference proceedings give academic editors headaches. The beady narrowness of
most contributions, strung on weak threads of thematic unity, leads to books that should
have been a special issue of a specialist journal. Bernard Lightman and those who
helped him deserve high praise for having created not only an invaluable contribution
to a very lively area in the history of science but also a model for how discrete and
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detailed studies can be woven into a coherent volume. The essays in this book—spanning the psychological dimensions of economics to zoological nomenclature, science
fiction to microscope illumination, scientific racism to the apodeictic quality of photographs—will be of value to all scholars working on the Victorian period, not merely
historians, and certainly not merely historians of science. Perhaps more important, the
breadth of the coverage, combined with the careful bibliographical essays that accompany each contribution, mean that Victorian Science in Context serves as a guide and
gazetteer for much of the work done in the last twenty-five years on the history of
science in the nineteenth century.
Three important questions drive the volume and hold it together. Part 1 takes on the
most fundamental of these: What defined “science” in the Victorian period? At stake is
the traditional assumption that science was from the start a self-patrolling community,
one in which a set of clearly defined (and almost autochthonous) principles and persons
established the boundary between what was science and what was not. The essays approach this issue in different ways. Alison Winter shows that surprisingly little distinguished the theories of two early Victorian physiologists, although their fates in the
arena of London scientific society could not have been more different. The conclusion
seems to be that careful management of social niceties and the maintenance of strategic
alliances played key roles in defining orthodoxy and heterodoxy; the content of the
theories themselves may have been of secondary importance. In another sally at the
same issue, Martin Fichman reviews the complicated entanglements of Victorian politics and Darwinian evolution. He shows that Alfred Russell Wallace himself, who
shares credit for the theory of evolution by natural selection, grew increasingly frustrated with the efforts of Huxley and others to confine the theory of evolution to an
apolitical sphere. A socialist, Wallace (presaging the late twentieth-century critiques of
Marxist-inspired science studies) objected to the ways that the seeming “neutrality” of
the “scientific fact” of “survival of the fittest” worked to ratify an exploitative capitalism.
Part 2 turns to popular science writing to ask a new, if related, question: In a period
traditionally characterized by scientific professionalization, what role did nonprofessional audiences play in defining science? The enormous volume of scientific books
written for the Victorian public offer much material for reflection, and the authors in
this section have dusted off some jaw-dropping oddments of Victorian popular scientific
culture. More than curios, however, these works are here woven into accounts that reveal the inadequacy of the so-called trickle-down theory of popular science, in which
the masses are thought to read the attenuated seepage of the higher vessel of real science. Lightman points to the simultaneous professional codification of science and writing and suggests that popular science writing in the period is best understood as a
product of the conflict of these two communities over common turf. In perhaps the most
surprising of these essays, Douglas Lorimer argues that the formation of a “scientific”
racism in the latter part of the century relied on a process of selection from among
popular categories and concepts. Rather than scientists offering the populace a new
language for discussing race, scientific language itself drew on and reinforced popular
terms. Fayter’s piece exploring three classic tropes in Victorian science fiction is a gem.
While the evidence for high science taking its cues from tabloid science fiction is somewhat weak, the effort to show the permeability of real science and science fiction succeeds.
The final and longest section opens a vast question: In what ways were the practices
of science situated in and responsive to broader cultural dynamics in the Victorian period? The different sites of scientific investigation come under scrutiny: Jane Camerini
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compares the fieldwork of four prominent Victorian naturalists; Graeme Gooday takes
up the experimentalist culture of the laboratory, examining how at times scientists reported their flubs and instrumental irregularities as validating material, whereas at other
times such difficulties were suppressed in the record. The expansive category of “scientific practice” and the implicit challenge of the question—to show that the gritty doing
of science itself does not stand apart from a cultural context—give rise to two of the
best essays in the collection: James Moore’s investigation of Wallace’s “Malthusian moment” and Simon Schaffer’s latest exercise in weaving together diverse strands of Victorian culture. In vigorous prose, Moore sets forth—and solves—a choice puzzle: If reading Malthus made such a memorable impression on Darwin, just how did the same
experience affect Wallace’s thinking on natural selection? The answer demands an improbable journey into surveying (Wallace’s early career), Celtic nationalism, and Papuan demographics. Schaffer’s piece on Victorian metrology—particularly the quest
for suitable national standards for measurement—probes the elaborate (and bizarre)
efforts to argue for the naturalness, historicity, and utility of particular incarnations of
the imperial yard. Dramatizing that such efforts—which reached out to the pyramids
of Egypt, the axis of the earth, and the spectrum of stellar hydrogen—were entangled
with everything from the Ordnance Survey of Jerusalem to industrial manufacture to
an elaborate natural theology, Schaffer produces a novel interpretation of the Victorian
obsession with precision. In his reading, the cult of measurement represents an “invention of tradition” in Eric Hobsbawm’s sense.
In an important way, Victorian Science in Context represents an invention of tradition
of its own. The title of the book offers a clue: this collection represents contextualist
history of science. Lightman traces a detailed genealogy of this style in his introduction,
but other authors—Moore, and a particularly helpful brief piece by Frank Turner—
join in the task of sketching the contours of the historiography that have led to the kinds
of densely embroidered studies of science and culture presented in this book. History
of science as a discipline has staked much on what has come to be identifiable as a
contextualist approach, the central premise of which lies in the rejection of the sort of
“science vs. society” dichotomy betrayed by Huxley’s proctologic musings. A potential
conundrum waits in the wings: historians of science—a community that distinguishes
itself from other historians because it studies science—seem to have in mind undermining the very exceptionalism that defines their professional identities. The extreme edges
of science studies stand to be admonished by the fate of other academic disciplines that
jettisoned the objects of their investigations in the throws of theoretical jouissance.
This book is cause for optimism, not alarm. The upside of the contextualist approach
is that nothing is ever simple. Therein, of course, lies a downside as well. The attempt
to situate science in culture demands stories as complicated as culture itself. As the
histories become both more complex and more detailed, the danger arises—and it is a
danger Turner warns against—that a sort of disciplinary solipsism will result. The proof
that this is not occurring will lie in the reception accorded to this text in a variety of
cognate fields. In her essay on ordering nature, Barbara Gates asks her readers to consider the Victorian mania for science and then to let themselves be seized with a mania
of their own, “a mania for the history of science” (p. 185). Victorian Science in Context
is a good place to start.
D. Graham Burnett
Columbia University
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Sick, Not Dead: The Health of British Workingmen during the Mortality
Decline. By James C. Riley.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Pp. xvii⫹349. $58.00.
Many numbers have been “crunched” and archives “trawled” in the writing of this volume, the principal objectives of which are, first, to provide a social history of friendly
societies in relation to health and medicine and, second, by using friendly society records, to explore what happened to working-class morbidity during a period of “mortality decline.”
To take the first of these themes: in Victorian and Edwardian Britain, friendly societies, which were essentially mutual insurance institutions for the working classes, had
a social, economic, and institutional significance out of all proportion to the modest
amount of attention that historians have devoted to them. Following their appearance
in the seventeenth century, the friendly societies were, in their late-nineteenth century
golden age, mass membership organizations. The statistics are impressive; by 1900 well
over 4.5 million people belonged to registered friendly societies (and many more to
unregistered) compared with a mere 1.5 million in trade unions. More than half of all
adult males and two-thirds of those who might be described as working-class belonged
to societies providing sickness and burial cover. Yet aside from P. H. J. H. Gosden’s
dated monograph, The Friendly Societies in England, 1815–1875 (Manchester, 1961),
which covers only a short period and concentrates on the institutional framework, scholarly studies consist mainly of isolated chapters in books, journal articles, and local
investigations. What James Riley supplies is a detailed examination of the role of the
societies in providing financial benefits and arranging medical care for their sick members. The picture that emerges does much to challenge established views about the
relationship between the medical profession and those adults who made up the central
ranks of the working class. Particularly during the last third of the nineteenth century,
the friendly societies used their bargaining power in a competitive marketplace to secure extremely advantageous terms from general practitioners. The result was that
cheap and abundant medical services were available to members. As a result, those
members were seldom dogged by chronic ill health for which they had no means to
secure advice and treatment. Neither were they the impotent victims of institutions and
elites; far from it, for they were fully capable of asserting their own claims and influence.
Friendly society demand for medical services had important implications for the
medical profession. Although few doctors were full-time employees of the societies,
most general practitioners spent the early part of their careers under contract to one
society or more and many were so contracted throughout their working lives. This being
the case, it is perhaps a mistake, Riley contends, to see the expansion of the Victorian
medical profession, as some observers have, solely in terms of growing middle-class
demand for medical services. But while the friendly societies and the doctors needed
each other, their relationship was largely loveless. General practitioners coveted the
regular income the societies provided, but many medical practitioners thought they
were exploited by those who “knew the price of everything and the value of nothing.”
For their part, members of the societies often believed that they received second-rate
doctoring.
The second half of this book sees Riley back on territory he explored in Sickness,
Recovery, and Death: A History and Forecast of Ill Health (Iowa City, Iowa, 1989). His
central thesis, based largely on the sickness records of the Ancient Order of Foresters
(AOF), is that in the last three decades of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth
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century, “the incidence of sickness declined, but less sharply than the incidence of mortality, while the average duration of sickness episodes and aggregate sickness time increased” (p. 11). People lived longer and suffered fewer bouts of sickness and disease,
but those bouts they did have lasted longer. That people who were sick more rather
than less of the time were experiencing improved health—which is one Riley’s main
conclusions—might appear odd, but their health gain was in being “sick not dead”—
hence the title of this study. That friendly society members’ bouts of sickness became
more protracted, notwithstanding easy access to medical assistance, appears to pose
questions about the value of such assistance. However, Riley raises, although unfortunately never really develops, an important point about medical intervention. All but
universally dismissed as an explanation for Britain’s mortality decline, medicine may
have had an unacknowledged significance, for while doctors may have done little for
patients in terms of providing rapid cures, they may at least have kept them alive.
Beyond his central argument, Riley looks at the nature of the ill health experienced
by friendly society members. Although the data are incomplete, the indications are that
accidents, respiratory disease, and muscular disorder predominated. As for the influence of locality, within Britain, the health of the English, particularly in the southeast,
improved relative to that of the Welsh and, particularly, the Scots. Not altogether surprisingly, the quantitative evidence endorses the view that life in a large and overcrowded city, working in a hazardous, low-wage occupation, was not conducive to
good health.
Based as they are on friendly society records, Riley’s conclusions are only as reliable
as the extant data. It is notoriously dangerous to use statistics generated from one activity (in this case the processing of benefit claims) to illuminate another phenomenon
(health trends). Friendly societies defined sickness in terms of inability to work for a
certain period of time. Clearly an amended definition could change the recorded amount
of sickness within the membership. As a good quantitative historian, Riley appreciates
the pitfalls. Yet while he maintains, with qualifications, that benefit claims provide a
good indication of objective reality—because the AOF’s definition of sickness altered
little over time—he pays little attention to the possibility that the “culture” of claiming
underwent change in response to economic, social, or other factors.
This is a book in which statistical analysis looms large. However, such analysis is
largely confined to the appendices. The numerically challenged need have no fears in
approaching this study, for Riley provides not only a thoughtful and helpful guide
through the maze of statistics but also succinct and jargon-free summaries of his
findings.
Peter W. J. Bartrip
University College, Northampton
Gothic Images of Race in Nineteenth-Century Britain. By H. L. Malchow.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996. Pp. xiii⫹335. $55.00 (cloth);
$18.95 (paper).
There was a time not so long ago—perhaps as little as twenty-five years—when scholars tended to consider novels like Frankenstein and Dracula as aberrant as their eponymous heroes. Through the early and middle decades of the twentieth century, it was
chiefly young or idiosyncratic readers and Hollywood producers who had kept us mindful of many of these works, sensitive to the conventionalized forms of horror that have
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been their characteristic stamp. But with the first strong stirrings of cultural studies,
feminist criticism, new historicism, postcolonialism, and gender and race studies, critical attention has turned in earnest to a range of fiction in the gothic line—works such as
Matthew Lewis’s The Monk (Dublin, 1796), Charles Maturin’s Melmoth the Wanderer
¨
(London, 1820), the novels of the Bronte sisters, and R. L. Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll and
Mr. Hyde (London, 1886). Whether or not we accept Mark Edmundson’s provocative
recent thesis that the gothic is everywhere in contemporary American life, it is hard
to deny that it has claimed its share of center stage when it comes to the history of
literary culture.
In the first wave of critical attention, gothic novels were examined primarily as exercises in composition and rhetorical management—this perhaps in keeping with Edgar
Allan Poe’s notorious insistence in “The Philosophy of Composition” (Philadelphia,
1846), later echoed by Alfred Hitchcock, that one must always commence a tale of
horror with the consideration of an effect. The philosophy of gothic composition could
not long be separated from the psychology of gothic composition, however, and it wasn’t
long before books by David Punter, Eve Sedgwick, and William Veeder, among others,
began to examine gothic texts with psychoanalytic instruments.1 This effort certainly
continues today, perhaps because of an implicit assumption that, just as psychopathology was thought by Freud to supply an invaluable index to the workings of “normal
psychology,” so the accelerated grimace of the gothic can tell us something profound
about the face of everyday life. But even in the critical works just mentioned, the uses
of the gothic were already being extended to include service in various kinds of cultural
history. Sedgwick, for example, reads gothic fiction for its relation to male homosocial
desire. From about the mid-1980s, certainly, we have seen a number of historical studies
explicitly focusing on the gothic as an index to various historical movements and situations: an index to female literary propriety in Mary Poovey’s account of Frankenstein,
gender ambiguity in Claudia Johnson’s account of Anne Radcliffe, and “reverse colonialism” in Stephen Arata’s account of Dracula.2 For Ian Duncan, indeed, the gothic
had paradoxically become an index of modernity itself, at least in Britain.3
Once the study of the gothic turned historicist, it was perhaps inevitable that a historian by training, in this case H. L. Malchow, should try his hand at the task. And what he
has produced will be regarded, I am certain, as a serious contribution to the scholarship.
Malchow concedes at the outset that his book is particularly indebted to two of the most
important of the historical studies of gothic from the late 1980s: Patrick Brantlinger’s
Rule of Darkness: British Literature and Imperialism, 1830–1914 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1988)
`
and Elaine Showalter’s Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the Fin de Siecle (New
York, 1990). Indeed, Malchow’s central notion of the “racial gothic” seems built upon
and sometimes hard to distinguish from the “imperial gothic” that Brantlinger, following the lead of Punter, has identified in novels of Stevenson, Haggard, and Kipling. This
1
David Punter, The Literature of Terror: A History of Gothic Fictions from 1765 to the Present Day
(London, 1980); Eve Sedgwick, The Coherence of Gothic Conventions (New York, 1986); William
Veeder, Mary Shelley and Frankenstein: The Fate of Androgyny (Chicago, 1986).
2
Mary Poovey, The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer: Ideology and Style in the Works of
Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley, and Jane Austen (Chicago, 1984); Claudia Johnson, Equivocal Beings: Politics, Gender, and Sentimentality in the 1790s: Wollstonecraft, Radcliffe, Burney,
`
Austen (Chicago, 1995); Stephen Arata, Fictions of Loss in Victorian Fin de Siecle (Cambridge,
1996).
3
Ian Duncan, Modern Romance and Transformations of the Novel: The Gothic, Scott, Dickens
(Cambridge, 1992).
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is especially so toward the end of the book, where Malchow is himself working on the
`
fin de siecle materials. Malchow’s distinguishing argument, however, is that the strain
of “racial gothic” runs deeper and earlier than “imperial gothic”—certainly to as early
as the late eighteenth century—and that it set the conditions for the later developments
represented in different terms by Brantlinger, Showalter, and others.
Insisting that his is not a work of literary criticism and that it is thus not committed
to an analysis of gothic as a genre or style, Malchow adopts a loose working definition
of the gothic as a twofold proposition: “as a language of panic, of unreasoning anxiety,
blind revulsion and distancing sensationalism, as well as a particular ‘literature of terror’ ” (p. 4). The relationship of the gothic, understood in this dual way, and the developing discourse of race in the nineteenth century is itself, furthermore, a two-way street.
Malchow insists both that the gothic was “at some level a response to expanding knowledge of cultural and racial difference” (p. 5) and that gothic writing established conventions for the production of just that knowledge. The four long chapters of the book fall
respectively under a sequence of rough, interrelated rubrics: “monsters,” “cannibals,”
“vampires,” and “werewolves” (i.e., half-breeds). And in each chapter, some now canonized novel in the gothic tradition is related to lesser known, but once popular, materials explicitly concerned with the representation of race. Thus, against (or alongside)
readings of Victor Frankenstein’s monster as a personification of a dangerous working
class or of flawed Prometheanism, Malchow adduces evidence to suggest an allegory
of race and black enslavement in the novel. Against (or alongside) readings of Dracula
`
in respect to fin de siecle anxieties about the uncertainty of gender and the dissolution
of empire, Malchow argues for a specifically racial and racist invocation of the melancholy count as an eastern European Jew.
The strength of these chapters lies in the massive array of apposite materials that
Malchow’s research has enabled him to bring to bear. Malchow is quite self-conscious
about his historian’s contextualist emphasis. Introducing his argument about Dracula,
for example, he insists that to “the historian’s mind, making the case requires more . . .
than a deconstructionist assault on the text. We must ask what Stoker’s own sources and
ideas on the subject of the European Jew may have been, and what the nature of the
public discussion of the alien ‘problem’ contemporaneous with the writing of Dracula
was, before proceeding to consider ways in which the story of the vampire itself can be
said to demonstrate Jewish—that is, anti-Semitic—coding” (p. 154). What he offers is
thick description indeed—not just the casual references in Marx and Engels to economic vampirism, but an ensemble of evidence from various archives, and from the
Stoker biography, all tending to make the central claim plausible. The interest and relevance of the visual evidence alone should make the book worth consulting for anyone
with a stake in these issues. In the end, Malchow succeeds, as few other books on the
subject could, in making us wonder how we could ever have assumed that the apparently aberrant texts could have come out of nowhere, so deeply embedded do they come
to seem in the unfolding controversies over race.
Because the book is so admirable in its assiduity and address, it may be especially
worthwhile to consider the features that indicate its limitations. One such feature is
Malchow’s inability to clinch the highly suggestive arguments he makes along the way,
something he often concedes without being able to solve: the conclusion to the Draculaas-Jew argument is a good example (p. 165). Such moments derive in part from Malchow’s reliance on a rhetoric of parallelism, as if, in eschewing what he calls the “deconstructive assault,” he were left with no other means of attacking the elusive problem
of textual allusiveness. Malchow’s previous book was a collection of biographical studies of Victorian “gentleman capitalists,” and his strongest arguments here—especially
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in the case of Stoker—tend to work in the biographical mode, although that is not the
dominant mode in this book.
The more general limitation of the larger argument has to do with Malchow’s
allowing his two central categories—the gothic as a literary mode and the racial as a
historical discourse—to collapse into each other. Useful as this book will be to other
scholars, it would have better succeeded in establishing its own critical and historical
claims if it had managed two symmetrical “hedges” against the conflation of its key
terms. The first would be to stress the role of racial discourse in narrative forms other
than those conventionally termed “gothic.” Malchow could not have known, for example, Markman Ellis’s The Politics of Sensibility: Race, Gender, and Commerce in the
Sentimental Novel (Cambridge, 1996), but the texts discussed by Ellis are well enough
known to have served notice of an alternative mode of approach. The handling of race,
both in the case of the black servant and his West Indian creole master, in Maria Edgeworth’s Belinda (a novel not discussed by Ellis), would have given Malchow a sentimental (i.e., nongothic) foil even closer to his starting point in Mary Shelley’s work. The
counterpart hedge against the conflation of terms from the opposite side would have
meant paying more attention than Malchow does to those aspects of the gothic tradition
that seem to have little to do with racial representation as such—the relation of gothic
“archaisms,” for example, to the specters self-consciously haunting European commercial modernity (matters discussed by both Ian Duncan and Emma Clery in recent studies of the gothic).4 Malchow acknowledges such aspects of the gothic only to dismiss
them (p. 5). In doing so, he loses an opportunity to maintain those differences between
gothic representation and racial discourse that give his central claims their particular
frisson.
James Chandler
University of Chicago
Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945–
1963. By Wolfram Kaiser. Contemporary History in Context Series. Edited by
Peter Catterall.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, in association with the Institute of Contemporary British
History, 1996. Pp. xviii⫹274. $59.95.
Wolfram Kaiser’s study of Britain and postwar European integration challenges two
sets of accepted truths. First, Kaiser argues that it is too easy to say that “Britain missed
the bus” both in 1950, when the Schuman Plan was launched, and in 1955, when the
Messina negotiations took place. Kaiser’s view is that the decisions to remain apart
from the Coal and Steel Community and then the Common Market were quite rational.
Thus in 1950 it made little sense to gamble on restructuring a large fraction of heavy
industry for the sake of more continental outlets when demand was high throughout the
British Empire and its Dominions. And in 1955 there was no guarantee that the Messina
process would actually succeed. Only a year earlier the ambitious plan to create a European Defence Community (EDC) had collapsed because of France’s distrust of Germany. Britain’s Western European Union (WEU) initiative had thereafter rescued the
project to rearm Germany without causing panic in France. Western Europe had been
held together and the alliance against the Soviet Union had been strengthened—much
4

Ibid.; E. J. Clery, The Rise of Supernatural Fiction, 1762–1800 (Cambridge, 1995).
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to Washington’s relief. London expected the common market scheme to go the same
way as the EDC, pulled apart this time by the tension between French protectionism
and German economic liberalism. Just as WEU had saved the day before, so a free trade
area led by Britain would guarantee continuing West European cooperation after the
anticipated fiasco had occurred.
Second, Kaiser proposes that the differences between continental support for an increasingly integrated community and British preference for a wide, loose association of
cooperating nation states have been overstated. Once it became clear that the European
Economic Community (EEC) was likely to be a political and economic success story,
it did not take very long for Britain to decide to apply for membership. During the
course of the 1961–63 negotiations, the government of Harold Macmillan showed itself
to be surprisingly communautaire, for example, on the questions of majority voting in
the EEC, agricultural policy, and the future of Commonwealth preference. The proEuropean strategy was continued by successive prime ministers and culminated in Margaret Thatcher’s sponsorship of a single European market.
So why is Britain seen as a “bad European”? Kaiser’s first answer is that the Foreign
Office was fixated on a world characterized in diplomatic and strategic terms by dependence on the Commonwealth alliance, the “special relationship” with the United States,
and Franco-German tension. The political commitment to cooperation in Paris and especially in Bonn after 1949 was therefore consistently underrated until the late 1950s.
At that point the reality of the new Europe exploded with a revelatory flash whose first
effects led Prime Minister Macmillan to try to sabotage the EEC out of fear that it was
a cunning German plan to achieve by peace what force had failed to do between 1939
and 1945. The failure of these efforts, together with fear of exclusion from a protected
European market and a desire to deepen the special relationship—in large part with the
objective of renewing the nuclear deterrent—motivated Britain’s first application. So
even when London had started to revise its worldview, it still clung to the Atlanticism
that provided President de Gaulle with an ideal excuse for his veto of Macmillan’s bid.
Kaiser’s second answer is that the Conservatives have generally used Europe as a
political football. Macmillan, even though thwarted by de Gaulle, was able to expose
rifts over Europe in the Labour Party. Business and finance might lead the Tories to
become the European party, but ideology required them to remain the national party.
Thus Macmillan could resort to German-bashing while both Margaret Thatcher and
John Major took Britain deeper into Europe even as they encouraged a xenophobic
press to write up their battles for budgetary rebates and treaty opt-outs in terms once
reserved for Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter Raleigh, and Lord Nelson.
This is a scholarly and perceptive book. It relies extensively on original documents,
mostly those within the Public Records Office. It is overall quite clearly written. Yet
there are faults. The first chapter is stupendously dull. It reads like an internal Foreign
Office history of the 1945–55 period and is probably more useful for insomniacs than
for the student.
Partly because Kaiser works so much with official papers, he brings to his work the
touch of a slightly old-fashioned diplomatic historian. Structural and nongovernmental
influences on policy are discussed—yet more could be said about the views of industry,
the City of London, and the unions. Perhaps this leads Kaiser to overstate the diplomatic
motives behind Macmillan’s bid for entry while underplaying the economic ones. No
one can deny the Atlanticist context of Britain’s first application. But it occurred against
a background of worry about sluggish economic growth in all major political parties
and on both sides of industry. French-style economic planning at home and access to
the large European market were genuinely seen by supporters of entry into the EEC as
two aspects of a larger project to modernize the British economy.
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In cultural terms the European consensus of the 1960s marked a dramatic break with
the imperial isolationism of the previous decade. The 1950s had opened with a burst of
patriotic self-congratulation in which victory in the two world wars reinforced pride in
“British” achievements, such as radar and the jet engine. The ascent of Everest and the
coronation of a young queen in 1953, at a time of rising prosperity for all, reinforced
popular faith in what were believed to be fundamental truths. These included the stability of the constitution, the enduring importance of the Commonwealth and the Empire,
and the resilience and ingenuity of the British people. The Foreign Office was not far
out of step with a popular feeling that allowed the Conservatives to strike (albeit increasingly muted) resonances into the 1990s. Kaiser’s discussion of these issues is
somewhat perfunctory. No serious effort is made to link the retrospective mind-set in
Whitehall and Westminster in the early to mid 1950s with the brief era of hope that
surrounded the new “Elizabethan age.”
That said, this is a good book. Indeed, parts of it are excellent—such as the incisive
discussion of Anthony Eden and the analysis of the nuclear diplomacy surrounding
Macmillan’s bid for membership in the EEC. The final chapter is stimulating and sensible. Overall, any student of Britain’s postwar relations with western Europe, especially
since the mid 1950s, should gain from this.
Scott Newton
University of Wales, Cardiff
Cultural Marxism in Postwar Britain: History, the New Left, and the Origins of
Cultural Studies. By Dennis Dworkin. Post-Contemporary Interventions. Edited
by Stanley Fish and Fredric Jameson.
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997. Pp. viii⫹322. $49.95 (cloth); $16.95
(paper).
Dennis Dworkin has provided the first comprehensive history of British cultural Marxism conceived as a coherent intellectual tradition. While previous authors have tended
to concentrate on a single intellectual (most notably Raymond Williams), Dworkin
ranges widely, embracing historians, such as E. P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, Raphael
Samuel, Sally Alexander, and Catherine Hall, as well as scholars in the field of cultural
studies, like Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall, and Dick Hebdige. He
explores both the dialogue (sometimes constructive but frequently tense and awkward)
between the disciplines of history and cultural studies and the debates that took place
within those disciplines. Dworkin is refreshingly objective, avoiding the polemical edge
that has colored previous critical interpretations of cultural Marxism written from an
interior position by the protagonists of various controversies about structure and agency
or the relationship between experience and ideology. Moreover, Dworkin is not concerned with an inward-looking history of ideas but instead seeks to relate developments
in cultural Marxism to the broader crisis of the British Left, promoted first by the cold
war and the Conservative electoral hegemony of the 1950s and reinforced by the failures of the Wilson/Callaghan governments and the Thatcher decade of the 1980s.
Dworkin writes in a readable and accessible style, providing an excellent guide to
those unfamiliar with the byzantine complexities of the postwar British Left. The personal alliances or animosities that underpinned many of the intellectual debates surveyed here are granted their full significance, most notably the tension between E. P.
Thompson and Perry Anderson over the “editorial coup” at the New Left Review in
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1963. By subtly incorporating information gleaned from interviews with many of the
figures discussed in the book, Dworkin succeeds in according a human face to the abstract world of dialectic, and his account of the December 1979 History Workshop
debate between E. P. Thompson, Richard Johnson, and Stuart Hall is atmospheric as
well as authoritative. Dworkin’s study reflects the complexity of cultural Marxism in
postwar Britain. In many senses it was a distinctly British genre, rejecting both the
narrowly economistic tradition of Stalinism and the philosophical approach of the
Frankfurt School. British Marxists rejected rarefied philosophy in favor of the desire to
associate with, and participate in, working-class and radical politics: the Popular Front
in the 1930s, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the late 1950s, the student
politics of 1968, and organized feminism and antiracism in the 1970s. British Marxists
were skeptical about simplistic models of base and superstructure, as is evident from
sites as diverse as Christopher Hill’s writings on the seventeenth century in the 1940s
and Stuart Hall’s proclamation of “new times” in the 1980s. When Thompson and Hill
left the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) after the Soviet invasion of Hungary
in 1956, they both criticized the CPGB for offering a pale imitation of Soviet Communism, thereby ignoring a specifically British tradition of radicalism and moral criticism,
the spirit of the Peasant’s Revolt, the Diggers, the London Corresponding Society, and
the Chartists. However, this does not mean that British Marxism was insular or parochial. Eric Hobsbawm, the only major historian to remain in the Communist Party after
1956 but also a Jew of Russian-Austrian descent, ensured that British Marxism was
informed by the concerns of the international labor movement. In the early 1960s Perry
Anderson used the New Left Review to inject more continentally derived theoretical
vigor into British Marxism. Together with Tom Nairn, he deliberately rejected British
intellectual traditions and instead composed a structural analysis of British historical
´
development that was inspired by Antonio Gramsci, Georg Lukacs, and Louis Althusser. Not all British Marxists welcomed this new development, Thompson in particular
mounting a staunch defense of the empirical and humanist strands of British Marxism.
However, if there was a “little Englandism” in British Marxism, it appears less with
regard to continental Europe than to the United States. In the 1970s there appeared a
younger generation of Marxists, such as Sheila Rowbotham, who had been raised on
American music and culture and who valued the modes of activism developed by the
American civil rights movements of the 1960s. However, the older generation of Left
intellectuals such as Thompson, Williams, and Hoggart were bitterly opposed to American cultural annexation, and Thompson’s polemical writings often contained crude caricatures of the United States.
A picture of equal complexity emerges with regard to the status of gender in the
British Marxist tradition. There is no doubt that cultural Marxism did much to reinvigorate British feminism. The “history from below” ethos of Thompson and the History
Workshop offered inspiration to feminists who argued that if the working-class could
be rescued from the condescension of posterity, so, too, could the history of domesticity.
However, it was all too obvious that women were not hidden from history in the same
way as workers or the poor had been obscured and that a Marxist approach that ignored
sexual difference would be inadequate. In the field of cultural studies, too, women such
as Angela McRobbie found they had to fight against male theorists’ exclusive concern
with the masculine subcultures of the pub and football terrace.
Dworkin’s study also raises interesting questions about the relationship between intellectuals and the masses. Thompson, as a Worker’s Educational Association tutor, had
firsthand experience of working people, but he overidealized the working class, ignoring their racism, sexism, and political conservatism. Anderson’s patrician origins and
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fondness for Sartre hardly marked him out as a man of the people, and his critique of
Thompson’s “sentimentalism” was compromised by a prose style that was impenetrable
to most other intellectuals, let alone your average proletarian activist. Raymond Williams and other leading proponents of cultural studies possessed an almost Leavisite
anxiety over the corrosive effects of mass culture. Many postwar British Marxists found
it difficult to escape the mindset of the 1930s and spent the postwar decades defending
what they felt to be the “authentic” working class values from the evils of affluence,
Americanization, and the commercialization of culture. In so doing they created a significant intellectual tradition, but they also ensured their ultimate irrelevance in the
world outside the academy.
Martin Francis
University of London
La Ligue. By Jean-Marie Constant.
Paris: Fayard, 1996. Pp. 520. Fr. 160.
Jean-Marie Constant has produced a valuable new synthesis on the climactic period of
the French Wars of Religion that was dominated by the aggressive attempt of an ultraCatholic “Holy League” to seize power from a monarchy accused of dealing too leniently with a heretical Protestant minority. Constant begins his story with a narrative
account of the Day of the Barricades (May 12, 1588), the popular uprising that was the
first real play for power on the part of Paris’s radical Holy League. He then turns back
to the more distant origins of the League with a useful chapter summarizing the spread
of Protestantism in France and the initial stages of the Wars of Religion. Succeeding
chapters recount Henri III’s growing unpopularity with his subjects and give a narrative
account of the League before turning to the analysis of the social and geographical
dimensions of support for the League—or, more tellingly, to the weaknesses of this
support that ultimately resulted in the League’s failure.
Although published by Fayard in a format clearly aimed at gaining a popular and not
just a scholarly audience, the book should not be dismissed as a mere popularization.
Constant makes good use of the wealth of excellent scholarship that has recently
emerged on the League and goes beyond it in several important areas. Paris has been
best served by the recent flurry of research, and Constant is able to rely almost entirely
on secondary works for his story here.1 For provincial cities, he uses the key works of
Philip Benedict on Rouen and Wolfgang Kaiser on Marseilles but also employs less
´
known secondary works, along with his own research on Orleans, Chartres, and Le
Mans, to show the variety of local issues and ambitions that determined both a city’s

´
1
Most important are Elie Barnavi, Le parti de Dieu: Etude social et´politique des chefs de la Ligue
parisienne, 1585–1594 (Brussels and Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1980); Elie Barnavi and Robert Desci´
mon, La Sainte Ligue, le juge et la potence: L’assassinat du president Brisson (Paris: Hachette,
1985); Denis Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu: La violence au temps des troubles de religion, vers
´
1525–vers 1610, 2 vols. (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 1990); Robert Descimon, Qui etaient les Seize?
´ ´
Mythes et realites de la Ligue parisienne, 1585–1594 (Paris: Klincksieck, 1983); and Denis Richet,
`
´
`
´
“Politique et religion: Les Processions a Paris en 1589,” in his De la Reforme a la Revolution: Etudes
sur la France moderne (Paris: Aubier, 1991), pp. 69–82.
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initial attraction to the League and the character of its revolt.2 Popular enthusiasm,
whipped to a frenzy of hatred for Henri III after his assassination of the duke and
cardinal of Guise, could lead to an early victory for the League, but the long-term
success of the movement in any given city depended more on the balance of power
among urban elites and between urban leaders and local nobles than on popular support
for League policies. This was true of Paris as well as the provincial cities, and Constant
does a good job of showing the underlying conflicts of interest that ultimately undermined the initial alliance struck between the League of the Catholic princes and the
movement’s radical leaders in Paris, the Seize.
Constant draws most heavily on his own research when he addresses the much neglected questions of just how strong support for the League was among the nobility and
where in particular this support was to be found. The book makes its most original and
useful contribution in this analysis of the social bases of the League, for it uncovers the
true weakness of the League’s power base outside of a few prominent urban centers. I
have some reservations about Constant’s decision to base his quantitative analysis of
aristocratic support for the League on a list of titled nobles received into the knightly
order of Saint Michel between 1560 and 1610. It is reasonable to ask how many men
named to the order before the revolt of the League remained loyal to the king. After
1588, however, one might well expect that the nominations were biased in favor of
rewarding men who had loyally served the crown. Despite these reservations about the
use of evidence, I am convinced by Constant’s broader argument that the royalist party
“was not in so catastrophic a situation” with respect to the League as “several generations of historians” have made it appear (p. 362). Henri IV’s eventual triumph over the
League is not as surprising as we are sometimes led to believe.
La Ligue does betray some marks of its hybrid character. The brief lists by chapter
of sources used only partly compensate for the book’s lack of footnotes, and local color
sometimes steals the floor from serious analysis. The chapter on “The Problem of
Henri III,” for example, retells all of the old saws about Henri’s frivolous favorites,
transvestite amusements, and baroque religious sensibilities. These stories may help
explain how Henri III’s subjects could become dissatisfied enough to join a revolt
´
against him, but making the king a roi faineant oversimplifies a complex situation. The
book does contain some factual errors, most of them trivial. For example, the misidentification of “la sainte veuve,” reported by Pierre de L’Estoile to have taken part in the
processions of the League wearing a rather suggestive costume, as Madame de Montpensier instead of Madeleine Luillier, Madame de Sainte-Beuve (p. 221), is unimpor´
tant except for the irony that Sainte-Beuve later emerged as a priggish devote and
founder of the French Ursulines. The misdating of the “uninterrupted cycle of processions” of the League in Paris to February 24 instead of January 24, 1589 (p. 219) is
more important in that it obscures the very direct connection between the overwrought
religiosity of the period and Henri III’s assassination of the Guises. It is also somewhat
misleading to date the cycle of processions only from the moment that they became a
more or less daily occurrence. A dramatic children’s procession took place on January
10, two days before the strange lights in the sky that Constant cites among the presumed
signs of God’s wrath that touched off the collective manifestations of penitential piety
in Paris (p. 219). The oversights here are particularly regrettable in that the seminal
2
Philip Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981); Wolfgang Kaiser, Marseille au temps´ de troubles:´Morphologie sociale et luttes de factions,
´
1559–1595, trans. Florence Chaix (Paris: Editions de l’Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales, 1992).
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article on these processions was written by Denis Richet, the scholar to whom Constant
dedicates his book (Richet). Still, in a five-hundred page book, some oversights and
errors of fact are perhaps inevitable. My criticisms on these minor points should not
obscure my recommendation of the book both as a synthesis that will prove useful to
nonspecialists and as an analytical work that specialists will want to read for its new
perspectives on the social geography and ultimate failure of the League.
Barbara B. Diefendorf
Boston University
A Classical Republican in Eighteenth-Century France: The Political Thought of
Mably. By Johnson Kent Wright.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997. Pp. vii⫹261. $49.50.
This intellectual biography of Gabriel Bonnot de Mably (1709–85) demonstrates the
vitality of the old art of situating texts in context, without elaborately constructed theory
and without apology for concentrating on an elite philosophe. It also shows that the
perennial question of the boundaries of the Enlightenment as a cultural movement and
the relationship of this movement to modern political culture will never be simply resolved. There was not a monolithic but a many-faceted Enlightenment that shaped the
vocabulary of modern political and social thought. Mably’s contribution created distant
echoes audible even in the era of late nineteenth-century Republics. The cranky, frugal
philosopher and historian lived a life of self-denial exemplifying his highest social ideals, feuded personally with Voltaire, criticized the “legal despotism” of the Physiocrats,
´
and lambasted partisans of luxury such as Claude-Adrien Helvetius. Modern scholars
have considered Mably either an archaic moralist outside the Enlightenment completely
or a communitarian utopian, who, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, forms a countercurrent
to a mainstream of Enlightenment thinkers enamored with commercial and industrial
progress.
Johnson Kent Wright’s original reinterpretation of Mably, inspired by his doctoral
supervisor Keith Baker, also explains why recent English and French historians (although not Italians and Germans) appear to have forgotten Mably. Mably, in this view,
was a classical republican and civic humanist, in the tradition of Polybius, Niccolo
Machiavelli, and the English Commonwealthsmen James Harrington and Algernon Sidney. This choice of ancients over moderns includes belief in “mixed government” (balanced monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic institutions) as realized in Sparta and
in the Roman Republic, a high valuation of civil and military sacrifices for the public
good, a critique of private gain and luxury, a partiality for ideological control through
moral censors and a public cult, and an interest in a communal property ideal or in
agrarian laws. Like Rousseau, Mably thought natural inequality no justified pretext for
the yawning chasms of social inequality.
Post-Revolutionary authors such as Benjamin Constant understood in 1819 that the
“ancient liberty” advocated by Mably and Rousseau inspired the Jacobins and was
therefore blameworthy, as contrasted to the “modern” commercial liberty of the marketplace. More recent historiography has simply forgotten the category of classical republicanism and has tended to focus on Mably’s links to utopian socialism.
To understand the significance of Mably, according to Wright, requires extending the
scope of J. G. A. Pocock’s Anglo-American “Atlantic” republicanism and civic humanism to France, with Mably and Rousseau as principal Continental exemplars. Wright’s
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thesis is well defended (there are hardly any Mably papers, however), although the
peculiarly elusive nature of “classical republicanism” remains. For example, before the
development of the political thought of Mably and Rousseau, the building blocks in
France included Henri de Boulainvilliers’s “aristocratic republicanism”—belief in an
egalitarian ancient assembly of racially pure nobles electing and largely dominating the
monarch. Subsequently, Montesquieu discussed the links between republicanism and
virtue, even if he himself feared the republic was an unlikely or unfeasible choice in
the modern world. With such diversely committed monarchists and supporters of aristocracy as Boulainvilliers and Montesquieu, it is little wonder that Wright must rely on
Harrington and Sidney for the origin of a truly republican tradition in France. Even
Mably seemed to regard the republic as unrealizable in a corrupt world and saw the
necessity for transforming the French absolute monarchy through a Whig-style revolu`
tion a la 1688 into a constitutional monarchy (Baker’s “script for a French revolution”).
In 1789, it was also Emmanuel Mounier’s “Monarchiens,” partisans of a strong monarchy, who appealed to Mably’s authority. While Mably no doubt inspired the Jacobins,
this is at least at face value an odd republican tradition with so many committed monarchists.
Far from being an abstract utopian, Mably’s most dramatic influence in preRevolutionary debates in 1788 stemmed from his realistic strategy (outlined in his
Droits et devoirs du citoyen, written thirty years earlier) for the reestablishment of an
Estates-General, with periodic sessions and true legislative authority. Mably’s life and
work took decisive turns as a result of three major events: The first was his personal
break with Cardinal de Tencin in 1747, which ended his bureaucratic and diplomatic
career and forever expelled him from an insider’s view. Second, the Jansenist and Parlementary agitation of the late 1750s led him to believe possible and necessary a major
change in French institutions. Finally, the Maupeou coup in France in 1771, followed
the next year by the collapse of Polish reform and of Swedish limited monarchy, unleashed a realistic, somewhat disillusioned pessimism. Mably died without realizing
how close France was to the cataclysm he had anticipated.
The author has meticulously studied all of Mably’s works, including his notions on
the study of history, which Mably applied most trenchantly in the Observations sur
l’histoire de France (published mostly in 1765). There Mably rejected the “ancient con`
`
stitution” theorists, whether of the these nobiliaire or of the these royale. France needed
a constitution not based on doubtful historical precedent but on natural law. His other
best-selling work, the philosophical dialogue called the Entretiens de Phocion (1763),
focused his strictures on the greed and ambition caused by private property. Reason
could temper the evil passions to transform them into virtues of emulation and prudence, and one could speculate about an ideal world of community of goods. Yet his
nonutopian strategy appears ever more clearly in his later works, that is, in his sensible
comments both on Polish government reform (1770–71) and on the American state
constitutions (1783).
This valuable book convincingly establishes that Mably, if not strikingly original,
deserves close study. In the conclusion, the author points toward a more thorough reassessment of the significance of the “classical republican” tradition that he may some
day wish to undertake.
Martin S. Staum
University of Calgary
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Freedom’s Moment: An Essay on the French Idea of Liberty from Rousseau to
Foucault. By Paul M. Cohen.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. Pp. x⫹229. $39.95 (cloth); $13.95
(paper).
Exercising critical discernment has been a defining activity of Western thinkers since
at least the time of the ancient Greeks. Only in the modern world, however, did “the
intellectual” emerge, with a more systematic critical stance, a heightened skepticism of
basic principles and norms, and a more clearly articulated opposition to social elites
and existing institutions. In France, the noun “intellectual” first appeared among the
literary avant-garde during the years immediately preceding the Dreyfus Affair, and it
quickly became the category of choice for thinkers who believed they had a right—
even an obligation—to speak on matters of national and international importance. But
although the newly christened category “intellectual” dates from the late nineteenth
century, the emergence of a secular militant group that believed it had a moral mission
to reform society and save the world dates from the Enlightenment, when the Encyclopedists transformed Locke’s prudent empiricism into an instrument of radical criticism.
The philosophes’ parti de la saine philosophie struggled against the “superstition” of
the church and the “irrationality” and “arbitrariness” of the state, and ever since France
has had an adversary culture which questions the legitimacy of established institutions
and the intelligence and good will of the clerisy, religious or secular, that defends
these institutions.
Paul M. Cohen, in his new book Freedom’s Moment, focuses on one subset of this
militant, missionary, moral intelligentsia in France, a subset made up of seven renowned
cultural critics from the mid-eighteenth century to the late twentieth century: JeanJacques Rousseau, Maximilien Robespierre, Jules Michelet, Henri Bergson, Charles
´
Peguy, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Michel Foucault, joined by Stendhal’s fictional creation
Julien Sorel. All of these men achieved notoriety in their day by denouncing the established order and its values and, also, by denouncing the established opposition. Cohen
makes a convincing case that these intellectuals, although not often associated, shared
a sufficient number of commonalities to constitute a tradition which he terms (employing a phrase of Pierre Bourdieu) “the consecrated heretics.”
What particularly fascinates Cohen is the common narrative structure—the recurrent
tropes and repeated motifs—in the lives and works of these “consecrated heretics.” One
of the most salient commonalities is the heroic myth which frames the public biographies of these individuals: the hero’s plebian and often provincial origins; his willful, intelligent, and independent character; his rise to celebrity because of his refusal to compromise with the socially dominant values of vanity, monetary advancement, and selfinterest; his public critiques of the established order and of those who make compromises with it; his public confession and martyrdom.
Central for all of these intellectuals, according to Cohen, was a distinctive conception
of liberty which insisted on absolute independence and autonomy. Freedom was liberation from les autres and from the pursuit of utilitarian gain, from the nightmare of
dependency on others, and from inner slavery to egoistic self-interest. It was this ideal
of liberty which informed their scathing critiques of high society and the bourgeoisie,
of the Catholic Church and its secular alternatives, of the centralized state and parliamentary politics. Liberation from the servility represented by all of these social forces
characteristically required moments of righteous and liberating violence. These intellectuals called for “a radical disruption of the norm, an outburst of violent will, an
exalted moment of crisis during which ‘the people’ purge both society and their own
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psyches of bureaucratic petrification and decay” (p. 174). Such “moments of freedom”
cannot be sustained, however, because there is an inevitable return to the realm of the
mundane and corrupt. Interludes of liberty, in sum, are fleeting and intermittent moments of unsullied will within a degenerate social universe.
Lucidly presented and elegantly written, Cohen’s account provides a refreshingly
bold view of the “fixed cultural architecture” (Cohen’s phrase, p. 19) of this tradition of
French political culture. My principal reservation is Cohen’s claim that this stance on
liberty is the French idea of liberty. While there can be little doubt that these French
cultural luminaries map out a French idea of liberty, it seems just as obvious that it
existed in a larger cultural world where competing conceptions of liberty also vied
for acceptance.
Most Enlightenment philosophes, to return to the formative chapter of the modern
French “intelligentsia,” combined criticism of the monarchy and church with proposals
for concrete institutional change. This is very different from Rousseau, who scorned the
give-and-take of deliberative politics and feared that intermediate political associations
would entail “dependence.” Rousseau mortgaged real politics for the purchase of abstract conceptions like general will and popular sovereignty, something that cannot be
said of Montesquieu, Voltaire, D’Alembert, Diderot, and others, who, compared with
Rousseau, advocated more practical reforms.
During the nineteenth century, liberals like Benjamin Constant, Alexis de Tocque´
ville, and Elie Halevy, republicans like Jules Simon, Charles Renouvier, and Emile
ˆ
`
Durkheim, and socialists like Louis Blanc, Benoit Malon, and Jean Jaures—to name
just a few—had views about liberty markedly different from those of Cohen’s idiosyncratic French tradition. Similar contrasts suggest themselves for the twentieth century.
Cohen’s account, by privileging a select group of French intellectuals who exalted outbursts of violent will and who, in his own words, nurtured “a disconcerting ideological
blind spot for the mythos of popular revolution” (p. 172), diminishes the centrality of
strains of French political thought that were concerned with fashioning realistic participatory arenas for deliberation about immediate economic and political issues.
This limitation is closely related to the manner in which Cohen frames the larger
issue of French political culture. Part of his agenda is to relate “the French concept of
freedom” to “the legendary instability of modern French politics—indeed, to the apparent resistance of modern France to liberal democracy as an established form of government” (p. 3). But France has been, except for the four-year hiatus of the Second World
War, a republic for over one hundred and twenty-five years; it was the first great European power to adopt a democratic constitution. Republican France has not been immune from crisis, of course, and it has often failed to live up to its ideal of republican
inclusion, but by any accounting this is an impressive run—indeed, it is one of the great
success stories of modern participatory democracy.
Cohen, I suspect, would not deny such obvious facts. But such contextual considerations suggest that the problematique of his book is flawed—or, better put, it makes too
grand a claim for the cultural dominance of these “consecrated heretics.” Their stance
on liberty, for all its brilliance, creativeness, and audacity (a stance so clearly captured
and imaginatively explored by Cohen in his book), seems, when compared with that of
other French traditions and when viewed from the perspective of the late twentieth
century, incredibly naive.
K. Steven Vincent
North Carolina State University
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Venality: The Sale of Offices in Eighteenth-Century France. By William Doyle.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp. 343. $85.00.
The author of two well-known books on the French Revolution and its origins, William
Doyle, a professor at the University of Bristol, now offers a thorough discussion of
a particular practice, the sale of offices. It is, however, no ordinary monograph. The
significance of the subject can hardly be overestimated. An enormous range of professions, including not only the entire judiciary but also such nonelite vocations as oyster
seller and freshwater fishmonger, came into the venal network. The sale of offices was
an important source of government revenue. It was the principal framework for social
mobility. It was a topic of debate among political theorists. Doyle manages to cover all
aspects in his detailed and wide-ranging chapters. As the listing of his own articles in
the bibliography reveals, he has been intrigued by the subject for thirty years. And,
along with erudition, he shows a talent for formulating interesting conclusions.
One such conclusion is that the French aristocracy was the most open in Europe.
Doyle estimates the number of ennoblements through the sale of offices to have been
at least ten thousand for the eighteenth century (p. 165). Ennobling offices, however,
elevated not simply individuals but their families as well. As Doyle notes, every officer
joining the nobility brought four or five other individuals with him; as a result, venality
accounted for fifty thousand or so new nobles. Elsewhere in Europe, to enter the nobility required a specific royal grant or a long process of assimilation based on the acquisition of land and other distinctive habits. Assimilation preceded the status—except in
France, where the process of assimilation began only after nobility was purchased (p.
166). Venality thus “transformed the character of the French nobility from a warrior
caste into a sort of open plutocracy” (p. 319). All of this changed in 1789, but not in
the way that was intended. The Revolutionaries tried to abolish nobility altogether but
“nobility,” Doyle writes, “cannot be abolished as long as people continue to accept
the existence of such an intangible, hereditary quality.” Respect for nobility outlasted
the Revolution—but the venal means of entering the nobility did not. Hence, one of the
results of the Revolution was that the nobility, for the first time in its history, ceased to
recruit newcomers. Ironically, the Revolution, with its hostility against social exclusion,
transformed an open nobility into a closed one (p. 319).
This should give an idea of how Doyle analyzes the sale of offices during the Old
Regime in a way that illuminates much more than just the Old Regime. A summary of
all the interesting topics he covers is impossible, but it is worth mentioning that he
provides an overview of the many types of offices (ennobling and non-ennobling) that
were for sale. He gives full information about the economic terms of office holding and
the changing rate of returns over the course of the century. He sketches the history
of the Parts Casual (Parties Casuelles), the bureau which administered venal offices and
the revenues produced by them. The director of this institution was called the Treasurer
General. The last Treasurer General before the Revolution was Auguste Louis Bertin
de Blagny, the author of “Reflections on the Venality of Offices in France” (presented
as a paper to the Academy of Inscriptions in 1750 and published in 1756), the only
work ever devoted entirely to the defense of venality. Bertin argued that as a source of
revenue for the Crown, venality weighed less heavily on the people than taxation. He
also tried to show that greed and rapacity were more connected to insecurity in the
tenure of office than security achieved through venality.
At the other end of the spectrum were those ministers—Colbert, Law, Laverdy, and
Maupeou—who set out most aggressively to limit the sale of offices. Doyle describes
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their plans of reform in great detail. Colbert’s efforts were the most effective. He
claimed to have suppressed twenty thousand venal positions. But as soon as war arose,
all his efforts were reversed. This was the general pattern in the following century:
attempts to change the system were aborted by financial emergency.
Doyle shows that many ministers would have liked to impose some limits on the sale
of offices. And most writers who dealt with the institution criticized it both economically, for diverting investment away from more productive outlets, and morally, for
making office a reward for wealth rather than merit or virtue. Venality pricked the conscience of the age, but no one could figure out a way to abolish it without doing enormous harm to current office holders. Doyle gives exquisite emphasis to the fact that a
custom can be solidly entrenched even when its ideological legitimacy is weak. On the
´
eve of acquiring a judicial office in Poitiers, Felix Faulcon noted in his journal in 1781:
“In good conscience, these customs of getting employment by purchase are always ridiculous and farcical, but since they are in vogue and one is almost naked in society
without some post thus acquired, I must simply do as others do. . . . Since I have no
means of destroying all the abuses that exist, let’s therefore tolerate what it’s not possible to change” (p. 274). Nothing could better illustrate the inertia in the system. But
then we are led to wonder: if the system was so widely accepted as a necessity, why did
´
the cahiers de doleances bring it dramatically into question, and why did the Revolutionaries abolish it so boldly?
These issues receive attention from Doyle near the end of the book, but his lines of
discussion seem to be tangled. Having consulted nearly all the cahiers, he finds that 31
percent of them attacked judicial venality and 28 percent attacked venal ennoblement.
Broken down by estate, the numbers can appear even more impressive. For example,
47 percent of cahiers from the Third Estate attacked judicial venality and 52 percent
of noble cahiers attacked venal ennoblement (p. 269). But Doyle seems intent on downplaying the figures: “venality was not an overwhelming concern for any of the orders
in 1789” (p. 270). He also claims that the terms of condemnation in the cahiers were
unoriginal: “Most striking . . . is the lack of new arguments” (p. 273). Yet he soon notes
that there was, in fact, something different in the cahiers. In contrast to earlier critics,
the critics in the cahiers were able to envision a novel alternative to the venal system.
They repeatedly affirmed that the way to appoint magistrates was by election, by “the
suffrage of public opinion” (p. 273).
But now it is unclear why he ever stated that the cahiers contain no new arguments.
Moreover, the information he supplies, although not his interpretation of it, plays well
into the hands of American and French scholars who have argued that the philosophical
idealization of “public opinion” in the last years of the Old Regime is a key element in
the story of the Revolution’s origins. The reader senses that Doyle does not want to tell
the story this way, for he makes no mention of this historiography; but he provides no
strong alternative either. In the end, the formulation he settles on is that the “complete
collapse of the established order opened minds to the possibility of hitherto unthinkable
changes” (p. 321). But is not the reverse the case? Don’t the cahiers suggest that it was
the opening of minds to the possibility of hitherto unthinkable change that led to the
complete collapse of the established order? If this is so, a fuller discussion of the ideological background and content of the cahiers would be helpful.
Doyle’s understanding of how entrenched institutions come to be abolished has apparently not advanced much since his Origins of the French Revolution (Oxford, 1980).
He seems to admit that his ideas are incomplete, for in a very modest footnote (p. 321,
n. 30) he compares his own interpretation of the abolition of venality unfavorably to
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J. H. Langbein’s more “sophisticated” work on the abolition of torture (Torture and the
Law of Proof [Chicago, 1977]). At this point, the reader is eager to intervene on the
author’s behalf. Doyle’s new book does advance scholarship on many issues. After all
the work that has already been done on eighteenth-century France, it is a pleasant shock
to see how many new things are to be gathered from a single study by this thoughtful
historian.
Daniel Gordon
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
The Revolution in Provincial France: Aquitaine, 1789–1799. By Alan Forrest.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp. x⫹377. $85.00.
The English are great connoisseurs of claret and are said to know the fine wines of
Bordeaux better than do the French themselves. Such expertise comes from the historically low costs of seaborne trade. It may also come from having once possessed the
area. It is fitting, then, that Alan Forrest, an Englishman with a deep affinity for Bordeaux and its regional wines, should try to reconstruct Eleanor of Aquitaine’s territory,
even though by the eighteenth century its regional identity had so weakened that it was
considered a “province that had aborted” (A. Demangeon, quoted on p. 2). Forrest’s
heroic effort to treat the very diverse revolutionary departments of the Charente´
´ ´
Inferieure, Gironde, Dordogne, Lot-et-Garonne, Landes, Basses-Pyrenees, and Hautes´ ´
Pyrenees (in older terms, the Aunis, Saintonge, Guienne, Gascony, Navarre, Bigorre,
´
and Bearn) as a single region is more than even Michelin’s guides verts could manage.
The choice can only be explained by the origins of this book as an intended volume
in
´
´
the series Histoire Provinciale de la Revolution Française before the publisher, Editions
Privat, fell victim to commercial forces. As is usually the case with orphans adopted by
new parents, Forrest’s book entered society with a rather different personality than it
would otherwise have had. Although it includes a handful of excellent maps, the many
images and document facsimiles common to its French siblings have been exchanged
for numerous footnotes and an ample bibliography. It is also, obviously, written in English, thus providing a welcome regional perspective for students of the French Revolution familiar with the main events but increasingly unable to read the plethora of local
histories written in French.
Alan Forrest is a leading member of the generation of British historians Richard
Cobb taught to look at the Revolution from a provincial point of view. Forrest’s first
book was entitled Society and Politics in Revolutionary Bordeaux (Oxford, 1975), but
now, several books later, he has returned to the region with a broader sense of revolutionary politics. Tensions between the center and periphery are now astutely balanced
by issues of purely local concern. In this way, he uncovers the political impact of chang´
ing trade patterns in the late ancien regime, the particularist opposition to the Estates´
General posed by Navarre and Bearn because they had provincial estates, the benefits
urban notables gained by mobilizing against the Great Fear, and the affirmation of
community solidarity in the festivals held ostensibly to celebrate the nation. It is fas`
cinating to see how the local power broker Bertrand Barere almost single-handedly
´ ´
created the improbable department of the Hautes-Pyrenees so that the modest town
of Tarbe, the site of his family fiefdom, could become its capital. Although insignificant on the national stage, these events were the stuff of provincial politics during the
Revolution.
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So too was violence. Large peasant jacqueries broke out frequently in the years
1789–91 and became increasingly ideological until antifeudal legislation removed the
principal sources of discontent. It might have been fruitful to compare the pattern of
these events with the areas of insurgency in 1799 and widespread incidents of violence
in 1800. However, like so many surveys of the French Revolutionary decade, the Directorial years get short shrift—indeed, royalism in the region after Napoleon gets better
coverage than the royalism there before him. These royalist sympathies and the overt
violence point back to the Federalist revolt. Forrest is an expert on federalism generally
and provides a detailed and nuanced study of its impact in the southwest. Dozens of
communities in the Gironde followed Bordeaux’s lead in opposing Jacobin centralism.
´
In contrast, the proximity of civil war in the Vendee and foreign war along the Pyrenees,
as well as strong pockets of Montagnard influence, left the surrounding departments
deeply ambivalent and chary of taking risks. Such hesitancy largely restricted bloody
repression to Bordeaux. Nonetheless, purges effected a local political—but not social—revolution wherever the National Convention had not received unswerving loyalty. Once thoroughly ensconced, the Jacobin dictatorship perpetrated some crimes
unique to the region, such as the “systematic attempt at mass deportation” inflicted on
the Basque villagers along the Spanish frontier (pp. 234–35). For the most part, however, the Terror was mild in the southwest and, therefore, so too was the Thermidorian
reaction: “there was no generalized killing” (p. 319).
This book is based on a wide range of secondary sources supplemented by documents from archival series in Paris and the seven department capitals of the southwest.
Forrest deftly weaves this material into a sturdy text that is sensitive to the many differences of experience across the area even while it facilitates comparison with other regions. These strengths are especially evident when the book’s loose chronological structure gives way to thematic chapters covering the impact of political mobilization,
religious reforms, foreign war, and economic and social change. Thus, one reads that
the Aquitaine had less rural resentment against urban elites than did western France,
even if thousands of peasants did invade the town of Sarlat in 1789; that the percentage
of clerical oath-taking was relatively high across the region, but that in Bordeaux it was
only 37 percent; that army recruitment was generally low, despite the Spanish invasion
of 1793 and the spectacularly successful French offensive of 1795; and that although
the collapse of Atlantic trade was catastrophic for rich and poor alike, consolidation of
the public debt did further damage to the merchant class at the same time that orphans
received special government assistance. Forrest’s thoughtful treatment of these and
many other issues is a smooth blend of venerable older scholarship and more recent
historiographical concerns. His use of French terms such as lods et ventes and jeunesse
´
doree without further explanation might imply an intended audience of experts, but it
is really novices locked in a Paris-centered understanding of the revolution who will
reap the greatest rewards from this book’s richly provincial point of view.
Howard G. Brown
SUNY, Binghamton

This content downloaded from 132.170.015.255 on November 05, 2019 07:03:14 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

710

Book Reviews

The Abolition of Feudalism: Peasants, Lords, and Legislators in the French
Revolution. By John Markoff.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996. Pp. xviii⫹689. $85.00
(cloth); $25.00 (paper).
This exceptionally useful book is the product of a mature scholar, a work of synthesis
at its best, bringing together in new form a wide body of secondary literature. Although
readers should be forewarned that the going is not always easy, the effort will be handsomely repaid.
John Markoff seeks to determine the grievances that propelled insurrectionary actions in various regions of France beginning in the spring and summer of 1789 and to
track them through the summer of 1793, when the National Convention, for all practical
purposes, eradicated all seigneurial rights. Only gradually, in fact, did antiseigneurial
insurrections become the primary type of action.
Markoff’s incisive treatment of the cahiers is one of the strongest features of the
book. He asserts convincingly that the peasantry did not view seigneurial rights as a
single, undifferentiated mass, but instead took a more nuanced view. For example, peasants resented the pigeons and rabbits of a lord, the exclusive right of the lord to hunt,
seigneurial monopolies, and property transfer payments much more than they did the
regular periodic dues. Furthermore, Markoff argues that it was less the weight of seigneurial obligations than the loss of their utility that contributed to the discontent of
the peasantry. Indeed, elements of the peasantry were willing to pay an indemnity to
end regular periodic dues.
The nobility also viewed seigneurialism in a bifurcated fashion, separating honor
from lucrative benefits. Not surprisingly, they emphasized the former, and thus were
largely unwilling to consider indemnification—most noble cahiers, in fact, simply remained silent on the issue of seigneurial obligations.
Markoff examines the peasant risings that occurred as the Old Regime began to
crumble. After establishing categories and skillfully advancing necessary qualifiers, he
analyzes nearly 4,700 actions between 1788 and 1793 drawn from secondary literature.
Just as the peasantry differentiated among seigneurial dues so, too, their insurrections
took various forms and had multiple targets. The most common form of peasant action,
antiseigneurial, was directed primarily against the symbols of lordship rather than at
lords themselves. Indeed, for all of the fear that they produced, the antiseigneurial risings were not nearly as unfocused as is generally believed and most were remarkably
nonviolent. Violence, in fact, was far more predominant in actions that had a religious
aspect. Markoff’s geographical breakdown also adds clarity to his findings and arguments. All of these actions, Markoff asserts, led to the Revolution taking form through
an interplay “of peripheral elites and central administrators, of elites and plebeians, of
the differently timed pressures from northern villagers and from those far from Paris”
(p. 426).
The watershed event was the meeting of the National Assembly during the evening
session of August 4, 1789. Although the National Assembly proclaimed the abolition
of feudalism, it established a distinction between rights to be abolished outright and
those to be abolished through compensation. This dichotomy framed the debate until
1793, when the National Convention, facing the need to mobilize the peasantry for war,
effectively eradicated seigneurial obligations by imposing nearly insuperable conditions for reimbursement. Markoff rightly emphasizes the evolving nature of the demands of the peasantry, which could change, as he notes, on virtually any given Sunday.
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A work of this scale will inevitably provoke discussion and disagreement. Markoff,
in fact, at times seems himself uncertain on major developments. He asserts—correctly,
in my opinion—that the legislation of March 1790 was “clearly a compromise” (p.
460), but two pages later this legislation, along with that of May 1790, establishing
indemnification rates, is characterized as seeking “to give away as little as possible
beyond grand statements” (p. 462)—a description that does not generally harmonize
with the concept of compromise. Indeed, having assiduously developed the importance
of honorific rights to the nobility and having described how much these rights were
detested by the peasantry, his characterization of their outright abolition as more form
than substance is surprising.
There is, in fact, a long tradition of denigrating the work of the National Assembly,
especially with respect to its resolution of the seigneurial issue. Although Markoff is
generally more cautious, he, too, occasionally succumbs to this tendency in an almost
reflexive fashion. In writing of the period of early 1790, for example, he characterizes
it as a period of sharp rural conflict, with 78 percent of insurrections antiseigneurial in
nature, whereas during July and August, 1789, the percentage of antiseigneurial actions
had been only 31 percent. The clear implication is that the August decrees had not only
done little to stem the discontent of the peasantry but had compounded it. On closer
examination, however, it turns out that the actual number of antiseigneurial actions was
approximately 383 during July–August 1789 and 222 during January–March 1790.
This is a decline of 42 percent in incidents, suggesting that the measures of August—
even as yet undefined—were more beneficial than Markoff seems to allow. As concerns
about the harvest receded, the number of subsistence actions declined, moving antiseigneurial actions to the forefront. Nevertheless, even as the percentage of antiseigneurial
events was increasing, the actual number of actions was decreasing.
Markoff’s enthusiasm for his subject occasionally leads him to interpret virtually all
measures of the National Assembly as aspects of the abolition of feudalism, when in
fact the abolition of feudalism was a springboard to far broader reforms. The renunciations originally put forward as a response to rural insurrection electrified the National
Assembly and became a catalyst to correct other perceived inequities in French society.
These subsequent renunciations were independent actions and were not necessarily
“part and parcel of ‘feudalism’ as it appeared to the revolutionaries of the summer of
1789” (p. 163). The destruction of venality of office, the free administration of justice,
the abolition of guilds, and other developments were not related to feudalism but became part of a broader effort to regenerate society that began with the apparent renunciation of feudalism during the night of August 4, 1789.
Finally, Markoff at times chides the legislators of the National Assembly for being
excessively legalistic in their treatment of seigneurial dues. There is, of course, a great
deal of truth to this, but, as Markoff recognizes, even the National Convention did not
seek to modify in any substantial fashion the legislation crafted by the National Assembly until it confronted the need to mobilize the peasantry for war. He observes that a
law of July 1793 that abolished reimbursement was anticlimactic, but he leaves unsaid
that this was due in part to the fact that the National Assembly never sought to enforce
or compel payment. This course of action could not be proclaimed explicitly, but the
fact that the National Assembly did not go beyond mere exhortation—for example, to
instruct departmental administrations to enforce payment or reimbursement of seigneurial dues—is significant.
These differences, or the disagreements that any reader may have, do not detract in
any way from Markoff’s substantial achievement. His book is one that scholars will
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want to consult in order to understand one of the major issues that confronted legislators
during the early years of the French Revolution. Comprehensive and judicious, this is
a book with which scholars will unquestionably want to acquaint themselves.
Michael P. Fitzsimmons
Auburn University at Montgomery
Singing the French Revolution: Popular Culture and Politics, 1787–1799. By
Laura Mason.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. xi⫹268. $39.95.
Of Paris in the last decade of the eighteenth century, Laura Mason writes: “It was a city
that encompassed a cacophony of voices as revolutionaries and royalists filled the
´
streets, theaters, and cafes, organizing festivals, giving speeches, rioting and throughout
all, singing” (p. 2). Mason’s purpose in this lively book is to treat songs as a means of
interpreting Revolutionary culture, as well as to analyze how the Revolution changed
singing. The dialogue inherent in singing culture had the important effect of involving
virtually everyone in the revolution, friends and foes alike, and explains why governments eventually tried to impose a uniform political outlook on a highly disparate public with vastly different experiences of and hopes for changes. The Revolution’s unraveling, she contends, was the result in large part of its inability to generate a permanent
song culture and polity.
The author’s interesting hypothesis, which she anchors in the work of François Furet,
Mona Ozouf, Maurice Agulhon, and Lynn Hunt, is that the modern notion of political
culture stems from the great multiplicity of ideas of it in early Revolutionary France—
´
from the variability that existed about, for example, liberte. Since people understood
´
liberte differently, it could be hailed, iconized, and sung among “radicals” and “counterrevolutionaries” in unison with no great problem.
Happily, Mason rejects the sociological conception of the term “popular”—but only
to interpolate it, by arguing that the notion of a commoner’s song was authorized by the
Old Regime’s labeling it “popular.” Thus, she uses a Baker-type linguistic, rhetorical,
and power-centered thesis to refute my argument that “popular” did not designate “culture” for the ordinary citizen as opposed to that for the elite. If the argument of her
book is that politics and culture interacted, then who did sing together and create the
new culture? If there was a continuous exchange among disparate groups during the
Revolution, who was it, if not elite and commoner alike, who legitimized songs as
political expressions and bequeathed to the nineteenth century the voice of a “more
equitable and inclusive polity” (p. 17)?
Mason employs a topical within a chronological organization in order to show how
conflicts among songs and singers responded to changes in events. Thus, readers can
appreciate varieties of song culture, but only as singing responded to the changes in
events. She stresses the times when a society of highly divergent groups and political
opinions coalesced on a particular promise or policy. Songs then became the voice of
the entire Revolutionary body rather than just the voice of commoners. But it could not
last. It was beyond the revolution’s ability to eliminate social differences and cultural
disparities.
The principal problem with this excellent book is the author’s inability to make up
her mind whether singing culture was the representative voice of opposition or the con-
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vergence of singers. She wants to have it both ways and tries to get out of the dilemma
by arguing for periods of transition versus innovation, radicals against conservatives,
by pegging songs to the flux of events. It does not always work, leading to contradiction and inconsistencies. It is as if Mason had constructed a hypothesis about revolutionary change and then bent the revolution and its song culture to fit her analytical categories.
Mason succeeds in demonstrating that singing and politics were tightly interconnected, providing commoners with a means of expressing and shaping their bonds,
debates, and aspirations. Her research is impressive. She has used several archives extensively, and she has an admirable command of the secondary literature. Mason’s subject is important, her argument is effectively presented, and the story is interesting.
Robert M. Isherwood
Vanderbilt University
´
`
Musee, nation, patrimoine, 1789–1815. By Dominique Poulot. Bibliotheque des
histoires.
Paris: Gallimard, 1997. Pp. 406.
In an age of hypercommunication and identity politics, when tourism outpaces other
sources of revenue in developed and undeveloped countries alike, the heritage business
is booming. As living memory erodes and severs the here and now from even an immediate past, anything not of the present becomes “old” and the source of resonance and
nostalgia. Collectibles, theme parks, disco music, retro diners, and museums of every
kind—the past in the form of packaged and commodified heritage has never been more
popular. For more than a decade, Dominique Poulot has written on the growth of this
industry and its historical origins, especially with respect to museums, high culture,
and France, where a convergence of historical events, institutional practices, and personalities fostered the early emergence of a collective national sense of patrimoine, and
where today the study of heritage constitutes a virtual subfield of history (appropriately,
the Louvre bookstore now features a separate section devoted to the subject).
The purpose of the present book, which represents a mature synthesis of Poulot’s
earlier writings, is to chart the development of the concept of heritage in France, from
its beginnings in the antiquarian pursuits of Benedictine monks and gentlemen scholars
on the fringe of the Enlightenment to its moment of modern definition in the hands of
F. P. G. Guizot, the nineteenth-century historian and politician whose initiatives and
writings led to a new understanding of the nation’s artistic patrimony and its contribution to French identity. In between the Benedictines and Guizot lies the French Revolution, the main focus of Poulot’s account. The novelty and strength of Poulot’s text lies
in the author’s ability to revisit familiar revolutionary strategies—notably, the nationalization of property and creation of museums, and the separation of feudal past from
republican present—in light of broader narrative concerns. While we don’t learn anything new about the fabric or daily workings of the Louvre or Alexandre Lenoir’s Museum of French Monuments, we do come away with a heightened sense of why they
mattered, then and now, and how they participated in an unfolding construction of heritage. Less an antiquarian than a historian of ideas, Poulot resists filling in the profiles
of people and places he mentions along the way, depriving us of local color but keeping
us focused on his central theme. This is not a book to dip into or approach selectively
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via the index; patience is required to yield the cumulative force of his layered argument.
(A more detailed and documented presentation of his thesis was published in 1996.)1
For Poulot, museums, and art museums in particular, were key because in them intersect the constituent elements of the modern idea of heritage: a collection of authentic
objects attractively configured to represent the past; a public disposed to view those
objects as embodiments of national traditions and universal human creativity; and Enlightenment notions about the utility of art and public institutions.
Antiquarian study in the early modern era, whether concerned with the Greco-Roman
world or the French past, relied heavily on the collecting and interpretation of material
objects. In the eighteenth century, J. J. Winckelmann and his disciples forged an equation between the quality of a society’s arts and its politico-moral health, claiming that
one could gauge the latter by assessing the former. On a more popular level, guidebooks
referred European travelers to monuments as eloquent witnesses to past epochs. The
evidentiary status and value of objects was further accentuated by the threat of destruction during the French Revolution. Vandalism triggered inventories and an evaluation
of objects, including those theretofore disdained by conventional taste, such as church
monuments and pre-Renaissance architecture. The problem of what to do with displaced or discredited objects was answered by the museum, where former associations
and meanings could be transmuted into a new utilitarian purpose and a transcendent
historical narrative.
Lenoir’s museum vividly illustrates these impulses, and it is given a climactic place
in Poulot’s story. Poulot is no apologist for Lenoir (though he is tempted to see in Lenoir’s taste for showmanship and self-promotion the sure mark of the modern museum
man). Rather he views the ongoing ideological battle over Lenoir’s achievements and
legacy as itself constitutive of the contingent and constructed nature of heritage. Lenoir
has been roundly criticized for his shoddy scholarship and eccentric theories on a startling array of topics, from Egyptian hieroglyphs to the origins of freemasonry and the
ogive arch, but, as Poulot argues, these eclectic studies were of a piece with the underlying goal of his museum, namely to demonstrate the universal history of man through
the form and iconography of material art objects. Not that he viewed the contents of
his museum as “art”: he was too much of his time to credit medieval monuments with
aesthetic merit. Presenting his monuments and sculptures as historical landmarks rather
than artistic masterpieces, he arranged his museum chronologically and decorated successive rooms with resonant “period” decor. In a final chapter devoted to contemporary
responses to the revolutionary museums, Poulot shows that visitors to the evocative
rooms of Lenoir’s museum in particular experienced a kind of historical insight that
approached hallucination in its intensity and depth. History could be seen and touched
in new and unforeseen ways. For Jules Michelet, who visited the museum as a boy, the
sensation was so strong that it made him a historian.
The sight of orphaned monuments and historical remains re-presented in a simulated
museum environment produced a paradoxical sensitivity to and nostalgia for original
´
sites and previously overlooked lieux de memoires. The simultaneous allure and rejection of museums gave birth to parallel developments that continue to inform our sense
of heritage. Historic preservation movements began to safeguard monuments in situ,
while at the same time the quest for authenticity and above all for feeling generated by
nostalgia would lead to a new breed of historically resonant museum, of which the
´
´
Dominique Poulot, “Surveiller et s’instruire”: La Revolution française et l’intelligence de l’heritage historique. Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, vol. 344, ed. Anthony Strugnell
(Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1996).
1
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´
Musee de Cluny in Paris and Soane Museum in London are early examples. The conjunction of popular revolution and public museum gave rise to what Poulot describes
as a new “museum sensibility,” a bourgeois desire to pursue private experience in a
space designed to deliver comforting messages about one’s identity and place in history.
Seemingly universal in scope yet open to local inflection, authoritative but conducive
to individual reverie, museums have become popular the world over and remain central
to our culture because they simultaneously affirm our shared heritage as well as our
subjective existence, our freedom to respond to (and purchase replicas of) objects that
embody who we are and where we come from.
Andrew McClellan
Tufts University
´ ´
Histoire des choses banales: Naissance de la consommation dans les societes
`
e
traditionnelles, XVII–XIX siecle. By Daniel Roche.
Paris: Fayard, 1997. Pp. 329. Fr. 130.
For over more than a decade now, Daniel Roche has been establishing himself as the
preeminent historian of consumption in early modern France. His Le peuple de Paris
(Paris, 1981) focused on the material life of the Parisian lower classes over the last
´
century of the ancien regime and posited the existence of a “first consumer revolution”
predating the social and political events of 1789. His La culture des apparences (Paris,
1989) concentrated on one of the more prominent features of that consumerism, the
emergence of a fashion industry over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while
`
his general synthesis, La France des Lumieres (Paris, 1993), set out the broad framework of the consumption of culture in the context of a general analysis of Enlightenment France.
The framework and mode of analysis of Histoire des choses banales—whose wonderful title is worthy of Georges Perec—is in some ways similar to the latter work,
offering as it does a broad synthesis drawn from a very wide range of materials: Roche
is well versed in current debates on consumerism in England and North America, while,
as well as displaying an impressive array of primary and secondary sources, he also
draws heavily on works of local erudition and on student theses often less accessible to
Anglo-American scholars. Yet the work also signals an important break in his own
methodology and conceptions as a historian. Roche started his career very much within
the aegis of the Annales tradition: his doctoral thesis on provincial academies delineated
the social framework of an important component of enlightened discourse in
eighteenth-century France, while Le Peuple de Paris was based on the systematic analysis of thousands of postmortem inventories. Here, however, he marks his distance from
the Annales paradigm, notably as regards Fernand Braudel’s Capitalism and Material
Life, to which the present work is directly comparable. Whereas Braudel viewed mate´
rial culture in the longue duree as a kind of imprisoning device limiting change, condi´
tioning ideologies and attitudes and dragging out a “social and economic ancien regime” well into the nineteenth century, Roche takes a less pessimistic and altogether
more culturalist and anthropological approach, turning Braudelian determinism on its
head. His specific rejection of an Annaliste approach that moves “upward” from the
cave to the grenier, as he puts it, forms part of a more general determination on his part
to eschew all the tempting polarities on which the history of material culture have hitherto been grounded. Conceptual schemas that bring into play putatively explanatory
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dichotomies (infra/superstructure, material/ideological, real/imaginary, popular/elite,
luxury/necessity, urban/rural, and so on) are all pitilessly condemned. The emphasis
throughout is on flow, fluidity, circulation, transcendence of barriers and obstacles, pluralistic creativity. Even production and consumption themselves are viewed as nondichotomous: following Marx, Roche sees each as the obverse of the other. Although he
admits in his conclusion that a narrative framed in terms of production as an effect of
consumption is still too difficult to achieve, he is clearly attracted to the idea of consumption as the means by which individual meanings and indeed subjectivities are produced.
Curiously, a work that claims—and largely delivers—so very much holds onto one
of the most enduring contrasts in the Annaliste palette, namely, that between the traditional and the modern. A traditional society, for Roche, is one that, in terms of material
culture, is characterized by scarcity and shortage; a modern society is one that is characterized by plethora, profusion, and plenty—although Roche is well aware of inequalities in provision within our own world. (Incidentally, he provides autobiographical clues
regarding his dogged holding on to this dichotomy: he lived through France’s enforced
return to an economy of scarcity following the 1940 defeat, an experience that made
the commodity culture that exploded onto France from the 1950s onward all the more
startling and contrastive.) The seventeenth and (particularly) eighteenth centuries,
which are the focus of the present work, are seen as the period of transition par excellence, as French society shifted from the traditional to the modern, from the preindustrial toward the industrial, and from a social discourse based on moral economy to one
grounded in political economy. Although he tracks the impact of change from cottage
to chateau and from domestic hearth to multiple sites of public display, the engine of
transformation is France’s couple of hundred towns, its four thousand-odd fairs, and its
even more numerous marketplaces that, together with an ever-more tentacular print
culture, formed a network for the creation of new meanings and new objects. Here the
historian may perceive innovative modes of appropriation of the natural world as well
as new attitudes and practices of consumerism. Following chapters devoted to the environment, the town, and the debate on luxury, Roche organizes his material around the
main arenas of material consumption: housing, warmth and light, water supply, furnishings, dress, and diet. It is impossible to summarize the dazzlingly entertaining diversity
of the material covered in each chapter as Roche disserts variously on buttons, baths,
and braziers, or on coffee, chamberpots, cookbooks, or candlelight—or indeed on any
aspect of the bric-a-brac of modern living. The most arcane or seemingly banal of objects, snatched from the jaws of the antiquarian and rendered its full historicity, becomes
a piece of a much larger jigsaw that bears the picture of modernity. Never dull and
always instructive, sage but never grave, he painstakingly documents the full extent of
the transformation of material culture being wrought at the very heart (and not solely in
the fashionable elite) of eighteenth-century society and rules out of court any nostalgic
´
attachment to the ancien regime as a prelapsarian world of preconsumerism, stretched
out on the rack of brute necessity. His splendid volume, which both transcends historical
pointillisme and offers important lessons in method, is a work to be read, savored, pondered, and (as quickly as possible, publishers, please) translated.
Colin Jones
Warwick University
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Music Criticism in Nineteenth-Century France: “La Revue et Gazette musicale
de Paris,” 1834–1880. By Katharine Ellis.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. xiii⫹301.
Music Criticism in Nineteenth-Century France offers an in-depth study of the richest,
most intellectually engaged of the popular French music journals of the nineteenth century. From the first years of the July Monarchy until 1880, La revue et gazette musicale
de Paris provided readers with a weekly selection of historical musicology, notices of
recently published scores, composers’ biographies, and extensive concert and operatic
reviews. To judge by subscription figures it was not the most widely read musical journal of its time, but as Katharine Ellis observes it did more than any of its competitors
to establish the terms and refine the techniques that guide professional musical criticism
today. This, in addition to the journal’s sheer range of topics treated over the better part
of the century, justifies its selection for this closely analytical monograph.
Ellis proposes three goals for the book: to survey the Gazette’s music criticism, to
provide a detailed reception history of works performed in Paris from 1834 to 1880,
and to explore the intellectual foundations of the journal’s musical discourse. Of the
three, the first receives Ellis’s most sustained attention. Her patient and comprehensive
presentation of the critical reaction to every major composer—and many minor ones
as well—who appeared in Paris reveals a vibrant intellectual community in near daily
dialogue with a rapidly changing musical scene. In contrast to our own personalityobsessed age, which takes the canon as above reproach and focuses on the performance,
these writers struggled to assess the works. The task inevitably produced howlers.
“Brahms seems entirely lacking in the gift of symphonic composition,” Charles Bannelier announced in 1880; and, for Edouard Monnais, Verdi’s Nabucco was “noise, lots
of noise, nothing but noise” (pp. 172, 195).
But the greater effect of the copious contemporary reviews Ellis quotes is to remind
us how skewed our own concertgoing assumptions can be: the “standard” nineteenthcentury repertoire, by which we judge the less familiar composers of the past, was more
often outside than within the mainstream. One reviewer pitied the pianist who had to
perform Beethoven’s Fourth Piano Concerto, whose equal status of orchestra and soloist
denied the latter his deserved attention and applause, and Beethoven’s Fifth Piano Concerto was deemed, simply, a “symphony with obbligato piano” (p. 164). A consequence
of these writers’ greater attention to the works than to their execution was to enlarge
the range of cultural and social references. One reviewer claimed, for instance, that the
best preparation for hearing L’Enfance du Christ of Hector Berlioz would be to stroll
through the early paintings at the Louvre, an intriguing recommendation that illustrates
the emergent Romantic conception of artistic interdependency and looks forward to the
synesthetic theories of Wassily Kandinsky.
Ellis is right to emphasize these wider implications of the journal’s essays, but her
analyses are not always illuminating. Ellis links the regular appearance of the term
“eclecticism” in musical reviews to Victor Cousin’s philosophical program of reconciling apparent opposites. Thus was Felix Mendelssohn praised for finding a compromise
between “melodic and learned principles” and balancing the demands of “expression
and doctrine.” Following Cousin, writers of La Gazette cited eclecticism in justifying
its overall aesthetic prudence, which viewed with equal suspicion, for instance, the
revolutionary Richard Wagner and “the gigantic strangleholds of a Bach or a Handel”
(p. 139).
But Ellis tends to conflate eclecticism as a philosophical program with the July Monarchy’s political program of juste-milieu, at times using them interchangeably. This is
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unfortunate, since a properly political understanding of the latter would enhance her
discussion of the Gazette’s general conservatism. Quite apart from Giacomo Meyerbeer’s musical eclecticism, which Ellis rightly identifies as mixing styles promiscuously, is the moderate political message of his plots, which invariably steer a middle
´
way between revolutionary bloodshed and reactionary fanaticism: his librettist Eugene
Scribe (inexplicably absent from these pages) was a virtuoso in playing to the hopes
and insecurities of the juste-milieu.
Ellis provides intelligent commentary on the process of musical canon-formation as
it occurred in nineteenth-century France. Given the eighteenth-century view that music
affected chiefly the senses without penetrating to the soul, the first requisite for a canon
of classics was the recognition of a moral and emotional component to music. Ellis
traces the rise of this conception in the pages of the Gazette through the works of Haydn
and Beethoven. She further observes that the very idea of a canon demands that audiences view musical works as timeless—or, short of that, at least as capable of outliving
´
their creators. This latter process, as the indefatigable pedagogue François-Joseph Fetis
discovered in his campaign for the revival of the works of Palestrina and Bach, involved
both historicizing the work in order to understand it and transcending the time and place
of composition in order to appreciate it. Ellis emphasizes the role Berlioz played as a
contributor to the Gazette in the development of a canon. “We are the ones who become
old,” he warned listeners who resisted early music, “it is our imagination which fades”
(p. 59).
Hector Berlioz, the subject of Ellis’s final chapter, enjoyed a unique status at the
Gazette as both judge and judged. He was a regular contributor to the journal and the
most comprehensively treated living composer in its pages. But as Ellis demonstrates,
his prominence in the Gazette did not necessarily secure him favors. His treatment at
the hands of colleagues was often severe and sometimes harsh. Ellis suggests that his
fortunes in the Gazette reveal much about the journal’s own editorial shifts over the
course of Berlioz’s long career. First championed as a romantic, Berlioz suffered in the
´
1840s and 1850s under the aesthetic conservatism of F.-J. Fetis (who believed that musical art since Mozart was in irreparable decline), only to be rehabilitated in the 1870s
as a closet Classicist. Music Criticism in Nineteenth-Century Paris retraces these shifts
as they affected Berlioz and his contemporaries admirably and with care, adding in
important ways to our knowledge of nineteenth-century French musical culture.
James H. Johnson
Boston University
The Paradise of Association: Political Culture and Popular Organizations in the
Paris Commune of 1871. By Martin Phillip Johnson.
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996. Pp. viii⫹321. $44.50.
One of the most interesting aspects of modern revolutions is the vibrant popular associations they spawn. The French Revolution produced Jacobin clubs and sans-culotte
assemblies; 1848 gave rise to democratic clubs and workers’ associations; the Paris
Commune saw the revival of clubs; the Russian Revolution created the soviets that
gave the new communist country its name. Revolutions seem to bring more people into
meeting halls than into the streets. Individuals long excluded from political life want to
participate; they want to shape the cascade of events the revolution has unleashed.
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Martin Phillip Johnson’s new book examines the multitude of political clubs that the
French events of 1870 and 1871 brought into being. As in 1789 and 1848, Parisians
flocked to popular associations to advance ideological positions, support or oppose the
Commune’s government, cheer or boo political leaders, and just associate with likeminded individuals. Political clubs saw themselves not just as pressure groups but as
the essence of a revolutionary movement whose day-to-day actions expressed their fundamental goal: popular sovereignty.
In this work, Johnson claims disinterest in old debates about whether the Commune
was a proletarian revolution and whether it looked to socialist revolutions of the future
or to democratic upheavals of the past. He wants to analyze the Commune on its own
terms, as a discrete historical phenomenon with a political culture born in the associations central to his story. Still, he can’t completely resist the tussles of his historiographical predecessors. Johnson sides with those who deny that the Commune was primarily
a class conflict, although he does see it as considerably more than a rerun of 1789
and 1848.
For Johnson, the Commune resulted from the determined organizational efforts of
radical clubs formed in the aftermath of the Second Empire’s collapse (September
1870). These associations sought to push the country’s timid new republican government to the Left and to maintain a patriotic front against the Germans who had laid
siege to Paris. The first clubbist uprising occurred as early as October and there were
repeated attempts over the next several months to replace the moderate republic with
a more radical regime. Johnson’s point is that an incipient Commune already existed in
the fall of 1870; it triumphed in March of 1871 thanks to the tireless efforts of the
numerous associations dedicated to revolutionary change.
In making this argument, Johnson exaggerates somewhat the novelty of his position,
downplaying the findings of some writers and misconstruing the work of others. Johnson is not the first to note the importance of popular organizations (see, e.g., Alain
Dalotel, Alain Faure, and Jean-Claude Freiermuth, Aux origins de la Commune: Le
´
`
mouvement de reunions publiques a Paris, 1868–1870 [Paris, 1980]), nor is it a breakthrough to show that the Commune was more the result of intensive organizing than
spontaneous rebellion in the streets. Johnson maintains that the long-dominant leftist
historiography of the Commune has overlooked the importance of organizations, preferring to celebrate the Commune as spontaneous and therefore authentic. But his own
evidence shows that at least some left-wingers may have been less romantic than he
thinks.
Johnson cites the Russian revolutionary Mikhail Bakunin, writing just after the Commune’s defeat, as a prime example of this left-wing romanticism. Bakunin declared
that “the revolution could only be accomplished and fully developed by means of the
spontaneous, continuous action of the masses—of the popular groups and associations”
(p. 278). Since “spontaneous” and “continuous” are oxymoronic, Bakunin must have
used “spontaneous” to mean something other than “unorganized.” The context of his
statement suggests what he had in mind. Bakunin chose the word “spontaneous” to
distinguish the democracy of clubs from the authoritarianism of the Commune government. Indeed, his quotation clearly links spontaneity to the activity of “popular groups
and associations,” making “spontaneity” synonymous with the work of the clubs. For
Bakunin, then, associations, not the Commune’s official government, formed the essence of the revolution, a position remarkably similar to the one Johnson takes in
his book.
Another troubling aspect of this work is its apparent unfamiliarity with the Revolu-
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tion of 1848, surely a crucial part of the historical context of the Paris Commune. Although Johnson cites Peter Amann’s seminal Revolution and Mass Democracy: The
Paris Club Movement in 1848 (Princeton, N.J., 1975), he seems to have missed the
extent to which the associations of 1848 anticipated those of 1871. Johnson might have
noted, for example, that in 1848, as under the Commune, most clubs represented localities, not trades or social classes, and that in both cases clubs sought to transform political
as well as economic life. When it came to revolutionary ideology, socialism was nearly
as important to 1848 as to 1871, and Johnson is incorrect to say that “the Revolutionary
Socialist Party [of 1871] represented a radical break from the earlier conceptions of
how to achieve a socialist society” (p. 74). The socialists of 1871 were not the first to
abandon the utopian idea that socialism could be created outside the realm of politics.
´
The democrates-socialistes of 1848 understood full well that the achievement of socialism required direct political action. To be sure, the socialism of 1848 differed from that
of 1871, but it was during the earlier revolution that socialism and politics became
inextricably linked.
Despite these problems of historical context and interpretation, Johnson’s book has
considerable value. Thanks to his impressive archival research, Johnson has provided
the fullest account to date of the Commune’s popular associations, including new data
and convincing analysis of the social composition of club participants. What is more,
he pays considerable attention to the women’s organizations largely ignored in the older
historiography. Women’s clubs sought to link socialism and feminism, and their members understood that female and male interests did not always coincide. Johnson shows
that the Commune’s cult of violence affected women’s organizations at least as much
as it did men’s, and he writes interestingly about women’s efforts to join, even lead, men
in battle. Extremely useful as well is his discussion of the communards’ efforts to harass
and repress those who opposed their movement. Finally, I found highly illuminating
Johnson’s efforts to understand conflicts within the Commune not in terms of the tired
categories of Jacobin, Proudhonian, Blanquist, or Marxist, but as the opposition
between revolutionary purists and republican-socialist reformers. Members of both
groups could be found in the Commune government as well as the clubs.
Johnson’s book may not have put to rest the traditional debates over the origins and
meaning of the Paris Commune, but he has cast these and many other key issues in a
fresh and interesting light.
Edward Berenson
New York University
Education and Identity in Rural France: The Politics of Schooling. By
Deborah Reed-Danahay. Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology,
volume 98. Edited by Ernest Gellner et al.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xiii⫹237.
In this anthropological study of the interplay between schooling and family strategies
in a remote agricultural community in south-central France, a public primary school
figures as “an important cultural site for the construction of both local and national
identity, and for the negotiation of conflict between families and the state” (p. 2). Based
on field work conducted in 1980 and 1981, the book is reminiscent of Laurence Wylie’s
famous account of the school’s role in a southeastern village in the Vaucluse department
during the early 1950s, and it should interest social scientists and historians wishing to
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compare Wylie’s observations with something more recent.1 Reed-Danahay’s village,
ˆ
“Lavialle,” is forty-five kilometers southwest of Clermont-Ferrand in the Puy-de-Dome
department of the Auvergne region. Although the village name is fictitious, as are the
names of residents, historians will be surprised that the author never explains that
the village designation is evidently a reminder of the (in) famous Vichy leader from the
Auvergne, Pierre Laval. He and Vichy do not figure in the index or bibliography, but
there is one reference to “the reactionary Vichy Regime” and its “renewed support to
religious education” (p. 127). The author supplemented her field experience with archival documents concerning the history of the community’s schools, population, and economic base, and for secondary sources she drew primarily from the sociology and history of rural areas and education and also from sociological and anthropological theory.
Reed-Danahay contests Eugen Weber’s conclusions about the primary school’s role
in turning “peasants into Frenchmen” during the Third Republic.2 Overlooking Weber’s
indications that this process was not over by 1914, she uses his book as a counterpoint
to her emphasis on the lingering strength of regional identities. Thus she concludes that
Lavialle’s people of the 1980s “had not . . . made the transition from ‘peasants into
Frenchmen’ ” and instead “forged an identity that allowed the coexistence of both rural
Auvergnat identity and French national identity” (p. 207). Readers may well view these
coexisting identities as partial confirmation of Weber’s thesis, but quibbles with such
generalizations do not prevent appreciation of the author’s insights into village life.
To account for local resistance to “national” identities represented by the public
school’s curriculum and teachers, Reed-Danahay not only draws on but also criticizes
the theoretical work of sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron. Despite
the high degree of centralization in French educational policy and practice, she argues
that many communities still use schools as sites for resistance to the national culture.
Bourdieu and Passeron have stressed the importance of “cultural capital” for success in
French society, and they underscore the role of elite secondary schools and grandes
´
ecoles in the process of “cultural reproduction.”3 In Lavialle and many comparable rural
´
communities, however, most pupils never advance to academic lycees in larger towns
`
and cities. Often repeating one or more grades, they end schooling at a nearby college
(“junior high school”), leaving when they reach age sixteen. The primary school’s basic
education certainly reinforces and reproduces national values, but Reed-Danahay finds
especially useful Bourdieu’s emphasis on the “symbolic violence” experienced in the
classroom by rural and working-class children. “Symbolic violence,” wrote Bourdieu,
“allows force to be fully exercised while disguising its true nature as force and gaining
recognition, approval and acceptance by dint of the fact that it can present itself under
the appearances of universality—that of reason or morality” (p. 212). Believing that
Bourdieu and Passeron exaggerate students’ and parents’ passive acceptance of “cultural reproduction,” Reed-Danahay looks for the community’s awareness of “symbolic
violence” and resistance to it.
Her evidence for resistance to the school’s culture comes from the fabric of everyday
life. Like many rural communities, Lavialle long experienced considerable losses of
population: by 1914, it was a third smaller than in 1800, and later emigrations removed
another third, leaving its 1982 population at 421 and barely able to support a two-room
1

Laurence Wylie, Village in the Vaucluse (1957; 3d. ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1975).
Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914 (Stanford, Calif., 1976).
´
´
3
Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Les heritiers, les etudiants et la culture (Paris, 1964),
and Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture, trans. R. Nice (1977; reprint, London, 1990).
2
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school for twenty-eight pupils. Dairy farming is Lavialle’s economic base, and parents
appreciate the value of literacy for farmers’ record-keeping and for children whom the
farm economy cannot support. At the same time, parents’ desire to pass the farm on to
one child prompts the discouraging of educational ambitions that might work against
familial goals. In turn, children internalize parental attitudes and express resistance to
the school through low academic achievement and by speaking negatively about teachers. To the economic explanation for disinterest in schooling, Reed-Danahay adds references to regional traditions of suspicion of outsiders and survival mechanisms that encourage crafty evasions of authority. Her examples of parents’ resistance to the school
include ceasing to donate potatoes for school lunches and ending children’s role in
cleaning up after lunch. Although the school long ago achieved the goal of turning
pupils into speakers of French, the “Laviallois” still speak patois when they want to
exclude teachers and other outsiders. Nonetheless, notes Reed-Danahay, parents also
actively support the school even as they display resistance. Some served willingly on
the parents committee resulting from the Haby reforms of 1975, most attended parentteacher meetings, and they helped raise funds for the school. During the teachers’ summer vacation parents also cleaned up the school yard, in the process complaining that
the teachers neglected it. Such mixtures of resistance to and active support for the
school suggest that the author sometimes exaggerates the theme of resistance, and readers may also question her contention that Lavialle’s parents are truly different from
those Vaucluse parents whom Wylie portrayed as highly supportive of teachers and their
disciplining of pupils.
Rich in the details of village life, Reed-Danahay’s book offers much to historians of
the Fifth Republic and those interested in how earlier educational traditions linger on
in the classroom and provoke community responses. Readers should, however, check
historical references against other sources, for there are errors. For example, a summation of the Ferry Laws of 1881–82 implies that all primary schools were “public”
(p. 111); education minister and sometime premier Jules Ferry is identified as foreign
minister from 1880 to 1885 (p. 217), although he held the latter portfolio only from
late 1883 to 1885; a law of July 7, 1904, is presented as excluding religious teachers
from public schools, but it was the 1886 Goblet law (never cited) which began that
policy, and the 1904 law was aimed specifically at private schools. Education’s role in
perpetuating, as well as overcoming, social class differences in France is undeniable,
and primary school teachers tried to end the longstanding structural separation between
primary and secondary schools by launching the interwar movement for a unified sys´
tem (ecole unique), here incorrectly dated from the post-1945 period (p. 128). François
Mitterrand was elected president while the author resided in Lavialle, and the socialist
victory at the national level prompted changes in the town council’s composition, yet
Mitterrand’s name is consistently misspelled. It is Reed-Danahay’s sensitivity to the
“feel” of village life and renditions of residents’ personality patterns that constitute this
volume’s strength.
Linda L. Clark
Millersville University of Pennsylvania
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´
´
Medias et journalistes de la Republique. By Marc Martin. Histoire, Hommes,
Entreprises.
Edited by Renaud de Rochebrune.
´
Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1997. Pp. 494.
´
´
Marc Martin’s Medias et journalistes de la Republique is a very fine synthesis of the
history of the political press in nineteenth- and twentieth-century France. Martin argues
that parliamentary democracies, in particular, rely on a free and open press; his study
seeks to understand the relation between “the political class on one side, media that
distribute information and their professionals on the other” (p. 13). While Martin’s narrative reaches back to the mid-nineteenth century to explain the development of the
mass circulation newspaper, this book is framed by two major pieces of legislation
regarding freedom of the press: that of July 29, 1881, which was so influential that the
promulgation of the second on July 29, 1982, overtly cast itself in the shadow of the
first. The 1881 law reversed the course of almost a century’s limitations on freedom of
expression following the French Revolution while the second law, under the aegis of
François Mitterrand’s Socialist government, ironically enough, abolished the state monopoly and established freedom of programming for audiovisual media such as radio
and television. Martin demonstrates that the press became so linked with Republican
government that freedom in 1982 actually meant privatization. This was especially true
in the case of radio and television, of which Martin is both critical and suspicious. Their
centralization, he argues, robbed the republic of the real contributions of the press,
which he attributes to the great print culture of the late nineteenth century: multiple
perspectives and the analytical and critical mediation of the journalist. Radio and television became tools of leadership as presidents and other political leaders could now
broadcast their messages directly to the public. As Charles de Gaulle duly noted, “The
entire (written) press is against me. I have the television and I’m going to keep it”
(p. 334).
Scholars of nineteenth and twentieth-century France have lagged behind those of the
revolutionary era in terms of generating an analytical history of press culture. Martin’s
book and new work by William Reddy and Dominique Kalifa finally go beyond such
´ ´
encyclopedic works as Claude Bellanger’s Histoire generale de la presse française
(Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1969–76). Martin is not just interested in press
history but in “media” history as well. Thus, he explores not only the rise of a massproduced daily newspaper but also its shifting relation to the public as new media such
as radio and television emerged. Martin manages to weave together two otherwise parallel narratives: that of technological innovation in media and a standard chronology of
political history. There are both benefits and costs to this admirable undertaking.
The amount of material covered in this book should make it an indispensable guide
to the major shifts and developments in the politics of mass media and the professionalization of journalism in France. Whether tracking the rise of a newspaper-reading public dependent on “information” as a key element of modernization along with universal
education and military service, explicating the reestablishment of a “Republican print
press” that suppressed all newspapers published under the Vichy regime, or illustrating
the triumphant emergence of the radio as an extension of government by the end of
World War II, Martin is cogent and thorough as he gleans his information from a wide
array of other press histories. Of particular interest is his account of the faltering print
dailies, a circumstance he attributes not simply to competition from other media but
also to what he takes to be a general depoliticization of public life. Newspapers, he
argues, are more associated with politics and editorializing in the public mind than
either radio or television, whose claims to neutrality appear more convincing to the
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public at large. As the public seeks to distance itself from parliamentary politics, the
spectacular television stage draws more and more viewers.
While Martin’s attention to the differences of print, aural, and visual media is indispensable if one is to grasp that variations in media make a significant impact on how
information is communicated, he does not spend enough time attempting to discern just
what “information” is and how that changes over time. Although he pays some attention
to the content of the late nineteenth-century newspapers, his treatment of content and
format is too cursory throughout. For example, he outlines the rise of such photo-driven
newspapers as Paris-Soir and mentions the rise of the analytical and glossy news weeklies such as L’Express but does not contextualize them outside of technological innovation. Even as technological history, his lack of attention to the centrality of film in
forcing such changes needs to be explored far beyond his simple proclamation that
Paris-Soir became a newspaper for the cinema era (p. 182). As a book that treats “news”
and “information,” his disregard for the history of the newsreel is glaring and is a missed
opportunity to study an earlier form of press intertextuality that long preceded the newspaper’s vexed relation to television.
In terms of a strict media history, Martin’s unwillingness to take seriously what is
called “the feminine press” (among other forms) also creates broad gaps that leave him
unable to explain the popularity of L’Express or especially Paris-Match, not to mention
Elle or Marie-Claire, which he does not even see as part of his subject. Françoise Giroud, coeditor with Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber of L’Express, came after all, from
Elle magazine. And that only begins to account for the production side in a study that
attempts to understand public opinion.
As far back as the late nineteenth century, the press packaged “real life” as entertainment. Politics, even in the most serious of dailies, was never devoid of spectacle, nor
did it compromise an entire newspaper’s content. “Information” as constructed by the
press has ranged from the unusual and obviously significant to the banal and mundane.
Just as politics never comprised “all the news that was fit to print,” so it cannot serve
as the only device for explaining the role of the media in mass society.
Martin’s history works best as an attempt to understand the media as a tool in the
arsenal of republican governments. Modern civic life, despite every attempt made by
(mostly male) politicians and their historians, has never concerned only government
actions. The modern mass media in France, from Le Petit Journal forward, grasped the
changing character of civic life from the start and thus managed to engage as well as
construct a public as broad as ever imagined. The public and its media, the media and
its public, are embedded in large issues of social, cultural, and economic transformation
in the twentieth century as well as in the political stakes and debates that Martin so
intelligently delineates here. That history has yet to be tackled.
Vanessa R. Schwartz
American University
Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: Algiers under French Rule. By
Zeynep Çelik.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997. Pp. xiv⫹236. $40.00.
This is a well-researched, clearly written, and informative book on Algiers’s urban form
understood as “the physical frame of things.” The author has published an equally serious book on Istanbul as an Ottoman city in the nineteenth century as well as another
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well-researched book on Orientalism in nineteenth-century world’s fairs as seen from
the perspective of the “Orientals.” Zeynep Çelik’s present book sets the mark as the
standard reference work for the architectural and urbanistic history of Algiers, although
as she indicates there is almost no competition for the title. The book’s organization is
straightforward, starting at the beginning of the site’s known history and bringing the
narrative up to the present. The core of the book treats the period from 1920 through
the 1950s. Çelik declares her fidelity to the tradition of urban history developed by the
late Spiro Kostoff at Berkeley. The genre is “an architectural historian’s urban history,”
that is to say not a social or cultural history but a history of the “physical frame of
things.” Straying from Kostoff’s rigorous refusal (bordering on disdain) to consider
theory as anything but a diversion from the work of documentation and representation,
Çelik makes a few halfhearted passes at incorporating recent theory (some postcolonialism but mercifully no “ethnoscapes”). These forays are fortunately irrelevant to what
she has documented and presented.
Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations demonstrates its real value through its
chronicling of the policies of urbanism and housing design in Algiers. It documents the
existence of a complexity of style and form that truly blurs not only traditional textbook
categories but much of contemporary postcolonial theorizing. The chapter on urban
structure demonstrates the affinities between the urban plans for Algiers drawn up by
Henri Prost and his team (1931, later revised) and those of Le Corbusier (between 1932
´ ´
and 1942). Everything would seem to oppose them: Prost was the chief protege of
Marechal Lyautey in Morocco, who worked with a combination of traditional Beaux
Arts principles and an eclectic style that sought to integrate cultural traditions, while
Le Corbusier was the pure visionary, the very High Modernist who despised everything
architects like Prost stood for. Yet Çelik demonstrates that their plans were ultimately
not that different in terms of spatial distributions, proportions—zoning and circulation
networks—and attention to the magnificent and difficult site of Algiers. Ultimately both
Prost and Le Corbusier believed not only that planning could act as a kind of social
hygiene but also that it was in a privileged position to do so. Çelik does not wrestle
with this inconvenient insight.
The core of the book is a detailed presentation and assessment of housing in Algiers
and its environs. Çelik documents the styles and types deployed to meet the everexpanding need for housing as wave after wave of rural Algerians were forced off their
land into the city. She briefly presents the rural “regroupment” strategy deployed by the
French during the battle for independence: the stark horror of these camps speaks volumes about the depths of French civilization. Çelik’s account of the last-gasp efforts of
the French administration to save its reign during the years 1953–58 is among the richest and most eloquent of the book. Of the massive building programs of Mayor Jacques
Chevallier, mainly devoted to housing for “local populations,” Çelik writes that they
“reveal a wide range of experimentation and a great deal of architectural ambition.”
These included both the subtle attempts of Fernand Pouillon to find and articulate deep
Mediterranean forms that would link Algiers to France and would be appropriate to the
site, its climate, and its cultural practices, and the hypermodernism of one of Le Corbusier’s disciples who tempered his master’s lessons with more respect for the local. The
architecture and the goals of social housing stood in an impasse with the regime’s stated
goal of assuring “the triumph of human dignity, of French liberties, and of the future of
French-Muslim civilization.”
Finally, after reading the book, one is led to contest the claim that “architecture and
urban forms are key players in definitions of culture and identity.” If this claim is selfevident, as Çelik takes it to be, then we need to know more about why there is such a

This content downloaded from 132.170.015.255 on November 05, 2019 07:03:14 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

726

Book Reviews

small literature treating these themes. More substantively, Çelik’s consistent demonstrations throughout the book lead us in the opposite direction: she shows how Algerian
culture and identity were not formed by the French housing projects and how urban
schemes, designed to pacify the Algerians, failed. Therefore Urban Forms and Colonial
Confrontations: Algiers under French Rule is not really a book about “colonial confrontations” over urban forms. The urban forms (as well as the rural ones) are interesting
in their own right but are not the key to everything. After all, the French army won the
battle of Algiers but lost the war. This poignant contradiction again resurfaces when
Çelik shows how successive independent Algerian regimes dealt with problems of urban form and housing. At first, in the years immediately after independence, planning
followed French lines although priorities were shifted. Later, French policies were
abandoned as the city’s and nation’s problems overran subtleties of style and housing
typology. Algeria’s descent into civil war is acknowledged, but its causes (and what ever
resolution it may come to) surely surpass the physical frame of things.
Paul Rabinow
University of California at Berkeley
France and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome. By
Frances M. B. Lynch. Routledge Explorations in Economic History, volume 5.
London: Routledge, 1997. Pp. xv⫹227. $45.00.
How did France, a country that between 1930 and 1945 underwent a sustained economic and social crisis as well as four years of German occupation, manage to reestablish itself on sound economic footing so swiftly after 1945, so well indeed that during
the 1960s, France’s average annual growth of gross domestic product (5.8 percent) exceeded that of Britain, Germany, and the United States? Frances Lynch does not provide
a single answer but investigates various components of France’s postwar economic recovery. While Lynch has done superb research in a variety of French, British, and U.S.
archives, the book is specialized and often highly technical, assuming on the reader’s
part not only a knowledge of economics but a familiarity with French Fourth Republic politics.
The first half of the book examines the years 1945–50, the crucial period in which a
new national strategy for economic recovery was put into place by the French administration. Lynch briefly discusses the legacies of the disastrous monetary policies of the
1930s, which had dictated deflation and protection as a way of riding out the international economic crisis. These policies were swept away during the war by the far more
interventionist Vichy authorities who initiated the era of state-managed capitalism in
France. Leading Resistance figures too concluded that the policies of the 1930s had
been unwise and that reconstruction would require considerable state intervention in
the economy.
The problem facing France was where to find the resources to fund an aggressive
policy of reconstruction and reinvestment, especially in the postwar euphoria when the
working public expected an end to privation and penury and an increase in wages and
standards of living. Social pressures ruled out an austerity plan, so France would have
to rely instead on American aid and immediate access to German coal resources to
supplement France’s own modest supplies. France’s chief economic strategist Jean
Monnet assured the Americans that U.S. aid would not be used simply to fulfill shortterm needs but would be mobilized as part of an overall state-initiated investment plan
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that would target key sectors of the economy. Expansion in these areas, it was hoped,
would soon produce a stimulating effect and spur economic growth. The French government also took advantage of the United States’ growing geopolitical obsession with
Communism to bolster its own status within Western Europe. As Washington grew ever
more worried about the fate of the Fourth Republic—in November 1946, the Communist Party drew nearly 29 percent of the vote—French officials were able to secure
favorable terms for a major loan (the Blum-Byrnes loan of 1946) and secured American
agreement to allow continued access to German coal resources. Very early on in the
Cold War, the French discovered that, despite their economic weaknesses, they maintained a surprising amount of leverage with Washington.
This fact was again demonstrated by the 1947 economic crisis that beset Western
Europe. The rapid efforts to restart the European economies had led to a huge increase
in imports before sufficient exports could be generated to pay for them. The balance of
payments crisis, aggravated by a severe winter and a shortfall in German coal production, threatened to stop European recovery in its tracks. The United States, now committed to a restoration of a liberal order in Western Europe, rushed interim aid to France
and launched the Marshall Plan, designed to cover Europe’s dollar shortfall. Here Lynch
is moving into territory well trod by historians, but she summarizes the recent debates
over the effectiveness of the Marshall Plan very nicely and offers a well-balanced assessment of Marshall Aid in France. She argues that Marshall Aid complemented the
tendencies already present within the French administration to develop a long-term plan
of economic recovery and was especially valuable in the modernization of the steel
and machine-tool industries. Lynch concludes that “the contribution of Marshall Aid to
French reconstruction was qualitative rather than quantitative” (p. 68). It helped fund
the high rates of investment in heavy industry that French planners had already deemed
vital to French growth, and it supported the mental conversion underway in France from
orthodoxy to state-managed capitalism. In this assessment, Lynch is far more generous
to the legacy of the Marshall Plan than was her academic adviser Alan Milward, who
cast serious doubt on the Plan in his work The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–
1951 (Berkeley, Calif., 1984).
But how was France to sustain its growth after the end of Marshall Aid in 1951?
Lynch succinctly outlines the debate within the French government between the protectionists, who continued to believe that the economy would be unable to bear the impact
of international competition, and those modernizers who sought to reduce tariffs and
liberalize trade as a means of further stimulating economic expansion. The debate was
resolved only in 1957, with France’s grudging entry into the European Economic Community. French leaders concluded that modernization and expansion could not be accomplished within a national framework and required a lowering of tariffs and an opening up of the economy to the impact of competition. This conclusion was reinforced by
the failure of France’s plans to use its colonies to help cover the metropolitan trade
deficit. The intensity of the debate surrounding this reorientation of France’s economy
demonstrates conclusively that the origins of the EEC lie not in some vague process of
convergence on the part of Western European economies but were the result of hard
policy choices and tough negotiations. In fact, the precise shape of the EEC as it
emerged in 1958 reflected French efforts to design a commercial regime that would
enhance French modernization while allowing continued protection for some sectors
of the economy, especially agriculture.
Lynch is far too understated in her conclusions. Her evidence shows that France
between 1945 and 1957 succeeded not only in overhauling its economy, reorienting its
national economic policy, and recasting its ties to its neighbors, but also in capturing
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the leadership of Europe. This was an astonishing turn-around for a country that in
1945 appeared on the verge of collapse. Lynch’s account—clinical, dry, colorless—
captures little of the drama of this process of national reinvention. Cold War diplomacy,
ideology, and the rough-and-tumble of French politics make no appearance in this account. One comes away from this book wishing that the author had integrated her admirable research more fully into the broad sweep of French postwar history.
William I. Hitchcock
Yale University
Money and Banking in Medieval and Renaissance Venice. Volume 2: The
Venetian Money Market: Banks, Panics, and the Public Debt, 1200–1500. By
Reinhold C. Mueller.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Pp. xxvi⫹711.
“Nothing like this book exists in the bibliography of medieval economic history”: this
was David Herlihy’s judgment on the first volume of the Reinhold Mueller–Frederic
Lane collaboration on money and banking in late medieval Venice (Business History
Review 60 [1986]: 527). More than one reviewer of that first volume (published in
1985) noted that the second volume, by Mueller alone after Lane’s death in 1984, was
impatiently awaited. So here it is: how does it measure up to the first volume’s “unique
history of money at a unique city” (Herlihy again)? In size the book is an appropriate
sequel: nearly 600 pages of text, ten lengthy appendices, 35 pages of bibliography. In
content, it has the same solid, “monumental” structure and contains material on a huge
variety of topics.
It is divided into five sections, each of which contains two or three chapters. The first
section sets the physical scene on the Rialto and establishes, among the several types
of bankers and deposits in Venice, the foreign exchange dealers, transfer bankers, and
current account deposits as the main focus of the study (rather than the money changers
at San Marco). Mueller then sets the institutional framework, considering, in turn, the
various layers of banking supervision and regulation, the secrecy and security of banks,
the commercial law within which banks operated (no limited liability), and the identity
of the Rialto bankers (mixed Venetian and foreign).
The second section—the most lively of all—works chronologically through the bank
failures from 1340, when seven or eight Rialto banks crashed, to the spiraling bank
crisis of 1499–1500. In each case, Mueller tries to tell the story of the panic and failure
and endeavors to work out the precise causes: some he is happy to attribute to personal
difficulties (such as bank staff who were caught falsifying accounts or clipping coin),
but the more spectacular collapses he presents as the result of a complex combination
of causes (sudden or dangerous fluctuations in the supply or price of bullion, volatility
in the credit-hungry grain trade, warfare and its disruptive effects on trade, credit, and
the money supply, gluts in commercial markets).
The third section examines the international money market in Venice, which was
dominated by Florentines at least until the later fifteenth century, and explains the credit
instruments (cambium ad Venetias, “dry exchange”) that were used not only to allow
commercial transactions to take place in Venice but also to supply credit unconnected
with trade (in which lender and borrower speculate—mostly to the lender’s advantage—on the differentials in two exchange rates between the date of the loan and the
date of its repayment). Venice was an attractive base for this kind of operation because
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the pattern of exchange rates there was predictable (rates moved in the summer months
as capital was invested in the annual galley-sailings to the Levant).
The fourth section deals with the Venetian public debt. In the fourteenth century, a
floating debt was administered by the Grain Office, which evolved into a sort of state
bank, taking in deposits on which it paid interest, paying out for the state’s extraordinary
needs and for a surprising range of hand-outs and state-sponsored ventures (distressed
noblemen, strategic investments in flour mills or brick kilns). Because the records of
the Grain Office do not survive, Mueller is able to focus only on two types of deposit,
documented elsewhere: first, those from foreign lords in northern Italy using the Grain
Office as a sort of Swiss bank (Mueller’s analogy) to stow away treasure against misfortune, and, second, dowries, which earned a higher rate of interest than other deposits.
In the fifteenth century, the Grain Office was replaced, as a source of government credit,
by private bankers, and Mueller investigates the amounts they were called on to lend,
the nonmonetary rewards that they enjoyed, and the general monetary effects of this
change.
The last section continues the theme of the public debt by looking at the consolidated,
funded debt or monte, into which Venetian citizens paid according to an assessment of
their worth, and from which interest of 5 percent per annum was paid on contributions.
Mueller sets out the history of the monte, from its thirteenth-century origins to its
fifteenth-century decline. He also explains the system for assessing citizens’ wealth,
addresses the problem of tax evasion, and shows how active merchants tended to sell
their credits at a discount as soon as possible, whereas others (foreign lords again,
founders of charitable funds) preferred to buy in and to stay.
Throughout all this, the virtues and vices of Lane and Mueller, part 1, are clearly in
evidence. On the credit side, there is the same meticulous piecing together of complex
evidence. As records have not survived for many of these Venetian financial institutions,
or for Venetian bankers, Mueller has to use all the scattered and indirect sources he
can—the famous Datini archive in Prato, for example, or the surviving ledgers of a
hospital in Treviso to show payments of interest from the Grain Office. Second, there
is the same “uncompromising quest for precision in detail” (Richard Mackenny’s review in Economic History Review 39 [1986]: 489–90), and the same combination of
synthesis and original research. However, on the debit side, the repetitiveness and diffuseness of part 1 are found here too, and, not content with pressing so much detail into
the text, Mueller also loads the footnotes with even more.
One other flaw is the absence of a proper conclusion: after staying with the book for
567 pages, the reader deserves more than the summary (plus added detail) that Mueller
offers. There were many themes on which Mueller could have made some concluding,
general remarks. One, for example, relates to the great economic and social importance
of Venetian money and banking across northern Italy. Venice drew investments, large
and small, from foreign rulers and institutions, and difficulties in Venice rippled out to
affect them: the Poor Clares of Pavia, for example, were victims of a financial fraud in
1456; during seasonal or cyclical shortages of coin in Venice, coins were sucked out of
the nearest banking city, Bologna, to meet the Venetian demand. A second theme is
Mueller’s dialogue with Florentine history and historiography: he starts by defending
Venetian banks against the Florentine view that they were few in number and backward
in method, he argues that Venetians had fewer scruples than Florentines about receiving
interest from the state and that the Venetian system of wealth assessment was the model
for the famous Florentine catasto of 1427. A third theme relates to the “fourteenthcentury crisis”: one criticism of Lane and Mueller, part 1, was that it paid little attention
to population, especially its collapse in the mid-fourteenth century. It would be untrue
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to say that Mueller ignores plague (there are half a dozen references in the index), but
he does tend, deliberately one assumes, to disregard its effects, direct or indirect, on
economic life. “The survival rate of bankers—or at of least banks—during the Black
Death . . . is surprising” (p. 140). Instead, Mueller traces bank failures to precise market
problems and gives greater weight to the effects of the War of Chioggia, which finished
off the Grain Office, damaged the monte, and had a transforming effect on many areas
of economic policy.
In his review of Lane and Mueller, part 1, Roberto Lopez appealed for Mueller to
produce an abridged version, and concluded: “Even for a fan of monetary history . . .
to read twice six hundred pages is a heavy load. . . . Much of this book can be condensed
or encapsulated in footnotes” (American Historical Review 91 [1986]: 694–95). This,
unfortunately, remains the case.
Trevor Dean
Roehampton Institute, London
Politische Karrieren und Machtverteilung im venezianischen Adel, 1646–1797.
By Oliver Thomas Domzalski. Studi: Schriftenreihe des Deutschen
Studienzentrums in Venedig, volume 14.
Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1996. Pp. 289. DM 79.
This is the most comprehensive analysis of the Venetian government since Robert Finlay’s Politics in Renaissance Venice (New Brunswick, N.J., 1980). While tackling some
of the larger questions in the political history of the late Republic, Domzalski focuses
on the question of how office-holding was distributed among noblemen, the male aristocrats who—though constituting less than 2 percent of the population of the capital
´
city—held a monopoly on political power in the Venetian ancien regime.
The approach is primarily quantitative. Drawing on the archives of the Segretario
alle Voci, the magistracy responsible for recording elections, Domzalski traces the careers of 1,324 patricians in the period running from 1646 to 1797. Much of part 1 offers
an overview of the Venetian magistracies, while part 2 examines the typical cursus
honorum for the various strata of the Venetian nobility. The methodology is solid. Domzalski correlates office-holding both to the wealth of the family (the casa or household,
not the lineage or casato) and to how long it had been an established noble house. The
Venetian nobility, like its counterparts elsewhere in eighteenth-century Europe, was not
uniform but included extraordinarily wealthy families and individuals—the grandi—
as well as impoverished patricians—known in Venice as the Barnaboti from their con`
centration in and around the parish of San Barnaba. Indeed, in his Saggio politico del
corpo aristocratico della Repubblica veneziana of the mid-1700s, the Venetian philosophe Giacomo Nani divided his fellow patricians into five “classi” or categories reaching from the very wealthy (“assai ricchi”) to the very poor (“che hanno niente”). But
Venetians judged their nobility not only by wealth but also by the antiquity of the house.
The more prestigious houses had been established by the “Serrata” or closing of the
Great Council at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries,
though many made claims of noble status that reached back even further. Several new
families were ennobled in 1381, but the Venetian aristocracy remained a closed caste
until 1646–69, when, during the War of Crete, seventy-seven additional families purchased aristocratic status for themselves at this time when the Venetian state was in
desperate need of funds. In the period 1684–1718, during the War of Morea, another
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forty-nine families bought their way into the patriciate. By correlating the names of
individuals elected to specific political offices over the course of their careers with both
the economic status (specifically the status groups defined by Nani) and the antiquity
of their houses, Domzalski finds that, in the period studied, “the older families of the
first three categories [some 40 percent of the total] constituted the most decisive ruling
group in the Republic” (p. 172).
What precisely does such a correlation show? Domzalski concludes that, while it is
still meaningful to describe Venice as an oligarchy or even a plutocracy, such terms
must be used with caution given the relatively broad sharing of power within the Venetian nobility. But it is not clear that a statistical approach alone can support this conclusion. Power, after all, may have the appearance of being broadly shared and nonetheless
be concentrated in a much smaller ruling group, as much of the best recent research on
early modern politics has shown. In some of his most insightful passages, Domzalski
recognizes this. He represents the Venetian government in largely hierarchical terms
with the wealthier, more established families dominating the most influential positions
(such as the Senate and the Council of Ten), while the lesser nobles were confined to
the Great Council and the minor magistracies. He notes, moreover, that the grandi or
primi could exercise their influence over the less powerful through a variety of mechanisms, ranging from the control of nominations (scrutinio) to electoral corruption
(broglio), to the judicious awarding of pensions to nobles whose support was needed
for a particular policy. Indeed, the very proliferation of offices within the Venetian government to more than nine hundred posts or positions functioned in part to provide
`
financial security to poorer aristocrats. “La classe dei ricchi non e numerosa, ma potentissima,” observed the exiled Venetian nobleman Leopoldo Curti in 1792 (p. 60).
Unhappily Domzalski fails to incorporate these insights into his statistical analysis,
with the result that it is still difficult to know if the relatively broad distribution of
office-holding he finds correlated with a relatively broad distribution of power or if—
as seems equally likely—power was concentrated in a relatively narrow (though difficult to define) circle of patrician households.
¨
This book originated as a dissertation at the Technische Universitat of Berlin under
the direction of Volker Hunecke, and, indeed, it should be read as a companion piece to
Hunecke’s more ambitious Der venezianische Adel am Ende der Republik, 1646–1797
¨
(Tubingen, 1995). Specialists, in particular, will find much of value in Domzalski’s
comprehensive study; its tables and appendices offer a kind of x-ray of power and
political institutions in the late Republic. He is especially astute, moreover, in his discussion of the ways in which various magistracies overlapped with one another in authority and competence. To be sure, Domzalski makes no effort to explore the perception Venetian nobles had of themselves or their roles, or to examine their education and
cultural interests—topics that have been at the forefront of studies of European elites
in the early modern period ever since Lawrence Stone published his Crisis of the Aristocracy (Oxford, 1965) more than thirty years ago. Nonetheless, Domzalski’s prodigious archival work greatly expands our understanding of the way in which officeholding—and perhaps even power—was distributed among the Venetian nobles and
thus more than justifies the sharp focus of this monograph. Domzalski’s text, together
with Hunecke’s, must now serve as a starting point for future studies of patricians,
politics, and power in the late Republic.
John Martin
Trinity University
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The Fortunes of the Courtier: The European Reception of Castiglione’s
Cortegiano. By Peter Burke. The Penn State Series in the History of the Book.
Edited by James L. W. West, III.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. Pp. xi⫹210. $40.00
(cloth); $16.95 (paper).
When Baldassare Castiglione’s Il libro del cortegiano (The book of the courtier) first
appeared in print in Venice in 1528, no one could have foreseen the enormous impact
that the work would have on European culture. Castiglione’s book, which purported to
report a dialogue between members of the court of the Duke of Urbino that took place
in 1506, was to be widely read, debated, reprinted, imitated, and translated well into
the seventeenth century. It had no peers as a guidebook for courtiers across Europe,
from the Italian principalities to the court of Queen Elizabeth, and many members of
´
the ancien regime elites owned a copy of the work. Castiglione’s influence also spread
with the development of the imperialist global trade network in this same period. A
Florentine merchant named Filippo Sassetti wrote in 1586 from Cochin on the coast of
India that he had found a copy of the book in a match seller’s shop; in 1582 Fray Juan
de Almaraz, an inquisitor in Lima, tried to censor the text; a Virginia planter had a copy
in his possession in 1701. In short, the Courtier was one of the few early modern Italian
books to occupy a central place in European culture during the age of absolutism and
global expansion. But just what, exactly, do we know about its readership and publication history during this crucial era?
A new book by Peter Burke, the renowned English cultural historian of the Renaissance, addresses precisely this question. The Fortunes of the “Courtier,” first published
in the United Kingdom by Polity Press in 1995, offers a general overview of the European reception of Castiglione’s masterpiece. Drawing on the work of Roger Chartier
and others, Burke sees the material history of Castiglione’s book—by which he means
editorial changes to its wording and organization, its “paratextual” apparatus, the marginalia of individual readers, and so on—as a product of shifting early modern responses to its form and content. He proceeds in a parallel fashion to examine the evidence of its dissemination and consumption by an elite readership, especially outside
of Italy, on the assumption that “the greater the cultural distance from an author’s milieu, the more clearly the process of active reception is revealed” (p. 2). Burke provides
not only illuminating chapters on the Courtier’s reception by successive generations of
readers in Italy and Europe, particularly in the years between 1528 and 1619. In two
fascinating appendices, he also lists European editions of the work between 1528 and
1850 and readers known to have owned the book before 1700. Situating the Courtier
at the beginning of a rich textual and cultural tradition, Burke concentrates on its reception in order to show how Castiglione’s dialogue ultimately contributed to the “gradual
integration of European culture over the centuries” (p. 2).
Each of the seven main chapters addresses a different aspect of the history of the
Courtier. In the second chapter, Burke provides a rather broad interpretation of the
dialogue itself, successfully—in spite of the notoriously paradoxical and aporetic nature of the speakers’ ragionamenti—summarizing its “message” (p. 32) for those unfamiliar with the work. In the third chapter, he turns instead to the reception of the Courtier in Italy, studying the publishers and readers who took the text to heart for its
treatment of such themes as “grace,” “nobility,” and “ease.” Asking the apparently
simple question, “What did they find in the dialogue to please them?” (p. 51), Burke
looks at the responses of specific readers such as Vittoria Colonna, Ludovico Dolce,
Torquato Tasso, and others. In the fourth chapter, Burke is at his best in going outside
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of Italy to translations of the Courtier. Here he makes the legitimate point that, although
Italian was a language spoken by many members of the European upper classes, translations “offer unusually detailed evidence of the responses of particularly careful readers
of the text . . . [that] go a long way to telling us how contemporaries, at least outside
Italy, understood key passages of the dialogue” (p. 66) or key terms such as sprezzatura
or grazia. In the fifth chapter, Burke turns his attention to “the exemplarity of the text”
(p. 81) as a model to be imitated by courtiers, treatise writers, and individual ladies and
gentlemen, from Irene di Spilimbergo to Sir Philip Sydney.
Burke examines negative reactions to the Courtier in the sixth chapter, ranging from
outright censorship (the work remained on the Index until 1966, except in its expurgated
1584 version [p. 104]) to moral critiques of the court to highly critical adaptations of
the text. To this point the book is convincingly argued. In the seventh chapter, entitled
“The Courtier Revived,” however, Burke gets into some difficulty. Intent on refuting
Amedeo Quondam’s well-known claims for the Courtier’s role as the “grammar” of the
Old Regime courts, Burke asserts that, around the middle of the seventeenth century,
“if not before, Castiglione’s Courtier became obsolete” (p. 118) for European courtiers.
The book may indeed have had little direct practical advice to give these individuals.
But the lists of readers and editions appended to Burke’s text would seem to suggest
that, although Castiglione’s was far from the first work on courtiers to appear in Europe,
the Courtier established an enduring transnational vocabulary for speaking about not
only the figure of the courtier (who was increasingly marginal by the mid-seventeenth
ˆ ´
century) but also the polite individual commanding the codes of bon ton and honnetete
(who was becoming increasingly important over the course of that same century). The
instrumentalism of absolutist subjects intent on accommodation with power did not
mean that they could avoid the demands of civility. Quite the contrary (as Burke himself—following Norbert Elias—allows on pp. 124–27), and this accounts for the continued importance of Castiglione’s text, if only as a prototypical model of comportment,
for these subjects in the seventeenth century.
For better or worse, Burke keeps to the criterion of actual ownership, or the appearance of a new edition or version, as the most reliable means of measuring the Courtier’s
reception. And, although there were late revivals of the work in England and Holland,
there is not a great deal of textual evidence of this sort to support claims for its “survival” (p. 132) through the last century of the Old Regime. Yet, as I have tried to suggest, this soundly empirical method of historical analysis displays its limits here, for
one can legitimately read the Courtier’s foundational role in the vast early modern literature on good manners, civility, and politeness as something more than a mere “je ne
sais quoi” (p. 127) by the middle of the seventeenth century. Burke’s work concludes
with a geography and sociology of reception in which he examines informally the social
groups or networks, as well as countries, to which Castiglione’s many readers belonged.
The results are not terribly surprising: most of the readers were (at least legally) aristocrats, males, and fluent in either Italian, French, German, Spanish, or English.
Like Burke’s previous works, The Fortunes of the “Courtier” is deftly written: the
prose is spare, concise, and jargon-free, and the author moves surely between languages, cultures, and geographical areas. He has a knack for formulating complex issues in readily understandable terms, as when he claims that “in the case of the Renaissance, it may therefore be useful to abandon the idea of a simple ‘influence’ or ‘spread’
of new ideas and images from Florence outwards, and to ask instead what the ‘uses’ of
Italy may have been for writers, scholars and artists in other parts of Europe, what was
the logic of their appropriations, and why and how far new Italian forms or ideas were
assimilated into everyday life and into indigenous traditions” (p. 4). This attractively
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produced book should be of interest to scholars working in the history of print culture,
early modern cultural studies, and Italian studies, and could certainly be used in both
graduate and advanced undergraduate classes.
Jon R. Snyder
University of California, Santa Barbara
Rosso e Nero. By Renzo De Felice. Edited by Pasquale Chessa.
Milan: Baldini & Castoldi, 1995. Pp. 167.
Of works occasioned by the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II in Italy, the
`
destruction of the Italian Social Republic of Salo (RSI), fascism’s most brutal phase,
none has been more controversial than the late (1929–96) Renzo de Felice’s final answer
to critics of his seven-volume history of fascism.
Given the polemics Rosso e Nero has aroused, it is important to keep De Felice’s
methodological purpose in mind. Rosso e Nero was not to have been an apology for
fascism but rather a work of scholarly purification. An “authentic history” (p. 20), De
Felice called it, an example of that “scientific habitus” (p. 24) of careful research that
had been submerged by half a century of “political Kitsch” (p. 12). An objective account
`
of Salo and of the birth of post-Fascist Italy had been all but wiped out by a sentimental
glorification of the Resistance as a popular insurrection, that is, by a political mythology
written by those who owed their power as well as academic hegemony to Italy’s humiliating defeat by the Anglo-American armies, foremost among these beneficiaries of Italy’s disgrace being the Italian Communist Party whose leaders served Soviet and not
Italian interests.
Rosso e Nero is a patriot-historian’s destruction of a legend on which the “First Republic,” as it is now being called, lived for half a century, until its historiographical
falsehoods were revealed by recent scandals and a movement calling for the devolution
of the national state:
The Resistance was a great historical event. No “revisionism” will ever succeed in denying it. But
history, as opposed to ideology and belief, is based on the truth of the facts, rather than on an
absolute certitude: to describe the world as it was, not as one would like it to have been. A historiographical vulgata, aggressively hegemonic, constructed for reasons of ideology (in order to legitimize the new democracy by means of antifascism), but often used for political ends (legitimizing
with democracy the Communist left), has created instead a series of stereotypes which have prevented us from disentangling, these past fifty years, that intricate snarl of unresolved problems:
Italy’s defeat and the crisis of national identity; the decisive military role played by the AngloAmerican armies, and the frustration among the antifascists; the Resistance’s military limitations
and the Realpolitik of the Communist and Catholic parties; the monarchy’s historic inconsistency
and the ethical-political inadequacy of the bourgeoisie. [Pp. 44–45]

De Felice asks historians to face unpleasant truths. The so-called armistice of September 8, 1943, was a disgraceful episode. The king and the prime minister, General Pietro
Badoglio, deserted the field. Out of this humiliating—and De Felice says avoidable
disaster had Italy but found its own Charles de Gaulle—the “First Republic” was born.
Unlike October–November 1917 when the bourgeoisie rallied in the aftermath of Caporetto, the events of September 1943 called into question the very existence of an
Italian state. De Felice quotes the judgment of a “great historian of Liberal Italy,” Rosario Romeo, Cavour’s biographer, who wrote that Italy’s defeat revealed a fundamental
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moral and political weakness that might be traced back even to the pre-unitarian era
(pp. 32–33, 35, 40).
Historians will question De Felice’s claim that Italian units capable of preventing
abject surrender were operational after the summer of 1943, lacking only an Italian de
Gaulle to lead them. Few, however, will contest his insistence that the Resistance, prior
to September 1943, was ineffectual, nor his well-known thesis that fascism was a domestic “consensus,” also enjoying widespread acceptance in Europe and the United
States.
It is when Rosso e Nero sets out to reconstruct what he calls “the many pages of
Resistance history [that] still remain blank” (pp. 12–13) that the “scientific habitus”
dissolves into a search for answers to unresolved mysteries. Of these, two are of special
interest: the whereabouts of papers—consisting of a Mussolini diary and his correspondence with heads of state, among these Churchill and Roosevelt—the Duce was carrying out of Italy, disguised as a German soldier, when captured by partisans; and the
facts behind Mussolini’s execution by the roadside as he was being taken to Milan to
be handed over to Allied authorities.
Questions about the Mussolini papers and his execution have generated an abundant
literature, beginning with a work as old as the events themselves—like De Felice’s,
hostile to Communist partisan units, portrayed as executioners of those within their own
ranks who served Italian and not Soviet interests.1 In Rosso e Nero’s version, the diary
may lie in “some Washington archive,” turned over to the Americans by the Japanese
ambassador to Italy, for which service he was not tried as a war criminal (pp. 142–43).
As for the missing correspondence, which Mussolini when captured asked to be cared
for as being important for Italian interests, it is De Felice’s surmise that its seizure and
the killing of Mussolini, whom the Americans wanted alive to face a tribunal, were
ordered by London. The intent may have been to conceal evidence that, far from an
ideological war for democracy, the Allied victory was a matter of power politics, in
`
which fascism, even in its final stage as the Republic of Salo, was a potential player.
As to the identity of the killer, De Felice has no interest. The order to eliminate
Mussolini, however, is another matter. On the basis of what can be gathered from witnesses, Rosso e Nero surmises that it came from “an agent of the English secret services,
an Italian by origin, who urged them [the partisans] to move quickly to wrap up the
Mussolini business, as if to say: ‘Look, if the Allies get him in time, they’ll snatch him
away from you, the way the Armistice wants it’ ” (pp. 144–45).
In this way, the embarrassing letters may have ended in some London archive. As for
the unnamed agent, De Felice’s account would suggest the late Massimo (Max) Salvadori, born in London in 1909, raised in Italy, arrested for antifascist activities, released,
then joining the exiled Justice and Liberty group. During the war, Salvadori served as
a British lieutenant colonel, at Salerno and Anzio, then behind the German lines in
Tuscany, operating with the partisans; he went to Milan at the time of Mussolini’s
nearby execution.
For fascism and Mussolini, victims of the June 1940 decision to fight on the side of
`
an apparently victorious Germany, Rosso e Nero finds no nostalgia. Salo, however, was
a new chapter in Italy’s history, one whose individualized, existential complexity De
Felice would liberate from the conventional picture of good versus the unrelieved evil of
`
Salo’s slaughter of partisans and the rounding up of Jews in collaboration with the SS.
Rosso e Nero offers three exemplars of those who fought for the RSI out of selfless
patriotism: Junio Valerio Borghese, World War I hero and never officially a Fascist,
1

Ezio Saini, La notte di Dongo (Rome, 1950).
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whose brigades, incorporated into the Wehrmacht, fought to save northeast Italy from
Tito and Italy itself from Communism; Giovanni Gentile, who emerged from political
obscurity after fascism had fallen to save Italian and European civilization from “Americanism”; and a non-Italian kindred patriotic spirit, Ezra Pound, defender of the true
America founded by John Adams which had degenerated in an age of bankers, capitalists, war profiteers, Wilsonian and Rooseveltian anglophiles, and Jews.
In Borghese’s memoirs,2 the September armistice was a stab in the back engineered
by political factions whose postwar parliamentary power, fruit of Italy’s betrayal, Borghese in an aborted coup tried to destroy, dying in 1972 in Spanish exile. Gentile was
killed by unknown antifascists, De Felice again raises the possibility of orders from
London (p. 126). For Pound, who insisted that Italy, and fascism from the start, were
antisemitic, the regime, which for years had backed militant Zionist followers of Vladi`
mir Jabotinsky, had no use prior to the 1938 racial laws. Salo later promoted Pound’s
political-economic writings.
Among De Felice’s many works, impressive for their mastery of archival material,
two were devoted to Fascist-Jewish relations, in which, as again in Rosso e Nero, the
still widespread notion of the 1938 laws as prompted by Nazi-Fascist policy considerations was shown to have no basis in fact. Mussolini turned on the Jews for strictly Italian
reasons. De Felice, here as in his major works on Italy and Jews, sees race theory (save
for Mussolini’s concern for Italian-African contaminations) as foreign to an Italian as
distinct from a German “culture,” thereby rejecting research on the drafting of the 1938
laws that showed both a biological criterion and Mussolini’s supervision of the text.3
John A. Thayer
University of Minnesota
Spain’s Golden Fleece: Wool Production and the Wool Trade from the Middle
Ages to the Nineteenth Century. By Carla Rahn Phillips and
William D. Phillips, Jr.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Pp. xviii⫹441. $49.95.
The team of Carla Rahn Phillips and William D. Phillips Jr. has written an excellent
book, destined to take its place in the top echelon of studies in Spanish economic history. The chronological scope of the book extends from the thirteenth century to the
early nineteenth. Geographically the focus is on Castile. Aragon is omitted by design.
The argument is put succinctly (p. xviii): “We argue that transhumant herding was an
ideal adaptation to the Spanish environment, that wool production and trade were beneficial to Spain over the long term, and that the fortunes of agriculture and textile manufacturing were not damaged by the success of herding.”
In pursuing this argument the authors tilt their lances at earlier generations of historians who regarded the herding economy as a constraint on Spanish economic development. Their particular targets are Julius Klein, who wrote the first major work on the
sheepowners’ association known in Spanish history as La Mesta, and Jaime Vicens
Vives, the great Catalan historian who (say the authors) so disliked Castile that it colored his judgment. While tackling the views represented by Klein and Vicens Vives,
2

Junio Valerio Borghese, Decima flottiglia Mas: Dalle origini all’armistizio (Milan, 1952).
Michele Sarfatti, Mussolini contro gli ebrei: Cronaca dell’elaborazione delle leggi razziali
(Turin, 1994.)
3
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the authors consciously promote the work of a newer generation of Spanish historians
little known outside Hispanist circles.
The book is primarily an economic and business history. It begins with a chapter on
the environment (topography, climate, vegetation) which the authors regard as, in many
places, suited for sheep but for little else. Four chronologically organized chapters follow, tracing the herding economy from medieval times until 1836 (when the mesta was
abolished). These chapters consider the vigor of the herding economy, its relation to
agriculture, the role of crown policy, the role of population growth, and other themes.
Herding prospered until about 1580, then stagnated or declined before reviving in the
eighteenth century. By their figures (app. 3) wool exports—not a perfect indicator of
total production—peaked in the 1540s and then more strongly in 1749–62. They estimate (app. 1) that total wool production climbed from 1500 to the 1760s, then fell by
half in the next thirty years. Sheepowners suffered toward the end of the sixteenth century mainly because population growth required more land for agriculture, reducing
available grazing lands. Population growth and extension of arable in the eighteenth
century did not have the same constraining effect on the herding economy, for reasons
that the authors leave unclear (p. 277). In these chapters the authors defend crown policy as appropriate, favoring herders when population was either low or in decline, favoring farmers when population was either high or growing fast. After 1760, the mesta
gradually lost state support. The power and prestige of the herding economy never recovered.
The next three chapters I found irresistibly fascinating. They amount to a “works
and days” of the herding economy, covering the calendar of transhumant shepherds:
migration, lambing, culling, shearing, and washing the fleece of millions of sheep.
These chapters rely on accounts from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century
and assume, in the absence of earlier descriptions, that procedures changed little from
medieval times. That assumption requires that Spanish sheepowners did not share in
the advance of knowledge concerning livestock breeding that took place elsewhere in
Europe. But even if the assumption is too strong, these chapters provide a marvelous
account of how flocks and wool were managed in the period 1760–1840.
The final five chapters deal with the marketing of Spanish wool, within Spain and
abroad, between 1500 and 1750. The authors treat wool transport, woolen manufactures
within Spain (more than we thought, they say), and networks of Spanish traders. The
roles of Burgos merchants and Burgos-Bruges links receive particular attention. These
chapters are heavily quantitative, less entrancing to read than earlier ones, and less
devoted to argument.
The book’s strengths are legion. It is based heavily on archival work in Spain and
Bruges. It presents a far more precise vision of the ebbs and flows of the herding economy and the wool trade than has been available hitherto. Its defense of crown policy
and the utility to Spain of the herding economy is for the most part convincing.
Its main weaknesses—small when measured against its strengths—are the lack of
comparative perspective and an unduly static appreciation of the Spanish landscape.
The authors know the important work on the herding economy of southern Italy by
John Marino (Pastoral Economics in the Kingdom of Naples [Baltimore, 1988]), but
they make no effort to compare Spanish developments to those in Italy or Anatolia, or
indeed any other herding economy. The book argues that much of Spain was ill-suited
for uses other than pastoralism. This the authors seem to regard as a timeless condition.
The only provisions for landscape change I found were deforestation and the conversion
of pasture to cropland (raised mainly in the context of the sixteenth century). But Spain
has a dynamic vegetation and soil history. In particular, much of Spain became suitable
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for sheep because sheep and shepherds made it so and kept it so, by grazing, browsing,
and burning. Sheep need grass and grass needs sheep, as New Zealand stockmen say.
If this is true, the authors’ argument might need a small adjustment: the herding
economy of c. 1300–1800 was optimal for Spain, given ecological circumstances substantially created by the herding economy of c. 1000–1300. How Castile acquired a
herding economy in the first place, in the same landscapes where Muslim predecessors
followed different land use practices, is not, I suspect, a matter of geography so much
as politics. In the insecure centuries of the reconquista, investing in sheep made more
sense than investing in crops or other fixed assets. In a world of raid and counterraid, a
store of wealth that could move ten to fifteen kilometers a day held great appeal. According to Michel Sivignon (Les pasteurs du Pinde Septentrional [Lyon, 1968]) it was
so in the Balkans in the waning (and violent) days of the Ottoman Empire, and I think
it likely was so in medieval Spain. Once the herding economy was well established in
the thirteenth century, it stabilized Castile in a new ecological formation, one which
was indeed suitable for sheep and little else.
The book includes handsome illustrations, appendices (mostly statistical), a detailed
index, and a useful bibliography. Scholars in a hurry will especially appreciate the crisp
summaries ending every chapter, and the conclusion, which briefly recaps each chapter
and the book’s main arguments.
J. R. McNeill
Georgetown University
A Silent Minority: Deaf Education in Spain, 1550–1835. By Susan Plann.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997. Pp. xvi⫹323. $40.00.
Beginning with the assertion that institutional deaf history starts in Spain, A Silent Minority traces this history from the middle of the sixteenth to the middle of the nineteenth
centuries by exploring how deaf pupils were taught to communicate. Plann, a linguistics
professor, is interested in the particulars of how language acquires meaning, how it is
transmitted, and how a given society deals with integrating or expelling what she describes as “linguistic minorities.” At the root of the research and analysis lies the pressing contemporary question of whether Spain, a country that has been appeasing Catalan, Galician, and Basque minorities through guarantees of legislative freedom, will lay
a new foundation for understanding deafness in these terms as well. “Spain may be no
different from many other nations in its view of deaf people as handicapped,” she points
out, yet the country’s tolerance of linguistic and cultural diversity makes it possible to
see and respond to deaf people in a whole new way (pp. 8–9).
The book is organized chronologically, focusing on institutional records and memoirs
written by visitors and teachers. The first chapter sets the tone by concentrating on the
˜
monastery of San Salvador at Ona and the work of the Benedictine Pedro Ponce de
´
Leon. Already in the mid-sixteenth century, the seeds were sown for the struggle between oralists (who believed that teaching the deaf to speak would better integrate them
into society and allow them to hear and say mass) and supporters of sign language
(who saw this as a means of giving the deaf a greater range for self-expression and
communication, notably with the Christian god). Interestingly, Plann notes, the Benedictines had already developed a language of signs to communicate with one another
during the many periods of silence that religious reverence required they keep for a
certain number of hours each day. Thus, the monks were in an excellent position to
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supply the rudiments of communicating with deaf and mute people, at the same time
that they lived in a context where such language was used and respected.
The remainder of the book concentrates on this conflict between sign and oralism.
“When deaf education moved outside the silent, signing monastery,” she argues, “it was
no longer tailored to the needs of the student. Instead, an attempt was made to force
deaf signers into a speaking and hearing mold, and this entailed suppressing their sign
language” (p. 49). Thus, the second chapter explores the changing image of the deaf as
a people whom teachers sought to integrate and bring into greater public view. The new
institutions of the seventeenth century stressed oral instruction based on the methods
´
of a secretive tutor, Manuel Ramirez de Carrion, and Pablo Bonet, a poseur and plagiarist who popularized different techniques by disseminating them throughout Spain as
his own. The pedagogy was bizarre, taking up everything from the use of paper or
leather tongues to the relationship between the shapes of letters and the sounds they
made. By the eighteenth century, for reasons Plann unfortunately fails to explore in
much detail, deaf education went into abeyance in Spain, the lead passing to France
and eventually Germany. By the time deaf education resumed toward the end of the
eighteenth century, most ideas were imported from abroad. The new schools, most notably the Royal School for Deaf Mutes founded in 1795, now catered to students of the
poorer classes as well as the rich and, interestingly, turned once again to the use of sign.
But the school fell victim to the poverty induced by the Napoleonic occupation of the
early nineteenth century, and the less fortunate students, many without clothes or food,
were sent off to poor houses. The book ends with oralism once again rejected in the
wars of independence against Napoleon and French cultural influences, though it would
take many years (which included a period of extreme instability in the aftermath of a
student riot) until deaf education in Spain regained a proper place. According to Plann,
1835 marks the end of the country’s “preprofessional period,” ushering in a time when,
in the name of professionalization, deaf teachers no longer would have a place in the
education of deaf students, and where once again concerted attempts were made to
stamp out the country’s proud deaf cultural tradition.
The book’s strengths lie in its sweeping account of a subject that has received little
attention in the premodern world. Most recent studies of deaf history focus on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the accounts of how professionals brought an end to
an early culture. It is fascinating to gain access to this unexplored world, particularly
the role played by religious culture in establishing a sense of group identity at a time
when many scholars focus on Catholicism’s leveling effects. The broad chronological
sweep also allows Plann to situate her narrative within a larger historical context,
thereby situating deaf history in relation to major developments such as the rise of state
authority, growing concerns for the poor, the role of cross-cultural pollination, and the
relationship between minority culture and society.
Unfortunately, the book’s inner chapters often lose sight of this bigger picture, becoming bogged down in details. To be sure, such details are the stuff of history, but for
readers not already engaged in both the period and the topic, they need to be contextualized. Typically, for example, we learn of “Don Alonso, fifth maquis of Priego, third
marques of Villafranca, and second marquis of Montalban” who “became the fifth duke
of Feria, fourth marquis of Villalba, and master of all the house of Figueroa and Mannuel” in the context of a complex inheritance scenario that will lose most avid readers
(p. 58). Similarly, some of the disputes between various individuals over the fine points
of deaf education need to be better integrated with the book’s main themes from time
to time; otherwise they risk creating an insider history at the expense of a more enlightening analytic adventure.
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Nevertheless, Plann has opened up new and fascinating territory. A field that is just
coming into its own, disability history has many rich and insightful lessons to teach
scholars interested in a variety of chronologic and methodological areas. The problem
of seeing the deaf community in the context of Spain’s linguistic minorities invites us
to think about minorities past and present in new ways.
Catherine J. Kudlick
University of California, Davis
Historia Patria: Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain, 1875–1975. By
Carolyn P. Boyd.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. Pp. xxi⫹358.
It is appropriate that one hundred years after the Spanish-American war of 1898, the
significance of the conflict should be reexamined in special exhibitions, publications,
and conferences in the countries involved. For the Spanish colonies—Cuba, Puerto
Rico, and the Philippines—it was not primarily a Spanish-American war at all but the
final stage in their struggle for national independence from Spain. Where the United
States is concerned, the controversy over whether 1898 did indeed signify a historic
turn to expansive imperialism continues its long run. But in defeated Spain, questions
of national identity dominated the anxious debate, as it became the first European country in modern times to face the end of empire.
Swathes of South America were lost to the Spanish crown in the 1820s without causing domestic trauma, but 1898 was different. It contrasted painfully with the imperial
expansion of other European societies, and it exposed Spain as a third-rate power or
even, as British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury suggested, a dying nation. In particular,
the loss of Cuba, where Christopher Columbus first set foot in the New World in 1492,
ended four hundred years in which Spain, “evangelizer of half the globe” as Marcelino
´
Menendez y Pelayo famously described it, had been associated with empire. If Spain
was no longer an empire, what was it? This was the question that worried the literary
generation of 1898, successive governments, and the Spanish army.
In 1979, Carolyn Boyd published Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain (Chapel Hill,
N.C.), a fine study of unrest in the Spanish Army after 1898 and of the militarization
of Spanish politics that culminated in General Primo de Rivera’s coup in 1923. Her new
book analyzes the way history was taught in Spanish schools from the restoration of
the Bourbon monarchy in 1875 to the end of the Franco regime a century later. The two
works share an underlying preoccupation with the weakness of a democratic, civic culture in Spain, and the failure of attempts to construct a national, representative, liberal
regime, in the constitution of 1875 and the Second Republic of 1931–36. Boyd essentially considers the same question that reverberated in Spain at the beginning of the
twentieth century. What consensus, if any, about national identity and national priorities
could hold together the Spanish state and the Spanish nation? Historia Patria: Politics,
History, and National Identity in Spain, 1875–1975 casts a narrow but bright beam of
light on the historical formation of a society that for almost fifty of the last hundred
years has been governed not through citizenly consensus but by the imposition of military dictatorship and that was torn apart for three years by civil war.
Historians have long been fascinated by the nationalist movements that emerged in
Catalonia and the Basque provinces in the 1890s as well as the difficulties that the
Spanish state encountered in trying to contain them, whether by devolutionary conces-

This content downloaded from 132.170.015.255 on November 05, 2019 07:03:14 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Book Reviews

741

sion or by repressive force. More recently, attention has also focused on the weakness
of the Spanish state for much of the twentieth century, as evidenced by its modest economic base, the limited extension and ambition of its administrative bureaucracy, and
its notorious failure to engage Spanish society in its own support through the construction of Spanish nationalism. There was no agreement about what constituted Spanish
national identity. For some the ingredients were Catholicism, empire, and monarchy,
rejected by others as too Castilian, centralizing, and backward looking. For Spain’s selfdesignated modernizers from the late nineteenth century on, national identity was spiritual but not Catholic, civic rather than military, and European not imperial, while traditionalists considered this a denial of everything characteristically Spanish. These
competing versions of the Spanish past rendered extremely difficult the promulgation
by the state of the kind of common myths, claimed values, and invented traditions being
busily disseminated by the state in Britain, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe at the
end of the nineteenth century. What exactly was the imagined community that was the
Spanish nation, which would find expression in the Spanish state and in turn be shaped
by it? There was no answer available that was not conflictive.
Historia Patria examines how the Spanish past was presented to schoolchildren between 1875 and 1975. State provision of schooling was comparatively weak until the
last fifteen years or so of the period. Woefully inadequate education budgets left many
Spanish children unschooled, and alternative provision by the Catholic church hampered the state’s efforts to construct citizens in the desired mold. As one would expect,
Boyd often found competing versions of what was desired. In the 1930s, “what republicans wanted children to learn from history was diametrically opposed to what the Catholic right wanted them to learn” (p. 214). But what emerges most interestingly from
her detailed analysis of textbooks and curricula is what she terms the “reticence” of the
state in cultural formation. Primo de Rivera and the politicians of the early Second
Republic both had an active agenda where historical education was concerned, but neither remained in power long enough to have a major impact. The pre-1923 liberal state
did not even know what orthodoxy to promote, and although the Franco regime certainly willed indoctrination like the liberal politicians at the turn of the century, it feared
popular mobilization. Moreover, educators trained in a positivist pedagogy resisted the
regime’s imposition of history as (Catholic, imperial) ideology, thereby reinforcing the
traditional inability of the Spanish state to educate and shape a nation to suit it. State
and nation continued to coexist rather than cohabit. The present did not control the past
or vice versa. One suddenly sees illuminated part of the cultural, as well as the betterknown political and economic reasons, for the swift democratic transition after Franco.
A centralizing dictatorship had been unable to prevent the formation of a democratic,
devolutionary, civic, European identity, in which the nation(s) of Spain and the Spanish
state seem at last to have a possibility of creative interaction.
Frances Lannon
Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford
Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism, 1753–1780. By Franz A. J. Szabo.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xviii⫹380.
Biographies are particularly good at illuminating the fabric of historical events and
developments surrounding a single individual, and Franz A. J. Szabo’s recent book,
Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism (Cambridge, 1994), is a fine example of this genre.
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Szabo’s study is an erudite reconstruction of the education and career of Prince Kaunitz,
but it never neglects the context of the prince’s biography: the account of his personal
affairs provides a vehicle for the author to shed light on the complex transition undergone by Enlightenment Europe. His research is based on an impressive variety of documents, both published and unpublished, which he explores in great detail. Since Kaunitz did not leave a personal archive, Szabo turned to sources concerning the Prince’s
public activity, which he found in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Hofkammerarchiv,
Kriegsarchiv, Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, and Handschriftensammlung, as well as
in other archives in Vienna and Brno. This extensive archival work, which consumed
more than twenty-five years, is greatly enhanced by the author’s well-known hermeneutic expertise.
The present volume ends with the death of Maria Theresa. It is a prelude to a forthcoming second volume on the eras of Joseph II, Leopold II, and the initial reign of
Francis II-I, when Kaunitz’s power was diminishing. In this first volume, in contrast,
Szabo emphasizes Kaunitz’s youth, when he acquired his fundamental ideas. His comportment and views seem to have been characterized by a sort of stoicism, which he
derived from the works of Thomasius and others. Kaunitz’s political ideas were influenced by his reading of Enlightenment philosophers like Diderot and Voltaire as well
as pre-Enlightenment Catholic thinkers like Ludovico Antonio Muratori. It would be
interesting to examine how Muratori’s works introduced Kaunitz to history and sensitized him to temporal changes in laws, institutions, and conceptions of civic life. (It
may also interest Italian scholars to learn that he was inspired by Cesare Beccaria to
abolish torture in the judicial realm; see the two unpublished letters from Kaunitz to
Maria Theresa, dated December 1, 1775, and January 2, 1776, that Szabo cites on p.
185.) Kaunitz also pursued studies in a wide variety of other areas, from logic, which
he drew from Wolff, to cultural fields like painting, architecture, and theater. These
broad interests manifested Kaunitz’s fascination with the nature of man and the intellectual mechanisms of society, which he wanted to manage according to “new” principles
born of the ideals of Europe’s intelligentsia.
Szabo then offers a panorama of the second half of the eighteenth century, which
was marked by questions of the balance of power and by an urgent need to reform the
state, of which Kaunitz was well aware. The chief merit of Szabo’s work is that he
underscores the influence of the Chancellor in the domestic politics of the state without
neglecting his conduct of foreign policy. Issues similar to those examined extensively
in the Italian historiography (especially in the exemplary studies of Venturi and Capra)
receive further illumination in this volume, particularly as far as the state’s relationship
`
with the Roman Church is concerned (pp. 209–57). The rights of the sovereign vis-avis the Church found an able and tenacious champion in Kaunitz, who laid the foundation for the affirmation and eventual success of the state’s jurisdiction over the Church.
Szabo also marshals new information about the general reorganization of the state at
the outset of the 1760s; the abolition of serfdom; the development of agriculture; the
containment of military spending; and the centralized administration of territories
based on regional models. Scholars in this field will eagerly await its sequel, which will
compare the impact of Kaunitz’s decisive reforms with that of the ideas and institutions
born of the French Revolution and will assess why the two “revolutions” were incompatible.
Annibale Zambarbieri
University of Pavia
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A Manorial World: Lord, Peasants, and Cultural Distinctions on a Danish
Estate, 1750–1980. By Palle Ove Christiansen.
Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996. Pp. 596.
In this massive and lavishly produced book—full of excellent maps, illustrations, and
photographs—anthropologist Palle Ove Christiansen offers both a many-layered history and an ethnography of a Danish noble lordship and its subject villagers. It is a
work from which the historian can learn a great deal about Danish rural society, both
in the distant past and in the 1970s, when the author carried out his fieldwork in the
region of the former lordship of Giesegaard, not far from Copenhagen on the island
of Zealand.
As a social theorist, Christiansen sees it as his principal challenge to steer between
ahistorical structuralism and antistructural culturalism, whether of folkloristic tradition
or “present-day culturalistic studies,” about both of which Christiansen says that they
believe it “possible to grasp Geist (folk culture) without reference to the physical world”
surrounding it (p. 575). The author proposes instead to chart his analytical course historically, taking production as the point of departure. “The economic aspect is crucial,
because peasants in fact produce.” Whom they produced for was decided by politics,
but economics and politics are “lived socially”—as well as differentially according to
social group. The varying social expressions of economic and political experience,
“which bear meaning within them, can be called culture” (p. 24).
About the dimension of history itself, Christiansen aimed “to integrate the field study
with a diachronic study which had an actual analytical status in the explanation of
cultural order in a human-geographical space.” The historical aspect of his inquiry “was
neither to be an end in itself, nor . . . a marginal introduction to a present-day study.”
Instead, historical analysis would be used “for explanatory purposes in relation to the
field study” (p. 18).
From these words historians may gather, in case they are not already aware of it, how
far diachronic analysis, as a mode of explanation, has been pushed away from the center
stage of the social sciences by twentieth-century structuralism, whether of a linguistic
or functionalist character. Some historians will find it gratifying, and others bemusing,
to see their disciplinary epistemology, as familiar to them as an old workbench to a
craftsman, invoked as an innovative strategy of understanding and explanation.
Giesegaard was a complex of manor farms, centered on the lordship’s great house. It
was worked by villagers who, until the late eighteenth century, lived in a personal subjection not far distant from serfdom, farming their surplus-producing holdings on precarious tenure. Their unpaid compulsory labor services drove the engine of manorial
production for domestic and export markets in grain, timber, and livestock. Starting
from a lively description of a present-day hunt on the still existent, socially distinguished, and—among local farmers and workers—much deferred to and often still
hated Giesegaard estate, Christiansen offers a valuable account of the establishment of
the lordship by a talented official of commoner origins under the regime of post-1660
Danish absolutism. As in Prussia and other absolutist states, the old-established landed
nobility had to suffer the intrusion into their ranks of the servants of the new militarybureaucratic dispensation, often rewarded in land for long unremunerated service or
in lieu of unpaid salaries. Christiansen’s analysis of the lordship’s economic structure
positions it well for comparison with east-Elbian German and other central or eastern
European forms of postmedieval commercialized manorialism, though here Christiansen’s lack of access to the German-language literature leads to some misunderstandings
and lost opportunities.
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Similarly, the eighteenth-century Giesegaard village farmers’ legal status and their
material and cultural circumstances, though well described in their Danish setting,
could be brought into clearer focus, especially for English-speaking readers, by comparative analysis. In tenurial terms, they held their farms as faester under the faeste
system. This is a Danish “feudal” vocabulary Christiansen treats as untranslatable into
modern concepts, but it seems that “nonhereditary leaseholder at will” or a similar
formulation would convey the sense of this situation, not far distant from short-term
¨
copyholders in England or Zeitpachter or unerbliche Laßbauern in Germany.
In any case, Christiansen, following cues given by a late eighteenth-century Giesegaard bailiff who published pamphlets on the villagers’ sorry state and how to improve
it, divides the lordship’s subject farmers into three categories: (1) the “strivers,” possessed of savings enough to buy their way into promising farms, whose heavy burden of
´
corvee they managed to bear while still producing surpluses on improving commodity
markets; (2) the “discomfited” (a better term might be the “disillusioned”), or those
who, as Christiansen says, “sauntered” through life, indifferent to profit-maximizing
self-discipline and devoted to the pleasures (and sins) of the day—a group familiar in
the English-language literature as the disreputable, insubordinate, and “undeserving”
poor; and (3) the “quiet ones,” who muddled through life without distinguishing themselves by success or failure. In another perspective, Christiansen sees them as either
ambitious self-improvers, possessing a linear understanding of time, or fatalists, with
an archaic, cyclical sensibility.
´
The ancien regime foundered on this duality, as the strivers encroached on the fatalists’ arable and grazing land, causing the poverty of the latter to burden the lordship
ever more while the gains of the former were uncapturable in feudal rent. Christiansen
offers a good account of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century agrarian reforms which Danish enlightened absolutism devised as the pathway to an agrarian capitalism based on maximal market production by estates and big village farms, powered
by the wage labor of the emancipated smallholders and cottagers. Its outcome, by the
mid-nineteenth century, was conversion of faeste to freehold, enclosure of manorial and
village land in individualized holdings, and booming output and profits in a golden age
of exports to Britain. Farm labor was secured by the creation of a class of housed cottagers, some with tiny plots, others without, some bound to unpaid labor-service for
their tenures, others working for meager wages under a regime of harsh physical discipline exercised by the manorial bailiffs. The resemblance of this nineteenth-century
configuration to the much lamented “Prussian road to capitalism in agriculture” (though
Christiansen does not observe it) bears emphasis, especially since the Danish independent farmer class avoided political subordination to the noble landlords (or Danish
“Junkers”), constituting itself instead as the backbone of Danish democratic liberalism.
Christiansen’s interest in post-1848 developments concentrates on the various groups,
now excluding the emancipated farmers, who served as the Giesegaard estate’s labor
force. These were, above all, the married cottagers, landed or landless. Some of them
fetishized the ideal of the independent cultivator, recalling the “strivers” of old, while
others lived for the day, after the manner of the unruly and insubordinate, accepting a
static life of poverty ruled, occasionally, by the estate officials’ clubs or fists (though it
was part of the workers’ culture to strike back when possible).
At the turn of the twentieth century, a new class of state-colonized smallholders appeared, intended to secure wage labor in the countryside as industrialization and overseas emigration drained workers from the villages. After 1917, as the echoes of Bolshevism reverberated through Scandinavia, land reform stripped away considerable
acreage from the noble estates. The nationwide smallholders’ movement, which—in-
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spired among others by the ideas of Henry George—aimed to abolish rural wage labor
by multiplication of the ranks of its members, celebrated big successes. Theirs was an
ideal of rural modernity that, patronized by the Danish welfare state, survived into the
1960s, until the urban and bureaucratic political elites decided the national interest required labor recruitment in industry. The smallholders, who had been faester of the
corporate liberal state, were left to buy their lands as freeholds and attempt to adapt to
the rigid economy based on dairy cattle and hog-breeding that had, since the late nineteenth century, become the fate of Danish family farmers. The anticapitalistic, though
not antimarket, ideology of cooperativized rural society lost resonance.
In his analysis of nineteenth- and twentieth-century developments in the Giesegaard
villages, Christiansen succeeds in showing that historical understanding is indeed indispensable in grasping the mentalities and sociocultural practices of the laborers and
farmers (and of the lords and servants of the manor house as well). For historians, this
book demonstrates the advantages to be gained from the ethnographic method, employed to draw from present-day heirs of the subjects of northern, central, and eastern
European noble manorial lordship a sense of the human dynamics it generated and
sustained. Christiansen was fortunate in having a seventeenth-century lordship still, in
some respects, intact today, but even where war and revolution have uprooted such
structures, human memory may and should be explored.
I have, so far, spoken of this book’s virtues. It must be added, though, that the ambitious project of translating the author’s Danish manuscript into idiomatic English was
only imperfectly realized. In its 578 pages, many incorrectly conceived or opaque formulations distract the well-wishing reader’s mind, while misspellings—sometimes of
high-profile words (such as “manuer”)—are legion. These are mostly what in German
¨
are called “beauty defects” (Schonheitsfehler). They challenge us to accustom ourselves
to the world Bertolt Brecht foresaw, in which everyone will speak English as a second
language.
It is also a question whether the issues of social theory that Christiansen addresses,
often at considerable length, are adequately formulated in this English translation. Even
when this appears to be the case, readers will wonder whether the penchant of anthropologists and other social scientists for laborious theorizations of the quotidian and the
self-evident pays an appropriate dividend. In the view of one who values and defends
theory in the social sciences, such as that of Max Weber, Michel Foucault, or Pierre
Bourdieu, it seems at least essential to link microtheorizing to a compelling macroconcept, whether amended or new, of one or another major dimension of the historical
process. Social theory itself, and not only the social-cultural practices and processes
social scientists such as Christiansen investigate, must be (re)historicized.1
William W. Hagen
University of California, Davis

1
A good example of such historically embedded theoretical work is Peter Wagner’s book, A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline (London, 1994).
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ˇ
Die Konfliktgemeinschaft: Tschechen und Deutsche, 1780–1918. By Jan Kren.
¨
Veroffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum, volume 71.
Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996. Pp. 404.
ˇ
Jan Kren has made an important contribution in this book to understanding CzechGerman relations in the nineteenth century and nationality conflicts in imperial Austria
more generally. These issues have attracted renewed interest in central and east-central
Europe since 1989, and historians both in- and outside the Czech Republic have begun
to fill a scholarly void that developed during the Cold War. Beyond some research on
ethnic German working-class politics and middle-class political parties in Bohemia and
Moravia, historians working under Czechoslovakia’s communist government were able
to publish little on ethnic group relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The government did not want to encourage debate over the expulsion of the German
population after World War II and was at times willing to play on the baser tendencies
of Czech and Slovak nationalism. General histories published in communist Czechoslovakia emphasized the historic sufferings of Czechs under Austro-German and later Nazi
domination. During the thaw of 1967 and 1968, a few more progressive Czech intellectuals began to call for a reassessment of the Czechs’ historic relations with the other
´
ethnic groups in their midst; but Gustav Husak’s government revived the old Stalinist
outlook. Monographic research on the German and Jewish minorities was virtually taboo during the 1970s and much of the 1980s. For historians elsewhere, the Cold War,
limited access to Czech archival sources, and, in Germany and Austria, bitterness over
the fate of the Sudeten Germans also affected what was written on this subject. As a
consequence, Elizabeth Wiskemann’s Czechs and Germans (1st ed., London and New
¨
¨
¨
York, 1938; 2d ed., New York, 1967) and Hermann Munch’s Bohmische Tragodie
(Braunschweig, Berlin, and Hamburg, 1949) long remained the only generally recommendable syntheses on the troubled history of Czech-German relations in the Bohemian lands.
ˇ
Kren, born in 1930, was one of the many intellectuals who was banned from academic work and official publication in Czechoslovakia after 1968, and he wrote this
book under difficult circumstances between 1974 and 1986. It began to circulate as
samizdat in 1988, was published first in Czech in Toronto in 1989 and then in Prague
in spring 1990. The Collegium Carolinum in Munich, which itself worked for decades
to reopen the Czech-German dialogue, has done a great service to those who do not
read Czech in sponsoring this German translation. For the German edition, the author
updated the notes to include references to newer scholarship, although the text remains
the same as in the Czech editions. This is not a book for casual reading. It is clearly the
product of much deep reflection, and the excellent translation has faithfully reproduced
the author’s densely argued prose.
ˇ
¨
The insights of Wiskemann and Munch continue to repay reading, but Kren’s mastery
of the many sides of the Czech-German relationship both at the level of popular experience and in the various political arenas makes his book even more rewarding. From the
outset, the author demonstrates his independence of the old communist historical outˇ
look. Kren treats fairly both the positive and negative accomplishments of Czech and
ˇ
German political strivings. Kren also notes the strengths and durability as well as weaknesses of the Habsburg government during the second half of the nineteenth century;
and he acknowledges that the Austrian governmental system contributed to the advanced social and political development of both Germans and Czechs. Perhaps inescapably, the author’s own Czech perspective shows in the more extended treatment he generally gives to Czech political ideas, leaders, and political formations than to their
German counterparts. Leading German figures such as Ernst von Plener, Eduard Herbst,
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or Franz Schmeykal, for instance, do not emerge here with the same clarity and texture
ˇ
ˇ
´ˇ
´ˇ
´
as do Frantisek Palacky, Frantisek L. Rieger, Karel Kramar, and Tomas G. Masaryk.
Part of this, however, must be attributed to the much thinner scholarship on the political
ˇ
history of the Bohemian and Moravian Germans and to Kren’s own limited access to
new foreign publications while writing the book as a banned independent scholar in
post-1968 Czechoslovakia.
ˇ
In Kren’s account, the Czechs and Germans in the Bohemian lands developed their
group identities, social structures, and modern political life not just in parallel but in a
close symbiosis. Moreover, that developing relationship, in the author’s view, must be
located not merely in the Bohemian-Moravian context but also in broader Austrian and
ˇ
German–central European arenas (p. 15). Kren accordingly begins with a discussion of
the strong influence that nation and state building in nineteenth-century Germany had
ˇ
on Austria and its peoples. Kren goes on to depict the slow processes of articulating
national identities and forming modern political movements among the Czechs and
Germans. In many ways, as he shows, the Bohemian Germans had a much more difficult
time than the Czechs in defining a modern national identity, despite their historic economic and political advantages over the Czechs. Many continued up to 1918 to identify
themselves simultaneously as German-speaking inhabitants of the Bohemian lands,
part of the leading nationality of multiethnic Austria, loyal subjects of the Habsburg
emperor, and members of the larger cultural unity of the German people. The complexities of political developments after 1880 tend to crowd out the treatment of social
ˇ
changes and popular mentality in the later chapters, but Kren offers one of the most
comprehensive and insightful analyses of the Czech-German struggle in Bohemian and
Austrian politics before World War I to have appeared in any language during the last
three decades. At the end of the nineteenth century Czechs across the political spectrum
increasingly chafed at the inability of the Austrian state and Austria’s German political
forces to grant them the degree of self-government in the Bohemian lands that they
ˇ
expected. Even into the early years of the First World War, however, as Kren makes
clear, most of the leading Czech politicians who remained at home still followed a
policy of positive engagement with the Austrian state and hoped for some understanding with their German neighbors. Really only in 1918 did the conduct of that war,
growing economic privation, Austria-Hungary’s increasing dependence on Germany,
and the performance of the Austrian government and Austria’s German political parties
convince the Czech population and the preponderance of their political leaders that
they must seek an independent Czechoslovak national state. None of the great political
developments in the complex relationship of Czechs and Germans in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries resulted from an easily predictable, linear process.
Gary B. Cohen
University of Oklahoma, Norman
¨
¨
¨
Osterreich, die Westmachte und das europaische Staatensystem nach dem
Krimkrieg, 1856–1859. By Katharina Weigand. Historische Studien, volume 445.
Edited by Helmut Castritius et al.
Husum: Matthiesen Verlag, 1997. Pp. 376. DM 98.
Austria’s ultimatum to Piedmont in April 1859 has gone down in history as one of the
great blunders of modern diplomacy. Indeed it is generally viewed as the reckless capstone to the reckless career of the Habsburg foreign minister who wrote the ultimatum
and later resigned because of its effects: Count Karl Ferdinand von Buol-Schauenstein.
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Menaced in 1859 by Piedmont’s claims to the Habsburg province of LombardyVenetia, the seditious activity of Italian nationalists inside the province, and the presence of a large Piedmontese army on the Lombard frontier, Austria—represented by
Count Buol—ordered the Piedmontese army to stand down and pull back from the
border. Had Piedmont stood alone in the conflict, Buol’s gambit would have worked.
Indeed he took a hard line with Turin precisely to underscore the point that Austria was
a great power, Piedmont a small one. And yet Piedmont was not alone, and this was the
chief flaw in Buol’s policy. Piedmont in 1859 was a French client and was assured of
French support in the event of an Austro-Piedmontese War. For this reason, Count Camillo Cavour, Piedmont’s foreign minister, rejected Buol’s ultimatum and provoked an
Austrian invasion. By making themselves the aggressor in the conflict, the Austrians
triggered Piedmont’s French alliance and isolated themselves from international support. While the inefficient Austrian army struggled to make its way into Piedmont, the
French rushed to the front and defeated the Austrians at the battles of Magenta and
Solferino. Badly beaten, Franz Joseph ceded Lombardy to the Piedmontese and angrily
accepted the resignation of Count Buol, who, by common consent, became the scapegoat for the humiliation of 1859.
The above represents a familiar story. Indeed it is one of the chestnuts of diplomatic
history, and Katharina Weigand’s book does not dispute it. Rather, Weigand seeks to
place Buol’s conduct in 1859 in the proper context of his overall European policy, from
his appointment in 1852 until his dismissal in 1859. Buol, she finds, was neither a fool
nor an adventurer; he was a perfectly intelligent and able statesman who did his best to
improve Austria’s difficult international position. Until 1866, the Austrian Empire was
pressed on three sides: by the Russians in the Balkans, by the Piedmontese in Italy, and
by the Prussians in Germany. These were the chief threats to Habsburg authority, and
Buol, like those before him and those after, had somehow to counter them.
Buol must at least be credited with boldness and imagination. In 1854, on the outbreak of the Crimean War, he enacted a diplomatic revolution. Since the war began with
a Russian push down to the Danube mouth, Buol decided to abandon Austria’s traditional Russian alliance and announce a “Neues System.” Austria would henceforth align
itself with Britain and France. Buol spoke proudly of a “Tripel-Allianz.” Although the
¨ ´
Austrian foreign minister has been ridiculed for his naıvete (how could Austria rely on
liberal Britain and Napoleonic France in any of its vital interests, most of which involved the repression of national movements dear to the British and French publics?),
Weigand argues that Buol was initially on solid ground. French and British fears of
Russian imperialism outweighed any animosity they felt toward Austria, that “prison
¨ ´
of the nations.” Moreover, she finds that if anyone must be indicted for naıvete, it is
Emperor Franz Joseph, not his minister. Young and restless in 1854, Franz Joseph
sought very deliberately to free himself from a Russian alliance that restricted Austria’s
freedom of action in central Europe and the Balkans. The twenty-four-year-old Habsburg emperor wanted to play the part of a “Grossmacht,” and this he considered impossible so long as Austria was tied to Russia.
Weigand’s new look at Buol’s diplomacy is illuminating. If the three consistent
threats to Austria were the Russians, the Piedmontese, and the Prussians, why not ally
with Britain and France? The British could be relied on to check Russian expansion in
the Balkans, and the French would not tolerate Prussian growth in Germany. As for
Italy, Buol and the emperor always assumed that the British would intervene there to
prevent the enlargement of France’s Piedmontese “satellite.” Weigand has done extensive research in British archives and finds that Buol’s key vulnerability was his failure to
recognize that midcentury British electoral reform had changed British politics forever.
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Britain’s new “ten pound voter”—a liberal, romantic type with a fondness for antiAustrian heroes like Lajos Kossuth and Giuseppe Garibaldi—drove a wedge between
Britain and Austria in their international relations. This was a development that Buol
did not discern until it was too late, and it is an intriguing example of the interplay
between domestic politics and foreign policy. Even had the earl of Malmesbury’s government wanted to limit the damage to Austria after Solferino to maintain the balance
of power in Europe, it could not, for reasons of internal politics best expressed by
Malmesbury himself to his ambassador in Paris at the height of the Franco-Austrian
War: “[The Austrians] cannot believe that we are not the England of 1815, but England
is no longer represented by an aristocratic House of Commons, but by the ‘ten pounders,’ who have no idea of la grande politique” (p. 339).
This passage typifies the insights of this book. By combining archival research in
Austria and England, Weigand has dusted off the prehistory of 1859 and revealed it in
an altogether new light. Buol’s fateful “Wende”—his turn away from Petersburg toward
London and Paris—was not itself disastrous. Rather, it was Buol’s misapprehension of
British politics, and, in Weigand’s view, Britain’s misapprehension of its own European
interests, that isolated Vienna and condemned Austria to defeat in 1859, and to decline thereafter.
Geoffrey Wawro
Oakland University
Democracy in the Undemocratic State: The German Reichstag Elections of 1898
and 1903. By Brett Fairbairn.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997. Pp. xiv⫹408. $55.00 (cloth); $19.95
(paper).
The once self-evident idea that the politics of the German Empire of 1871–1918 combined authoritarianism with pseudo-democratic political manipulation has come under
increasing criticism in the last twenty years. Critics have pointed to the early introduction of universal manhood suffrage in national elections, vigorous electioneering, and
high turnout rates as well as the growing salience in the post-1890, Wilhelmine era of
a populist political style, characterized by rank-and-file initiatives, and an open opposition to any claims to leadership on the part of the state authorities or the upper classes.
This critique was originally articulated by younger British historians, but its initial proponents, such as David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, are no longer so young, and their
ranks have been joined by a growing number of North American and German scholars.
Targets of their criticism, particularly the senior German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler,
have admitted the validity of at least some of their ideas.
Brett Fairbairn’s Democracy in the Undemocratic State is an example of the second
generation of such investigations into German political history. Inspired by the examples of Eley and Blackbourn as well as by the interesting work of the late Stanley
Suvall, Electoral Politics in Wilhelmine Germany (1985), Fairbairn studies in detail the
two general elections of 1898 and 1903. Working primarily from government records
and the contemporary press, and also doing some quantitative analysis, the author advances two main theses about these elections, and, more broadly, about politics in Wilhelmine Germany. First, he suggests that the salient campaign themes were no longer
the issues of nationalism and national unity or of confessional and ethnic conflict that
were typical of the Bismarckian era. Rather, a new emphasis on “fairness issues,” such

This content downloaded from 132.170.015.255 on November 05, 2019 07:03:14 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

750

Book Reviews

as taxes and tariffs, determined election outcomes. Parties that played to such fairness
issues were successful; those that stuck with the earlier nationalist themes were not.
Second, he argues that the period saw the end of notables’ politics—in which a slowmoving political life was determined by the locally most influential men—and the rise
of mass politics, in which democratic and populist political movements—hostile to the
state and to social elites, wedded to mass campaigning and to an egalitarian ethos—
made all the running. Fairbairn identifies such groups across the German political spectrum: above all, the Social Democratic Party (SPD); but among the liberals, Eugene
Richter’s Progressives; for Catholic voters, the Bavarian Peasant League and the various
Catholic agrarian dissidents; and, on the right, the anti-Semites and the Agrarian League.
The book is most convincing in its demonstration that the government had lost control of the political process. Generally, the political parties favored by the authorities
did not do well at the polls, and state officials came to realize that an open show of
support would be downright counterproductive, causing the voters to reject the government’s choice. Although the author does not put it this way, his book demonstrates the
growing independence of civil society from the state in Wilhelmine Germany. His account of the actual election campaigns themselves, on the other hand, is lacking in color
and revealing detail—two areas in which Stanley Suvall’s work excelled.
I am not entirely sure that the evidence presented really supports one of the book’s
main theses, the successes at the polls of populist movements across the entire political
spectrum. If anything, the 1898 and 1903 elections demonstrated the taming and containment of most populist initiatives. The SPD did well, of course, but these elections
were disasters for the Progressives, and, in 1903 the Bavarian Peasant League, the Catholic agrarians, and the anti-Semites suffered substantial defeats. The only one of the
populist groups to maintain itself was the Agrarian League, which, given its aristocratic
leadership and close ties to high government officials, was the least populist of the lot.
Fairbairn has also not dealt with Margaret Anderson’s trenchant criticism of a thesis
of Eley and Blackbourn that is also a mainstay of his own work. If the 1890s were a
period of rank-and-file populist upsurge in German politics, Anderson has asked, why
did turnout decline persistently throughout the general elections of the decade, reaching
its 1887–1912 lowpoint in 1898? Turnout did rebound in 1903, but those were the only
general elections in the entire history of Imperial Germany when an increase in turnout
went along with a victory for the political Left, a point that Fairbairn does not even
mention, much less try to explain.
Doubts about these conceptual weaknesses are reinforced by the author’s use of quantification, which is the weakest aspect of the book. There are a number of technical
problems that undermine Fairbairn’s regression analysis. The author asserts that regional and demographic factors had greater influence than confessional ones on the
SPD’s vote because the respective regression coefficients were larger. He fails to understand an elementary point of multivariate regression, that the influence of different independent variables is properly measured by their standardized regression coefficients,
which eliminate the spurious influence of different units of measurement. Fairbairn
does not show the standardized regression coefficients, but a look at the t-ratios, which
he does present, demonstrates that the exact opposite of his contention is correct (pp.
227–28). It is unclear why Fairbairn used all 397 constituencies as observations in his
regressions, since most parties did put up candidates in all constituencies. Particularly
for the smaller parties that were present in only a minority of constituencies, the procedure is problematic. The use of regional dummy variables in such regressions just
shows where these parties put up candidates and where they did not (cf., e.g., pp. 127,
138, 170).
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Fairbairn also performs his regressions election by election; that is, he tries to calculate what factors might have influenced each of the parties at each of the general elections in the Wilhelmine Era. He does not consider the movement of voters from one
election to the next, a process that determined the rise and fall of individual parties and
would also be helpful in dealing with the issue of voter turnout (which he has neglected). In contrast to Fairbairn’s questionable use of numbers, the recent if regrettably
¨
little-known work of the German political scientist Jurgen Winkler, Sozialstruktur, politische Tradition und Liberalismus (Opladen, 1995), demonstrates how a technically and
conceptually more satisfactory quantitative analysis of elections in Imperial Germany
can be done.
The book thus leaves a divided impression. In part, it is a useful enhancement and
refinement of a challenging line of historical research. However, it also contains a number of deficiencies. Some of these reflect problems specific to this particular work, but
others suggest that critique of the authoritarian and manipulative character of German
politics in the late nineteenth century, and the assertion of its populist and democratic
nature, are now themselves in need of some criticism.
Jonathan Sperber
University of Missouri, Columbia
The Practical Imagination: The German Sciences of State in the Nineteenth
Century. By David F. Lindenfeld.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. Pp. x⫹382. $57.00 (cloth); $19.95
(paper).
David F. Lindenfeld addresses a subject that is always present in the background in
historical treatments of German social science but is seldom approached directly: the
changing nature of the segment of German higher education devoted to the training of
future state officials. A large part of the reason for the existence of German universities
in the eighteenth century was to educate administrators, and although universities acquired many additional functions in the nineteenth century, the production of qualified
civil servants remained one of their central tasks. In varying degrees, most of the academics who created the social sciences in Germany taught the “sciences of state,” as
Lindenfeld calls the administrative subjects in the university curriculum, and most
thought and wrote about relationships among the administrative curriculum, the current
needs of state and nation, and contemporary trends in social thought. The close association between German social science and administrative training has frequently been
cited as a major reason for the statist orientation among professors of political subjects.
Lindenfeld shows that this explanation, while not entirely incorrect, greatly oversimplifies a complicated connection. He argues convincingly that it is much more fruitful to
regard the education of administrators as one of several contexts that framed the work
of social scientists.
One of the strengths of Lindenfeld’s work is the balance he achieves between analysis
of the writings of significant figures in the sciences of state and delineation of trends in
their professional environment through examination of university catalogs, biographical
sources, and numerical studies of university students and professors. He has done an
admirable job of relating his topic to a highly heterogeneous literature in these areas.
Lindenfeld shows that the sciences of state retained well into the nineteenth century
the pre-Humboldtian encyclopedic tradition of German university education, with its

This content downloaded from 132.170.015.255 on November 05, 2019 07:03:14 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

752

Book Reviews

emphasis on presenting comprehensive treatments of subjects important for preparing
students for their careers rather than on developing intellectual capacities through research on “pure” science or scholarship. Lindenfeld goes a long way toward rehabilitating this approach, which he links to the premodern episteme identified by Michel Foucault that featured categorization for purposes of application rather than the discovery
of new knowledge. Lindenfeld argues that the encyclopedic-categorizing tradition was
much more sophisticated and creative (hence the title of the book) than it is usually
regarded as having been, and appropriate for the education of students entering political
careers. Although he finds some benefit from the gradual movement of the sciences of
state into the research-oriented framework of social science in the nineteenth century
(especially among the leaders of the movement such as Gustav Schmoller and Max
Weber, who managed to maintain a very broad view of what they were doing), Lindenfeld claims that the specialization and abstraction that came to characterize training
in economics (the main descendant of the state sciences) produced graduates who were
less professionally qualified than their predecessors—or at least than the circumstances
of the time required them to be. In an interesting but insufficiently supported argument
at the end of the book, Lindenfeld suggests that the poor economic and financial decisions made by the Reich’s technical experts during the First World War were a direct
result of inadequate university training.
Lindenfeld places the work of a great many prominent German nineteenth-century
social and political thinkers into the framework of state science evolving into social
science. In many cases, this provides an unusual and interesting perspective on the
contexts within which individuals—usually, but not always, academics—developed
new ideas. Lindenfeld understandably focuses on the context he has identified, which
occasionally leads him to pay more attention than one might have expected to descriptive sequences of ideas among academics and less to explaining changes influenced by,
for example, ideological factors, but in other cases he connects a wide variety of influences very convincingly. He manages to incorporate cogent examinations of historical
economics, Sozialpolitik, the Austrian school of economics, and a great deal more into
a book of moderate length. It appears at times that the book is about to lose track of its
central thrust in the midst of the author’s analysis of particular sets of ideas, but he
usually pulls the discussion back into line in the end.
This is an excellent book that should be of considerable value to those interested in
German intellectual history or working on the history of social science. It will have an
important place in the literatures of those fields for some time to come.
Woodruff D. Smith
University of Massachusetts, Boston
The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy.
By Manfred B. Steger.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xiv⫹287. $64.95.
Combining a history of political thought with political biography, political scientist
Manfred Steger has embarked on his own quest to demonstrate the relevance of Eduard
Bernstein’s evolutionary socialism for liberal socialists of the postmodern age. Steger
argues that the failure of Marxism-Leninism and the rise of global corporate capitalism
have made the resurrection of Bernstein’s “reconceptualization” (p. 6) of socialism nec-
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essary for maintaining its future viability. Thus his mission differs from Peter Gay’s
earlier history, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein’s Challenge
to Marx (New York, 1962).
While benefiting from the extensive literature published on Bernstein and the Social
Democrats since Gay’s revised edition appeared, Steger treads much the same ground.
In both books we learn about Bernstein’s modest, working-class background and his
initiation into the Social Democratic movement. Both trace Bernstein’s trajectory from
trusted editor and London correspondent for important party publications to revisionist
problem child. Steger, however, emphasizes the Bernstein family’s liberal politics and
the young man’s early attraction to social-liberal thought. Steger also fleshes out for us
the impact of Bernstein’s experience in London. He reminds us that the middle-aged
exile imbibed not only the Fabian spirit but the entire empiricist and social-liberal climate of late nineteenth-century England. For Steger, the “British disease” had a profound impact on Bernstein’s thought.
Similarly, Steger echoes much of Gay’s history in outlining the basic thrust of Bernstein’s revisionism: the rejection of dialectical materialism; the orientation toward neoKantianism; the support of Social Democratic trade unionists and practical politicians
more interested in reform than in revolution. But Steger excels in focusing his meticulous investigation on Bernstein’s determination to resolve the tensions, present in Marx
and Engels’s own thought, between the revolutionary theory of scientific socialism and
reformist practice. Bernstein observed that late nineteenth-century capitalism was not
self-destructing but was transforming itself into a social welfare state. For him, continued adherence to an outdated Marxist “science” would doom the German Social Democratic Party to passivity and ultimate failure. The labor movement could only actively
be served by relying on and coping with the demonstrable fact of capitalism’s continued
vitality and not on Marx’s mechanistic teleology.
Steger has mined the archives and a great variety of Bernstein’s own publications to
reveal the tortuous path that Bernstein followed for over two decades in order to arrive
at his reconceptualization. Steger highlights, as Gay did not, the central importance for
Bernstein of the socialist ethic of freedom and human dignity. In jettisoning dialectical
materialism, it was the revival of socialism’s ethical program as well as the achievement
of socioeconomic reform that motivated him. He never descended, Steger claims, into
the opportunism characteristic of trade unionists and practical politicians like Georg
von Vollmar.
In analyzing Bernstein’s life and thought after his return to Germany in 1901, Steger
presents us with the well-known history of Bernstein’s modulated acceptance of the
`
general strike and with his differentiated stance vis-a-vis the growing nationalism of
the Social Democratic right wing. Bernstein understood the powerful emotional attraction and organizing capacities of the nation for the masses but thought it was only one
step along the road to internationalization. By the same token, he supported colonialism
as a force civilisatrice but insisted that the labor movement influenced colonial policies
in a humane direction.
Although he voted for war credits, along with most of his socialist colleagues, at
the beginning of World War I, Bernstein soon divined the imperialist nature of the
government’s policy, and in 1917 he joined the antiwar Independent Social Democratic
Party. Even when war ended, and he rejoined the Majority Social Democrats, he advocated that the party openly admit Germany’s war guilt. Such forthright admission, he
argued, would firmly establish the party’s ethical principles and enhance its credibility
with the masses. The party failed to heed this advice, just as it rejected his revisionist
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ideas in approving the doctrinaire Heidelberg Program of 1925. For Steger, this rejection represented a fatal, missed opportunity. It allowed the party to be stigmatized as
Marxist while giving ground to the right-wing forces that destroyed the Weimar Republic.
In concluding this intellectual biography, Steger, the political scientist, exercises a
license that few historians can indulge. While claiming Bernstein’s preeminence as a
social theorist who influenced successors as diverse as Georges Sorel and Karl Popper,
`
he also projects socialism, a la Bernstein, as the force necessary to uphold democratic
values in a global society increasingly preoccupied with economic efficiency. Above
all, Steger focuses on Bernstein’s tolerance, on his willingness to challenge accepted
doctrine, and on his courage to espouse necessary change.
Beverly Heckart
Central Washington University
¨
Der Volksverein fur das Katholische Deutschland, 1890–1933: Geschichte,
¨
Bedeutung, Untergang. By Gotthard Klein. Veroffentlichungen der Kommission
¨
fur Zeitgeschichte, series B: Forschungen, volume 75. Edited by Ulrich von Hehl.
¨
Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1996. Pp. 597.
Historians now enjoy a choice of two new monographs on virtually the same topic, the
role of the “People’s League for Catholic Germany” in the Weimar Republic. The
¨
Friedrich Ebert Foundation recently published a critical study by Dirk Muller,1 and now
Gotthard Klein offers an implicit rebuttal published by the Roman Catholic Kommis¨
sion fur Zeitgeschichte, implicit in that the two authors seem unaware of each other’s
work. Both are serious scholars, not polemicists, but the differences between these
books illustrate important tensions within the historical profession. Klein is by far the
¨
more diligent researcher; he has explored two dozen archives not consulted by Muller
and found genuinely important documentation in several of them. But Klein seems
reluctant to go beyond the task of summarizing his documents and sometimes avoids
difficult questions of historical interpretation.
The People’s League was founded as a mass organization for German Catholics in
1890 by Center Party politicians and activist priests who sought to combine antiMarxist apologetics with positive efforts to ameliorate poverty. Its membership swelled
to 800,000 by 1914, and it enjoyed great influence as an educator of leaders for other
Catholic associations and a lobby for welfare legislation. Klein’s introductory chapter
on the Wilhelmian era correctly identifies the crucial question about the League’s early
history—whether it served primarily as an instrument for Catholic notables to mobilize
popular support or as a vehicle for the genuine emancipation of Catholic workers—but
makes no effort to answer it (pp. 49–50).
Klein’s purpose in writing (see p. 34) is to explain the subsequent decline of the
People’s League, which suffered a steady loss of membership after 1921 and financial
shipwreck in 1928. The author identifies four causes: (1) an unfortunate ideological
tendency to turn away from careful research into social problems toward vague appeals
for all Germans to become more altruistic; (2) disaffection by more and more Catholics
¨
¨
1
Dirk Muller, Arbeiter, Katholizismus, Staat: Der Volksverein fur das katholische Deutschland
und die katholischen Arbeiterorganisationen in der Weimarer Republik (Bonn, 1996).
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with the responsibility assumed by the Center Party in all coalition governments of
the 1920s; (3) the emancipation of the Catholic vocational associations founded with
the help of the People’s League, which began to compete with it in many ways; and
(4) the disastrous investment strategies of the league’s business director, who for years
concealed growing deficits from his executive council as he sought to build a lucrative
press empire. Regarding the first cause, Klein stands in notable agreement with Dirk
¨
Muller when he reproaches the chief ideologue of the league in the 1920s, August
Pieper, for a loss of touch with social reality and “spiritualistic one-sidedness” (pp.
¨
155–56). Klein vigorously opposes, however, the tendency by historians such as Muller
to speculate about a fifth cause, a supposed campaign by the Catholic episcopate to
reassert control over the laity in response to the papal program of “Catholic Action.”
Klein’s painstaking research establishes that the church hierarchy played a passive role
in the league’s reorganization in December 1928, the only practical result of which was
to increase the influence of the rival vocational associations, which together received
one-third of the seats on the new central committee in exchange for modest financial
assistance (pp. 218–49). Pieper, who retired in 1929, was quick to see in such events a
revival of the fierce battles of the Wilhelmian era between authoritarian bishops and
laity struggling for autonomy, but Klein labels him paranoid (pp. 113–15, 220, 297–98).
The author does not consider a sixth hypothesis that the decline of the People’s League
may have resulted from declining religiosity among the younger generation.
Some earlier accounts treat the reorganization of 1928/29 as the virtual end of the
People’s League, but Klein pays careful attention to its subsequent efforts to carry out
two new missions: to combat the violent anticlericalism promoted by the Comintern
and to propagate a “corporatist” social order in response to worsening class conflict. He
explains the influence exerted by social theorists associated with the People’s League on
the famous papal encyclical of 1931, Quadragesimo anno, and on the subsequent debate over how to translate its lofty ideals into practice. Some readers may feel that the
author is too quick to dismiss those who discern nostalgia for medieval arrangements
or sympathy for the “syndicates” of Fascist Italy in this encyclical (pp. 285–94). The
book concludes by describing the noteworthy failure of attempts under the Third Reich
to convict leaders of the People’s League of financial corruption in show trials and the
successful campaign by the German episcopate after May 1945 to discourage any effort
to revive the People’s League. This last section of the book undermines somewhat
Klein’s earlier attempt to downplay tensions between the episcopate and laity; it quotes
¨
harsh statements by Archbishop Grober of Freiburg and advisors to Cardinal Frings of
Cologne after 1945 about the need to strengthen episcopal control of all Catholic activities (pp. 387–401).
¨
As mentioned earlier, Klein and Muller exemplify a dramatic contrast of historical
styles. Klein treats archival documents with reverent care and builds credibility through
scrupulous attention to detail, for example, by including biographical particulars on a
large cast of characters in his footnotes. But he generally does not go beyond the task
of summarizing his documents, offering a respectful reconstruction of the subjective
view of events by the leaders of German Catholicism. He sometimes feels compelled
to summarize all his documents, moreover, leaving the reader to wade through highly
detailed discussions of failed business ventures or plans for reorganization that were
¨
never implemented. Muller is far more eager to cut through the verbiage of his protagonists to analyze the “real” significance of their actions. At times his reach exceeds his
¨
grasp, but Muller asks more interesting questions and strives to show how particular
events contributed to a profound long-term transformation of relations between the
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Catholic clergy and laity. The whole historiography of the Catholic social movement in
Germany remains far too sharply polarized between these contrasting styles.
William Patch
Grinnell College
¨
¨
Das Wahlverhalten der judischen Bevolkerung: Zur politischen Orientierung
der Juden in der Weimarer Republik. By Martin Liepach. Schriftenreihe
wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts, volume 53.
¨
Tubingen: J. C. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1996. Pp. xiv⫹333. DM 128.
Martin Liepach’s study of Jewish electoral behavior delivers a more varied content than
the title would suggest. This is partly due to the work’s structure, which betrays its
origins as a doctoral dissertation. It divides into four large sections (historiography and
research agenda, Jewish politics and culture in the Weimar Republic, Jewish newspapers and their electoral endorsements, and an analysis of the electoral results of the
1930 and 1932 Reichstag elections) each of which explicates a problem separate from,
but related to, the other three. Although Liepach shows a firm grasp of the primary
material necessary for such a study, principally newspapers and electoral results, his
work is ultimately unsurprising in its conclusions and narrow in scope.
As he states in the book’s first sentence, Liepach is concerned with the voting patterns
of German Jews between 1924 and 1932. He argues that such a study is necessary, as
previous work on the subject was either impressionistic or statistically flawed. Thus,
the value of this study lies in its quantitative sophistication. Unfortunately, he does not
return to this quantitative analysis until the final section. The conventional wisdom that
he examines in the introduction claims that, in the Republic’s middle years, Jews voted
primarily for the left-liberal Deutsche Demokratische Partei (DDP). In the Republic’s
final years, however, with the DDP’s electoral collapse and move to the right—eventually reconstituting itself as the Deutsche Staatspartei (DstP), a far more conservative,
vaguely antisemitic organization—Jews left it in search of other republican options.
The book’s second, untitled, section investigates Jewish politics by focusing on new
forms of antisemitism, the problematic relationship between Jews and liberalism, tension within German Judaism, and the demographic and economic situation of German
Jews. This analysis, based largely on a thorough reading of secondary material, does
not add very much to our knowledge of the Jewish situation in the 1920s. For example,
Liepach reminds us of the importance of some Jewish politicians in the revolution and
in the new Republic, as well as of the changed nature of antisemitism in Weimar, as it
called the state’s legitimacy into question, something that would have been inconceivable during the Kaiserreich. One area in which his study could have cast new light is
his discussion of the so-called German-Jewish symbiosis and the question of GermanJewish identity. Here a spate of new work is forcing a reconceptualization of GermanJewish culture in the Weimar era, arguing that a dramatic shift—from liberalism to
cultural distinctiveness—took place in the 1920s. A very important work for this topic
is Michael Brenner, The Renaissance of Jewish Culture in Weimar Germany (New Haven, Conn., 1996). Unfortunately, Liepach presents us with some of the old verities,
albeit based on a close reading of German-Jewish newspapers as well as on secondary
literature. For example, there is a discussion of the Liberal-Zionist rift within German
Jewry and a discussion of the figure of the Ostjude (eastern Jew) whom Liepach claims
was a figure of shame for liberals but a symbol of authenticity for Zionists. Brenner has
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shown that the situation was much more complex than this straightforward description
would allow. Indeed, Brenner has shown convincingly that the Ostjude as cultural icon
had wide currency among German Jews.
In the book’s third section, Liepach explores the electoral agendas of Germany’s various Jewish and liberal newspapers. He is able to show that the Jewish newspapers had
negative recommendations, urging their readers to avoid voting for certain parties because of their antisemitic tendencies. Very few of the papers urged support for specific
political parties. The narrative here is rather confusing. Instead of providing a chronological discussion that wends through the years of the Republic, Liepach chose to break
the section up into subsections, one per newspaper. This leads to a certain amount of
redundancy in the discussion of the elections and sometimes to more than a little confusion. This section does, however, show the wide range of newspapers and political
positions available to German Jewry. Once again, an opportunity opens in which the
variegated nature of German Jewry could be explored, an opportunity that Liepach does
not, unfortunately, use to its fullest extent.
In the fourth and final section, the book presents a statistical analysis of Jewish voting
patterns. According to Liepach, his is the first analysis to make use of sophisticated
statistical methodology. Indeed, Liepach does reach some suggestive conclusions. He
argues that Jewish voters did not quickly abandon the DDP after its electoral collapse;
rather, more subtle shifts occurred. For example, due to Weimar’s complicated method
of awarding electoral mandates, it was sometimes possible for a core group of liberal
voters to elect a DDP/DstP representative to the Reichstag. In these areas, Liepach
argues that Jewish support for the party often remained strong. Elsewhere, there was
some shift away from left liberalism either to Social Democracy or to political Catholicism. Here Liepach reaches the same conclusion as the preponderance of the historiography which he criticizes, albeit he argues that the shift is relatively minimal. Most
interesting, however, is Liepach’s contention that a large number of Jewish voters simply abandoned voting altogether. As he indicates, this should move forward the question
of Jews’ perception of their integration into German society. Unfortunately, this study
does very little to advance this discussion.
In the end, Liepach’s work is both useful and unsatisfying. His grasp of the secondary
material is impressive, indeed his bibliography provides an excellent starting point for
all students of interwar German Jewry. He provides a very informative discussion of
German Jewish newspaper culture. His electoral analysis points up some trends obscured in previous research. Future works should combine Liepach’s empirical study
with sufficient analysis to begin a reinterpretation of German-Jewish self-perception in
the waning days of Weimar democracy.
Richard Bodek
College of Charleston
Das Volkswagenwerk und seine Arbeiter im Dritten Reich. By Hans Mommsen
and Manfred Grieger.
¨
Dusseldorf: ECON Verlag, 1996. Pp. 1055. DM 78.
In 1936 and 1937 Ferdinand Porsche, the legendary automobile designer and producer,
spent a few weeks at Ford’s River Rouge plant in Detroit. He closely observed the
workings of the factory and recruited about a dozen German-American engineers and
skilled workers to return to Germany with him. Porsche was intent on building the
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German River Rouge, a model of technological efficiency that would spin off the assembly line thousands upon thousands of affordable automobiles. Adolf Hitler shared
the designer’s vision of producing a German variant of the Model T but added some
elements of his own to Porsche’s technocratic proclivities. The Volkswagen that Porsche
conceived and Hitler supported was to be produced in a model factory and community:
sleek, efficient, and productive, populated with happy and healthy workers, a technological and racial utopia.
The reality was rather different, as Hans Mommsen, Manfred Greiger, and their many
collaborators demonstrate in their monumental history of the Volkswagen firm and its
workers in the Third Reich. The research project was commissioned by the company;
the result it got was probably far more extensive, far more of an indictment, than the
firm’s executives had ever imagined. In the foreword, Mommsen makes clear that his
intent quickly moved beyond a simple narrative of the firm’s history to an embracing,
comprehensive analysis of Volkswagen in all its guises. For the authors, everything
about Volkswagen illuminates central characteristics of the Third Reich. Readers familiar with Mommsen’s sharply honed analyses of the Nazi period will find many of his
arguments restated here supported by a mountain of empirical evidence. (Thankfully
for such a detailed book, the introduction provides an incisive summary that can be
read on its own.)
This is a story spun from many threads, and the finished tale is grim indeed: the
Faustian pact between the Nazi regime and Germany’s technical elite, happy to have
the backing of a murderous regime for its vaunted efforts at design and production;
the polycratic competition among the various elements of the Nazi system; the glib
exploitation of slave labor in the pursuit of profitability. Time and again Volkswagen
was pulled back from the abyss of bankruptcy by its close and carefully cultivated connection to the leadership of the Third Reich, which included a very personal relationship between Porsche and Hitler. The dictator, who claimed a certain knowledge of
mechanics, admired Porsche as an innovative and productive German engineer, the very
kind of entrepreneur required for the Third Reich. Porsche rarely voiced political opinions and cared little about National Socialist ideology and practice. All he desired was
the capital and freedom to turn his designs into motor vehicles, and the Third Reich
offered him copious amounts of both.
For Mommsen and Greiger, two critical elements define the character of the National
Socialist regime, a system with which Volkswagen was inextricably entwined: the primacy of race, which led to the completely instrumental use of human beings, and the
systemic contradictions that resulted from the extreme voluntarism of the regime. The
authors put to rest any notion of the Third Reich as a purely modernizing regime. Such
¨
interpretations fail to capture the dynamic of a system in which decrees of the Fuhrer
carried the weight of law and acts of will were presumed able to surmount any limitations of resources and knowledge. Time and again the authors demonstrate the chaos
that ensued when Volkswagen won a contract to build a tank or truck yet was unable to
procure sufficient labor and raw materials, while Hitler, Albert Speer, or the Wehrmacht
command issued completely unrealistic production quotas. All the time, Volkswagen
was busy trying to fend off its rivals in the automobile industry and everyone else while
the army, state ministries, the German Labor Front, and the SS were all maneuvering
to enhance their powers, with Volkswagen as one of the prize plums. Porsche’s relationship with Hitler proved critical here, since he was usually able to retain a relatively
wide degree of autonomy for his own activities and for the firm, so long as it turned
out the tanks, trucks, amphibious vehicles, planes, and autos that the Wehrmacht demanded. The firm got the requisite machinery and buildings along with technical ex-
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pertise—though some of its tank designs were notable disasters—that positioned it
well for its great success in the 1950s. But ultimately, it was the Allied victory, not the
Third Reich itself, that cleared the obstacles to the emergence of a modern society
in Germany.
In the determined pursuit of its ambitions, Volkswagen—including Porsche himself,
as a few documents attest—had no compunctions about using slave labor. Early on in
the war the firm requested and received prisoners of war and impressed laborers from
eastern Europe. Later on they would be supplemented by concentration camp inmates
from all over Europe—with the exception of Jews, because Hitler, despite the pleas of
industry and the army, had ordered that no Jews were to be admitted to the German
areas of the Reich. Hitler’s decree held in force until the desperate labor shortages of
1944, when the firm managed to obtain some Jews from Auschwitz. By this point, much
of the firm’s production had been moved underground, and these prisoners, along with
many others, lived below with their machines. For month after month they never saw
the light of day. In a volume copiously and effectively outfitted with photographic reproductions, the most haunting images are those of the hundreds of young children, the
progeny of forced laborers. And the most haunting stories involve the vicious treatment
by the SS guards of French prisoner-laborers, most of whom had been active in the
Resistance. The camp commandant in this case was brutal even by the standards of the
Third Reich. But as the authors make crystal clear, it was the intrinsic nature of the
Third Reich and the compliance of Volkswagen that enabled individuals to practice
their brutality. Of the vaunted ambition to create a model Third Reich city around the
factory, all that was left were rows of barracks for the more privileged workers and
concentration camp conditions for impressed laborers. And not until the “economic
miracle” of the 1950s would Germans find their Model T. The German Labor Front’s
posters of happy vacationers driving their Volkswagens remained mere propaganda,
since in the 1930s and 1940s the car was never inexpensive enough for the population
at large. In any case, tanks and airplanes quickly pushed pleasure vehicles off the assembly line.
Das Volkswagenwerk und seine Arbeiter draws on extensive archival research in half
a dozen countries. Volkswagen’s own archive had been partially destroyed and lost, yet
it seems that the authors were more than able to make up for the missing items. Most
interesting, and haunting again, are the accounts derived from scores of interviews that
the research team conducted with survivors of forced labor at Volkswagen, some of
whom were tracked down in Israel, Italy, Poland, and other countries.
There is more, much more, to be gained from reading this work—details on the
technical developments pioneered by the firm, its production palette, the nature of
the German automobile industry in the 1930s and 1940s, the German Labor Front, the
designs for the Volkswagen city, the structure of the firm and its management. Das
Volkswagenwerk und seine Arbeiter makes few concessions to the reader, who, to conquer this detail, has to wade through more than nine hundred pages of text and many
repetitions. Mommsen and Greiger were clearly most concerned with providing a painstakingly thorough account of Volkswagen in all its dimensions, not with the patience
of their readers. Their history of the company would illuminate the inner workings
of the Nazi regime and of German society under the Third Reich, an effort that has
succeeded brilliantly.
Eric D. Weitz
St. Olaf College
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Hitler’s Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third
Reich. By Ulrich Herbert. Translated by William Templer.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xxi⫹510. $80.00.
The foreign labor program of Nazi Germany has been neglected by scholars, jurists,
industrialists, and the general public for a number of decades. The reasons for this
are puzzling. The program involved millions of people, was vital to the war economy,
prolonged the war, and confronted the Nazis with some formidable and intriguing ideological, political, and social issues. Although its institution was a central charge against
many in the postwar trials, and those who were forced to participate are now obviously
owed some kind of restitution settlement, the program has been ignored by the media
and even by fiction writers. Compared to the countless number of accounts by victims,
soldiers, and ordinary people during the war, the actors in the program are strangely
mute, like the serfs, slaves, and peasants of yesteryear. Is it because everyone either
accepts or feels victimized by the mystiques of war, the economy, and the prevailing
social and political cultures of the day? Fortunately this comprehensive study should
help correct the situation. Based on new archival resources and a considerable amount
of work by Eastern and women’s studies scholars, the author has answered a number of
questions about the program and directs the reader to new areas that need further investigation.
Ulrich Herbert concentrates on four areas: the origins of the program; the political
decision process; the working and living conditions of the foreign workers (usually
industrial workers, since other accounts have handled the agricultural workers); and
the complicated relations between the foreigners and the Germans. All four areas are
controversial. As to the origins of the program, Herbert is less interested in whether
there was continuity or a rupture in the program and more specifically concerned with
the modifications made by the Nazis and German business. Not surprisingly, he found
an astonishing similarity between the labor practices of World War I and those of World
War II, including maltreatment, strict punishment, and the use of special badges. What
was new about the Nazi version was its massive size, fervor, and racism; and the Nazis
were not deterred by the obvious failures of the World War I program. He finds no
evidence of a prepared program but cites rather the immediacy of the problems confronting the prewar Reich. These include the growing manpower gaps in agriculture
and industry, the disposition of German authorities and employers to limit the employment of more German women, and a practice of favoring the use of Polish workers
while ignoring the distinctions between free and forced labor from Poland once the war
started. The foreign labor program was a temporary stopgap, but, once the massive
deployment started, ideological questions had to be answered.
Despite vigorous dissent from the party purists, the authorities accepted the massive
employment of Poles but sought to placate some criticism by imposing coercive measures against them. A pattern was established that continued during the war. By March
8, 1940, when the package of decrees (Polenerlasse) regulating the working and living
conditions of the Poles was issued, the basic compromise between the contending factions in the party was settled. Poland and its people became a laboratory for what would
come later in the war. The Nazi authorities tried out nearly every new measure with the
Poles in occupied Poland; the impact of each measure was carefully noted and argued
over, especially its acceptance by the German public. Although the compromise varied
slightly through the war, depending on exigencies—for example, eastern workers were
later given better rations based on their productivity—the basic compromise remained intact.
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A far more difficult area to generalize about was the working and living conditions
of the foreign workers. In a program that involved millions of individuals and many
nationalities and races, the variety of circumstances was enormous. Legally and diplomatically the Nazi authorities started by recognizing areas incorporated directly into
the Reich (German law was immediately introduced), allied nations, occupied territories, and neutrals. Racial attitudes, cultural traditions, and typical German stereotyping
played an important role in everything from food rations to housing. During the course
of the war many other changes occurred so that it is virtually impossible to describe the
everyday existence of any one foreign worker in the Reich. Fortunately, Herbert earlier
helped to establish a huge bank of oral interviews of foreign workers while director of
research at the Institute for the History of National Socialism in Hamburg; this unique
resource enabled him to give a selective but informative view of conditions from the
bottom up. But constant improvisation was a major feature of Nazism, so that a careful
examination of the various developmental shifts and phases during the war is necessary;
more work is needed. Herbert does loosely distinguish several major phases: the euphoria stage of 1940–41; the annihilation versus exploitation phase of 1942; the “Europe
against Bolshevism” phase of 1943–44; and the integration and terror phase of 1943–
44. He also argues vaguely for a “panic of violence” phase at the end of the war.
The fourth area involving relations between Germans and foreigners focuses on the
workplace. Herbert offers a number of observations about the mentality of the Germans
after their experiences. Here he is at his best. His compassion for the foreigners is clear
but he is not judgmental. He is judicious, accurate, and informative.
This fine historian has published the best work yet on the foreign labor program. This
English edition is not as complete as the German but lacks only minor details. It is an
important study of one of the most complex and intriguing problems of the twentieth
century. Both the specialist and the general reader will profit by this account of how a
modern industrial society implemented a racial ideology in the midst of war.
Edward L. Homze
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
On the Road to the Wolf’s Lair: German Resistance to Hitler. By
Theodore S. Hamerow.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1997. Pp. xi⫹442.
$29.95.
As any student of German history knows, on July 20, 1944, Count Claus von Stauffenberg, acting in collaboration with a small group of anti-Nazi conspirators, tried unsuc¨
cessfully to assassinate Adolf Hitler by planting a bomb at the Fuhrer’s eastern headquarters near Rastenburg in East Prussia (now Poland). Theodore S. Hamerow’s On the
Road to the Wolf’s Lair is a meticulous study of the ideological and political prehistory
of this event. Rather than recapitulating the well-known details of the assassination
attempt, the book seeks to explain why, how, and when the primary conspirators arrived
at their fateful (and, for most of them, fatal) decision to rid the world of Hitler. Because
its central concern is the buildup to the botched bombing, Hamerow’s work focuses on
the primarily conservative circle behind the plot rather than on the wide and diverse
spectrum of German opposition to the Nazi regime.
The literature on the German resistance to Hitler—even its conservative wing—is
enormous. One must therefore ask whether we need yet another lengthy study devoted
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to this topic. The answer can be yes only if the author gives us something usefully
new in terms of interpretation or documentation. Hamerow satisfies this requirement
by focusing on issues that, though certainly addressed by previous scholars, have never
been handled so comprehensively or competently. He examines in depth the mentality
of the key resisters before they became resisters, showing the extent to which they
shared many of the central ideas of National Socialism. He then looks at the complicated and agonizing process through which these figures cast off the spell of Nazism
and, with periodic relapses, became convinced of the need to overturn the regime by
eliminating its leader. Finally, he briefly discusses the ways in which the post-Hitler
world, which was certainly not the world the conspirators had hoped for, dealt with the
resistance legacy.
Hamerow devotes the early chapters of his book to placing his central characters
firmly in the conservative-nationalist anti-Weimar camp. Quoting extensively from
their own writings, he documents their deep distrust of the new parliamentary order,
which they associated with military impotence, economic instability, spiritual emptiness, and “excess cosmopolitanism” (i.e., too much Jewish and foreign influence).
Whether they came from the military, like Stauffenberg, Ludwig Beck, Hans Oster, and
Heinrich von Tresckow; the civilian bureaucracy, like Johannes von Popitz, FritzDietlof von der Schulenburg, Carl Goerdeler, and Ulrich von Hassell; or the clergy, like
Michael von Faulhaber, Theophil Wurm, Otto Dibelius, and Clemens August von Galen, they were so convinced that Weimar represented a wrong turn in German history
that they viewed Hitler’s dictatorship as a promising new beginning or, perhaps more
accurately, as a chance to get the country back on the right track.
Once the Nazi regime was established most of the future resisters continued to support it well after it betrayed its essential nature. They expressed their loyalty not just
through words but through active collaboration as members of the military, bureaucracy,
and clerical establishment. Of course they had occasional doubts and caveats, some of
which they expressed, but these were outweighed by their declarations and acts of support, which brought the regime much-needed respectability. The central irony of the
conservative opposition to Hitler, Hamerow’s book reminds us, is that the people who
eventually tried to end his regime were instrumental in helping him to consolidate his
power.
What was it, then, that prompted the shift from collaboration, however qualified, to
resistance, however reluctant? The author, not being a sociologist, recognizes that there
is no easy answer to this question. The key figures started down the road to Rastenburg
at different times and from different places and they did not all carry the same intellectual baggage. Moreover, the available evidence regarding their apostasy is somewhat
problematical. Most of them did not generate detailed explanations for their change of
heart at the same time it occurred. Their most detailed commentary came during their
interrogations after the failure of the July 20 plot. Hamerow understands that explanations offered in this context might have stemmed largely, or partly, from a desire to
mitigate the severity of the inevitable punishment. Nonetheless, he takes the view that
they were generally telling the truth when they claimed to have turned against Nazism
because they believed it had turned against itself, not because they had come to see it
as inherently evil. As he writes, summarizing their perspective: “They almost never
conceded that they had been mistaken in their initial assessment of National Socialism,
that they had perhaps underestimated its inherent brutality or overlooked its essential
malevolence. Rather, National Socialism had altered in the course of time; it had abandoned its original principles; it had become intoxicated with success; it had been corrupted by power. If only it had remained true to its original ideal of selfless service to
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the nation. Hitler was the one who had changed, not those who tried to assassinate him”
(p. 14).
To buttress his thesis that the conservative resisters’ motivation derived mainly from
disappointment over the unfulfillment or corruption of shared aims, Hamerow shows
that when these men complained about the Nazi regime, time and again they focused
more on practice than on principle. They objected to the monopolization of power by a
small clique of self-serving despots, not to the ideal of replacing parliamentary democracy with an authoritarian system. They opposed the risky use of force to extend German control in Europe, not to the proposition that German control needed to be extended. They denounced, sometimes openly, the Nazis’ brutal methods for solving the
“Jewish problem,” not the notion that there was a Jewish problem to begin with.
The resisters’ allegiance to a set of authoritarian and nationalist ideals that overlapped in significant ways with the Nazis’ worldview was evident also in their plans for
a post-Hitler world. Although they tended to be vague in this domain and often did not
see eye to eye, the resisters in general “envisioned a one-sided partnership dominated
by traditional conservatives, with the Socialists providing a facade of democratic and
reformist respectability” (p. 324). In world affairs, as Stauffenberg himself argued, the
new regime’s most important goal would “be to ensure that Germany continues to be a
significant power factor in the interaction of [diplomatic] forces, and especially that the
Wehrmacht remains a useful instrument in the hands of its leaders” (p. 320). Had the
men who orchestrated the July 20 plot survived the Nazis’ bloody retribution, they
would probably not have been much happier with the post-Hitler political scene than
the surviving Nazis themselves.
Postwar Germany was not, for its part, terribly happy with the resistance legacy, at
least at the outset. It took some time for the leaders of the Federal Republic (the East
German regime did not see anything positive in the conservative resistance until its last
years) to recognize that the resistance could be useful in countering lingering charges
of collective guilt for Nazi crimes and in establishing an inspirational pedigree for the
new democracy (never mind that the pedigree in question was not democratic). Hamerow effectively chronicles the belated “beatitude” of the resistance but does not do
justice to the complexity or contentiousness of this process. Even after the canonization
had begun, there were bitter fights over just who belonged in the canon and what lessons
should be drawn from it. The Bundeswehr in particular found it difficult to include
among the “traditions” it was meant to honor an attempt to assassinate during wartime
the nation’s commander-in-chief. In essence, the resistance became part of the minefield
of historical symbols that continues to litter the German landscape. This legacy—to
change the metaphor—also continues to be a political football. When, on the occasion
of the fiftieth anniversary of the July 20 plot, Chancellor Helmut Kohl honored the
resisters for, among other services, uniting Germans “of the most diverse political convictions” in a common struggle against “the rule of criminality,” (p. 404) he dropped
from an earlier draft of his speech a phrase praising the Socialist resisters. It seems that
he was miffed because the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [German
Social Democratic Party]) had claimed that the CDU (Christlich-Demokratische Union
[Christian Democratic Union]) was exploiting the resistance legacy for partisan political purposes.
David Clay Large
Montana State University
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Hitler’s War in the East, 1941–1945: A Critical Assessment. By
¨
¨
Rolf-Dieter Muller and Gerd R. Ueberschar.
¨
Providence, R.I.: Berghahn Books in association with the Bibliothek fur Zeitgeschichte/
Library of Contemporary History, Stuttgart, 1997. Pp. x⫹405.
“There has been a tendency in the English-speaking world, particularly obvious in recent commemorations of the invasion of Normandy in 1944 and victory in Europe in
1945, to focus on the American and British participation in both events. That the invasion was made possible by the need for Germany to keep the great majority of its forces
on the front in the East, and that victory was in large measure bought at enormous
expense in Soviet lives somehow seemed to escape the attention of much of the public.
Similarly, the terrible nature of the war in the East, a product of German plans and
intentions, has rarely been grasped by people in the United States or Great Britain.”
Thus writes Gerhard Weinberg in the foreword (p. vii) to this important and readable
book, which provides both critical essays and extensive bibliographies (over three thousand entries) of works published on the Russo-German war up to 1994. The authors are
¨
Senior Research Fellows at the Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt in Potsdam and
have written numerous articles and monographs on various aspects of the war. They are
also major contributors to the monumental ten-volume project Das Deutsche Reich und
der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1979–), of which six volumes have now appeared (the
first four volumes are available in an English translation published by Oxford University
Press under the title Germany and the Second World War).
The Russo-German War has already generated a virtually unmanageable historical
literature, and the present work, focusing on the war from the German standpoint, does
not claim to be comprehensive. At the same time, however, the authors have successfully avoided a narrow military approach. Thus, of the five historiographical essays,
only one deals with the literature on military operations. Other essays focus on research
devoted to, respectively, policy and strategy, German treatment of the Jewish and Slav
populations, the German occupation, and, finally, the results of the war. Each essay has
a separate bibliography, which greatly enhances the value of the book as a reference
tool for specialists and nonspecialists alike, as well as for students and all readers interested in World War II.
In discussing the older as well as the current scholarship, the essays reveal not only
areas where researchers have made recent breakthroughs but also topics where research
¨
appears to have reached an interpretive impasse. Thus, Rolf-Dieter Muller’s essay on
policy and strategy, which focuses primarily on the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and Hitler’s plans for the Soviet Union, leaves the impression that recent studies devoted to
these themes have not succeeded in revising Andreas Hillgruber’s monumental work,
Hitlers Strategie (Frankfurt, 1965). Hillgruber argued that German policies in the East
were primarily the result of Hitler’s ideology of racial superiority and Lebensraum.
¨
By contrast, the operational history of the war, discussed in Gerd Ueberschar’s essay
on the military campaign, has apparently been the target of much reinterpretation. Thus,
as early as 1972, Klaus Reinhardt argued persuasively that the German defeat in the
Battle of Moscow (late September 1941 through January 1942) signaled a turning point
after which Germany had virtually no chance of winning the war in the East. Reinhardt’s
study (which Oxford University Press published in English in 1992 under the title Moscow: The Turning Point) also thoroughly debunked the myth that it was the Russian
winter—and not the Red Army—that stopped the Germans at Moscow.
In an essay entitled “The Ideologically Motivated War of Annihilation in the East,”
¨
Ueberschar deals with the most controversial aspect of the war in the East, German
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treatment of the Slav and Jewish populations living in occupied Soviet territory. The
author focuses on two major German war crimes, the genocide of approximately three
million Soviet Jews and the deliberate starvation of over three million Soviet prisoners
of war. One of the major issues in the literature is the participation and role of the
German army in these crimes.
After World War II, apologists for the German army insisted that the Wehrmacht and
its operational commanders had conducted a “clean” war on the Eastern Front and bore
no blame for the mass murders of civilians and prisoners in the East. Instead they laid
¨
these crimes at the door of Himmler’s Schutzstaffeln (SS) and especially the Einsatz¨
gruppen operating in the rear areas. This claim, as Ueberschar demonstrates, has been
increasingly undermined by recent studies (many of them by German historians) showing the “deep involvement of many Wehrmacht soldiers in the murder of Jewish civilians,” as well as the complicity between the Wehrmacht and the SS (pp. 228–29).
¨
Muller’s relatively short essay on German administration and exploitation of the occupied Soviet territories is very good on the literature devoted to German economic
policy but surprisingly thin on the related problem of the partisan war. The bibliography
on the partisans, listing only 150 titles (mostly in German and Russian), suggests that
this area is especially ripe for new research.
Hitler’s war in the East—one of the most dramatic and horrifying events in history—
was also one of the decisive episodes of our century and will doubtless become a central
topic of research and teaching for subsequent generations of European historians. In
providing both present and future historians with this well-written and beautifully organized guide to the literature and historiography of the Russo-German war, the authors
have done an important service for their English-speaking colleagues.
Edgar Melton
Wright State University
The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945–1989. By Jeffrey Kopstein.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. Pp. xii⫹246.
One of the most enduring paradoxes of the Soviet-dominated states of eastern Europe
after 1945 was the failure of regimes committed to the Leninist vision of technocratic
modernization to create “modern” industrial economies capable of competing with the
capitalist West. The simpler explanations—for example, that state planning ipso facto
produces inertia and inefficiency—have never been entirely satisfactory. Planning is
not a communist prerogative; nor was planning in less developed economies a complete
failure, as the Soviet success in World War II exemplified. The failures of technocratic
socialism can only be understood by reconstructing the political and social processes
that shaped it in each case.
Jeffrey Kopstein has done just that for the economy of the former German Democratic Republic. He has produced an original and persuasive analysis of why that economy, despite greater resource advantages than other east European states, failed to deliver high growth and expanding consumerism. He has been able to use the records of
the former communist regime, which gives his analysis the authority and depth that
most pre-1989 studies lacked. The book is divided into two parts. The first looks at the
macroeconomic performance of the economy since 1945 and the major explanations
for its performance; the second part is devoted to looking at the way the labor market,
consumerism, and political control operated at local level.
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The central argument of the book is that the performance of the East German economy was undermined by a “social compact” made in the 1950s between the regime’s
working-class base and the bureaucrats and apparatchiks with a vested interest in communist power. This compact came about as a result of the early failure of the regime to
tie economic rewards to productive performance. The labor relations of the USSR were
borrowed in the 1940s to overcome the demoralization and inertia of the postwar workforce. Generous amenities at work, weak piece-rates or work norms, and wage rates
that bore little relation to productivity growth, all helped to generate greater labor enthusiasm but tied the regime, a self-conscious workers’ state, to what Kopstein calls the
“veto power” of the working class. In 1953 an attempt was made to balance wages and
productivity by raising prices sharply and enforcing realistic work norms, but the result
was the violent crisis in June of that year. Thereafter the regime was obsessed with the
fear of alienating its social base, and, despite regular efforts to reform (but not transform) the economic system, relatively high wages and low productivity became endemic. As long as the USSR was prepared to help out its weaker partners, the structural
inefficiency of the German economy could be tolerated. But once Soviet assistance
declined in the 1970s (and Soviet oil prices rose), East Germany could survive only on
massive external debts and a huge domestic deficit. What seems so surprising from
Kopstein’s account is not that East Germany collapsed when it did, but that the collapse
did not occur sooner.
The survival of the social compact created further paradoxes. The appeasement of
working-class demands reduced the resources required for capital accumulation and
held up a more rapid modernization of the industrial structure, particularly in the 1960s
and 1980s when the unkinder economic climate forced all industrial economies to adjust or decline. But the failure to modernize effectively meant that workers could never
hope to get the high Western living standards many of them increasingly wanted. In the
1980s this led to the absurd situation in which workers were saving at higher than ever
rates because their high-wage, low-productivity economy could not produce the things
they wanted to buy. Kopstein might have compared this situation with the late 1930s,
when low-productivity growth and rising savings characterized the stagnant consumer
economy of the Third Reich. The difference between the two authoritarian regimes is
that the Third Reich wanted workers’ savings to fuel rearmament whereas the communist elite really did want to raise living standards and emulate the West. (There are,
indeed, striking analogies or continuities between the two dictatorships under which
East Germans had to live from 1933, particularly on issues of wage reform and wage
structure. Kopstein makes little of them, but the links are closer than either dictatorship
would have liked to admit.)
If workers and elite both wanted high growth and rising income, why could they not
produce a system that could supply it? Kopstein’s answer lies not with economics but
with politics: the communist regime was not prepared throughout its history to risk
reforms that might undermine the socialist complexion of the state. In this sense both
rulers and ruled complicity accepted the low-growth option. The one period of reform
in the 1960s, when Walter Ulbricht tried to decentralize the planning functions and
stimulate socialist competition, ended in near disaster by 1970, and led to his replacement by Erich Honecker, who insisted on reapplying the Stalinist model. Critics of the
low-growth model, such as the planning chairman, Gerhard Schurer, were isolated
within the elite and risked political reprisal. Kopstein’s study of local politics shows the
same pattern. Communist leaders and state functionaries were encouraged not to rock
the boat. Propaganda, or “campaign economics,” came to replace the rational assessment of economic means and ends. The public was to be persuaded that the economy
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worked in order to endorse the existing power structure. By 1989 the gap between
image and reality could not be masked. East Germany had an external debt of 46 billion
marks, stagnant trade, vast domestic subsidies (53 billion marks) to shore up the social
wage. Kopstein argues that it was the complete bankruptcy of Honecker’s regime in the
face of this looming material catastrophe that produced the final crisis. It was not the
desire for political freedom but for more consumer goods that brought down the Wall.
There is clearly much to be said for this argument, though an entirely materialist
explanation begs many questions. The price to pay for the social compact was intrusive
Stasi interference at every level of society. The monochrome culture, the survival of an
elite based on patronage and party loyalty, the bare toleration of religious belief, all of
these things were insupportable for many East Germans by 1989. Indeed Kopstein suggests that ordinary East Germans had a genuine commitment to economic egalitarianism in the absence of a free labor market and an enterprise culture and were not perhaps
as fixated on living-standard performance in the 1980s as he suggests. There were some
East Germans who hesitated in 1989 to embrace Western consumerism but who longed
for liberal civil rights. Since 1989 East Germany has become anything but an overnight
economic paradise. The pre-1989 world may well have offered a false equilibrium,
bought at the expense of Western investors, but the free market has produced pronounced social tensions and inequalities along with the Volkswagen.
Kopstein does not shy away from the achievements of the German Democratic Republic. There was growth, though its economic explanation is treated rather cursorily
here. The social wage was high and social policy progressive. Workers, if feared politically, were indulged socially. What led thousands to risk everything to flee from East
Germany throughout the period of its existence was surely the crude authoritarianism
and stifling political culture of Soviet-style communism. Until the 1970s the gap between an East German worker and a West German worker was not as wide as the aggregate figures of economic performance suggest, but the difference in their status as citizens was immense.
Richard Overy
King’s College, London
Von der wohlwollenden Despotie zur Herrschaft des Rechts: Entwicklungsstufen
der amerikanischen Besatzung Deutschlands, 1944–1949. By Dieter Waibel.
¨
Beitrage zur Rechtsgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, volume 15. Edited by
¨
Knut Wolfgang Norr et al.
¨
Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1996. Pp. xx⫹410. DM 188.
“Being Military Governor was a pretty heady job. It was the nearest thing to a Roman
proconsulship the modern world afforded. You could turn to your secretary and say,
‘Take a law.’ . . . It was a challenging job to an ambitious man. Benevolent Despotism.”
This famous comment from John J. McCloy, American Military Governor and High
Commissioner for Germany, epitomizes the situation facing the triumphant United
States after 1945. The complete collapse of National Socialist Germany offered McCloy
and other Allied leaders the intoxicating yet intimidating prospect of virtually unlimited
power to rebuild German society from its foundations. Their freedom of action was
matched only by the high stakes for which they were playing, especially as the deepening Cold War made Germany the cockpit of East-West competition. It is therefore particularly appropriate that Dieter Waibel chose to make McCloy’s quotation the epigraph
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for his book, which traces the development of American occupation policy from the
“benevolent despotism” described by McCloy to the Occupation Statute that formally
regulated relations between the Western Allies and the new Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. Unfortunately, the rest of the book does not equal this inspired beginning.
¨
In this revised version of his 1995 Tubingen legal studies dissertation, Waibel offers
a different perspective on a familiar topic. The American occupation of Germany, especially the ultimate decision to abandon four-power control in favor of a separate West
German state, has inspired a flood of scholarly works from both sides of the Atlantic.
The appeal of the history of the occupation lies primarily in its intimate relationship to
larger questions about postwar German politics and society, an appeal that has grown
as reunified Germany and its neighbors come to terms with four decades of division.
Recent reassessments of the occupation, such as Carolyn Eisenberg’s Drawing the Line:
The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949 (Cambridge, 1996), have
sparked debate by suggesting that German division was the direct result of American
policy, which rejected possible compromises with the Soviet Union in the interest of
Western European economic recovery. Eisenberg’s bold, if sometimes overstated, thesis
challenges post–Cold War triumphalism by requiring Americans to consider their share
in the blame for the division of Germany and Europe. Waibel’s book, however, is a
much more modest and less controversial contribution to the literature. He examines
the development of American occupation policy in light of its relationship to the AngloAmerican concept of the “rule of law,” most broadly defined as the protection of individual rights against state power (p. 9). This narrow focus is the source of his book’s
strengths and weaknesses.
Waibel’s legal analysis offers some important new insights. He demonstrates, for
example, how painfully aware the Americans were of their ambivalent legal status after
1945. The complete collapse of National Socialist Germany, and the Allied desire to
remove what vestiges remained after the surrender, created a legal and political vacuum
with little precedent in international law. Current legal theory generally assumed that
any occupation would be temporary and directly related to the continuation of hostilities. Once peace was restored, existing regulations foresaw either the direct annexation
of the occupied territory or the return of the previous government. Allied policy, however, aimed at neither of these options but, rather, assumed an extended period of occupation and reeducation, followed by the eventual construction of a completely new
German government. The result was a paradox, with the Americans proclaiming their
ultimate desire to establish democracy and the rule of law in Germany while exercising
authoritarian power to purge German society of any militarist, nationalist, or national
socialist elements that might challenge such a system.
It was in this paradoxical context that the United States tried to fashion a coherent
occupation policy. The story that Waibel tells is of an uncertain and often contradictory
interplay between official policy and practical reality. Waibel demonstrates how different groups within the Washington establishment argued among themselves over the best
route to German reeducation and also how German analysts tried to reconcile American
democratic rhetoric with the authoritarian reality of the occupation. As he describes the
evolution of American policy from the harsh Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1067
in 1945 to the more moderate JCS 1779 in 1947, and the gradual modification of plans
for denazification and property confiscation, Waibel demonstrates how the rule of law
served as a point of orientation. As the Americans became more interested in cultivating
German allies, they relaxed restrictions on German participation in public life and
greatly reduced the punitive aspects of the occupation, hoping to demonstrate the supe-
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riority of their legal conceptions. While not underestimating the distance both Americans and Germans had to travel to measure up to their stated ideals, Waibel nevertheless
concludes with a positive assessment of the occupation, asserting that the Occupation
Statute in 1949 provided “a reliable framework, leading to . . . [West] German sovereignty in 1955” (p. 351).
If Waibel’s analysis offers some new insights on the legal conceptions behind occupation policy, however, it also has distinct weaknesses. The relative lack of attention to
larger political issues is the most glaring fault. Waibel admits that his work offers but
one perspective on a very large topic and does not promise a comprehensive history of
the American occupation (pp. 5, 350). Nevertheless, he cannot ignore broader developments altogether, such as the origins of the Marshall Plan (pp. 138–41), and here his
discussions are far too vague to satisfy a specialist in the field. Occupation policy was
not made in a vacuum, and in relating the transformation of that policy, Waibel should
offer a clearer understanding of the external forces that shaped policy debates. Waibel
also sets up a straw man by focusing too closely on the Morgenthau Plan, American
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s 1944 proposal to punish Germany by
destroying its industrial base. Claiming that the “spirit of Morgenthau” influenced many
American policy makers (p. 48), Waibel portrays much of the policy debate as a conflict
between equally matched friends and foes of German rehabilitation. Such a perspective
does not reflect current historiography, which emphasizes Morgenthau’s isolation, especially after the death of Franklin Roosevelt. This distortion of the situation in Washington weakens his overall analysis of the course of occupation policy, which fails to offer
an adequate appreciation of the powerful individuals and interests both inside and outside the government who believed German and European recovery were inseparable.
Finally, Waibel’s work provides an object example of the strengths and weaknesses that
readers have come to expect from German doctoral dissertations: the documentation of
the legal debates is as impressive and voluminous as the writing is cautious and ponderous.
This book could be useful to specialists in American and German legal history who
want to trace the influence of American legal conceptions on occupied Germany. For
the relationship of the occupation to larger political and social questions, however, readers should look elsewhere, to works such as Eisenberg’s Drawing the Line; Thomas
Alan Schwartz’s America’s Germany (Cambridge, 1991); or Hermann-Josef Rupieper’s
Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie (Opladen, 1993).
Ronald J. Granieri
Furman University
The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape. By
Brian Ladd.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. Pp. ix⫹271. $29.95.
Brian Ladd has written a study of Berlin’s outstanding “monuments,” intended and not,
uncovering the layers of history and historical contest that constitute the new capital’s
physiognomy and its self-perception. Ladd brings his established expertise in the history of architecture and urban planning to bear on current debates concerning monuments, memorials, the history of memory, and the “historicization” of German history.
He vividly demonstrates how very alive the German past is in its present, offering remarkable evidence that history matters, and matters deeply. A volume written for
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broader appeal than other recent work covering some of the same territory, this is an
encouraging example of a study that combines disciplinary interest in reaching outside
an expert audience with recent publishers’ demands that all books do so.
The book is organized broadly chronologically, permitting Ladd to trace the layering
of historical meaning. But this chronology is deceptive. If chapter 2 begins with Berlin’s
early history as a walled city, chapter 1 is about that legacy as represented in the
twentieth-century Wall, symbol of the cold war. This organization is compelling, challenging accepted periodizations and demonstrating how meaning is ever reconstructed,
reading the old through the new. At the same time, this structure generates practical
difficulties. The Wall is discussed in chapter 1, the German Democratic Republic’s
(GDR’s) “Palace of the Republic” in chapter 2, and so on; while the chapter specifically
entitled “Divided Berlin” focuses on those sites that presumably first became “monuments,” sites of historical significance and memory between 1949 and 1989. Sometimes
this makes for difficulty, particularly for the nonexpert reader, in putting together the
book’s arguments, “layered” as they themselves are. It also makes for repetition from
chapter to chapter. But on balance this ambitious conception works.
Ladd remarks on the city’s centuries-long history as a walled town. It is in this light
that in chapter 1, “Berlin Walls,” Ladd seems to join some cold war critics in viewing
the twentieth-century Wall dividing Europe as “anachronistic,” an atavistic artifact of
the original wall in an age of mobility and connectedness. He also observes that, generally speaking, the Wall became the premier symbol of Berlin, indeed was Berlin for
many. In generalizing this symbolism Ladd may be conflating bombastic political rhetoric with everyday sensibilities, though in general in this volume he is careful to distinguish among different voices. His assertion of the political nature of the graffiti on the
western side of the wall might have noted that those markings, insofar as they were
indeed intended as political, mocked outsiders’ (especially Western politicians’) limited
view of Berlin nearly as often as they condemned Eastern Bloc officials. In the end,
Ladd claims, it was because of its anachronism that the wall did not survive as a monument.
The outcome was different, however, for other edifices. Ladd’s chapter on “Old Berlin” considers primarily the fate of two “palaces”: the eighteenth-century royal palace,
always primarily a symbol, the ruins of which were cleared in 1950; and the GDR’s
“Palace of the Republic,” also largely symbolic, condemned for asbestos contamination
shortly before the events of November 1989. Ladd carefully reconstructs the breathtaking post-1989 debates over whether the royal palace ought actually to be reconstructed:
its presence in Germans’ minds as a monument belies its physical absence. He focuses
on the 1993 exhibition of a life-size cloth facade of the palace on the original site.
This prompted an extraordinary suggestion: not the preservation of an already existing
artifact, but the reconstruction of a building—or even just its facade (!)—which represented a past of monarchical authoritarianism. The aesthetic effect of the cloth structure
was enough to create a surge of popular enthusiasm for rebuilding the monument. For
others, the idea of a rebuilt palace also signified the prospect of a new “civic wholeness”
that had been physically absent from Berlin in the wake of World War II bombing
and the Wall—a wholeness, moreover, that might allow Berliners to find a symbolic
reconnection with a civic past that preceded twentieth-century infamies. Ladd’s attention to a range of voices, from those of professional preservationists, politicians, historians, and enthusiastic millionaires to those in the comment book at the facade exhibition,
make this an extraordinary discussion of monuments and overdetermined memory, of
the interaction between physical buildings and peoples’ ideas over time. The flourishing
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debate ended abruptly with the announcement of state budget cuts; these realities too
inform the texture of memory, as Ladd demonstrates.
Once again identifying memory in multivalent presences and absences, Ladd also
considers how the Nazis sought a radical transformation of Berlin into a working monument to their own regime. He traces the endless recent debates concerning how best to
memorialize the Third Reich and its heinous acts in the city which was its central power
base. Although scholars have expressed concern that the historical literature focuses on
the perpetrators at the expense of the victims, those involved in debates concerning
monuments have warned of the need to draw greater attention to the perpetrators. It is
in this light that many argued that the Topographie des Terrors, originally a temporary
1987 exhibit located at the site of the former Gestapo headquarters, should constitute a
permanent site of memory. Ladd recounts discussion of how planners of the exhibition
sought not to close discussion, not to make a definitive statement that would finally put
the era to rest, but rather to act as an “active museum” and as a “countermonument.”
He notes that the 1989 resolution designating the historic site for permanent use by
the exhibit might never have taken place a year later when this area became prime
real estate.
Ladd’s volume concludes with a discussion of “Divided Berlin” and a brief chapter
on Berlin’s new incarnation as capital (once again), both looking at the problem of
creating the city quasi-anew after the bombing and the division of the city. The outstanding topic here is the building-up and tearing-down of monuments to socialism in
the form of “intentional” monuments, new apartment buildings, and new street names.
Here, too, Ladd allows the range of German voices to provide dense texture to the
discussions; he recounts, for example, how alternative politicians responded to the attempted erasure of GDR history with demands for the demolition of the victory column
¨
(Siegessaule), a symbol of nineteenth-century militarist nationalism. Such attempts
at erasure are in any case dubious efforts, Ladd notes; the “ghosts” that inhabit all of
these physical structures are unlikely to be put to rest as Berlin enters a new phase of
its history.
This very denseness of texture, along with the book’s style of broad appeal, leave
Ladd too often in the position of losing his own voice, and often one wishes he had
allowed himself the space to complete his own thoughts on a variety of issues. At the
same time, since the book is aimed at a wide audience, Ladd might have taken more
care to avoid a number of potentially misleading comments (such as that the Wall prevented GDR citizens from leaving their country [p. 28]). But on balance this is a remarkable book, offering for historians and a broader readership alike a fascinating introduction to a range of historical issues critical to contemporary Germans. The book
is generously embellished with well-placed images as well as a thoughtful narrative
bibliography. But it is Ladd’s ability to effectively “reconstruct” the monuments for the
reader—and with them much of twentieth-century German history—that makes this
such an exciting study.
Belinda Davis
Rutgers University
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Klassenkampf oder Nation? Deutsche Sozialdemokratie in Polen, 1918–1939. By
Petra Blachetta-Madajczyk. Schriften des Bundesarchivs, volume 49.
¨
Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1997. Pp. xiv⫹315. DM 72.
In Arc de Triomphe, one of Erich Maria Remarque’s novels about the frenetic existence
of emigrants in post-1933 Europe, the protagonist lands in a police station. He is a
German surgeon who has traded a Nazi concentration camp for an underground life in
the swelling ranks of unregistered foreigners in Paris. Pondering what will be his third
deportation, he encounters two French workers who assure him that the future proletarian revolution will do away with passports. Best known for the antiwar blockbuster All
Quiet on the Western Front, Remarque was himself a refugee from Nazi Germany, and
his prose is characterized by hard-bitten cynicism and resigned realism. The workers’
pronouncements cannot prevent the expulsion of the talented but passportless German,
who winds up in the hands of the police because he has administered first aid to the
victims of a construction accident and whose anesthetized patients have included the
corpulent, chauvinistic bureaucrat responsible for giving the deportation order.
As its title indicates, the monograph under review focuses on the perceived dichotomy between workers’ adherence to the universal class struggle and their loyalty to the
nation. The democratic Left was the most powerful institutional advocate of themes
that resonate throughout Remarque’s work: antimilitarism, antifascism, decency amid
the rise of totalitarian ideologies, and republican virtue amid the crisis of liberalism.
That being said, of course, the Left was unable to halt Europe’s plunge into the abyss,
and, like the scene in Arc de Triomphe, ideological pronouncements more often than
not remained but hollow phrases.
Besides fracturing Europe’s working-class movement into two hostile camps and thus
rendering it much weaker than it otherwise would have been, World War I restructured
forever the map of East Central Europe. In “the lands in between,” the old multinational
empires collapsed to be replaced by still multinational nation-states. One of these successor states was, of course, the Second Polish Republic, which had large Ukrainian
and Jewish minorities as well as over one million ethnic Germans in 1920 (the figure
declined to around 700,000 by 1931 due to emigration). Petra Blachetta-Madajczyk’s
monograph traces the history of the German social democrats who were left behind in
Poland when the new borders with Germany were drawn. Underlying her analysis is
the notion that, at least in theory, socialism offered the best prescriptions for overcoming the pitfalls of nationalism. The resulting historical analysis, however, would have
been well served by a dose of Remarque’s realism.
Unlike their ideological comrades and ethnic cousins in the First Czechoslovak Republic, the German social democrats were never a mass force in interwar Poland; indeed, they were a rather small group. To make matters worse, ideological and structural
differences existed between their three geographical focal points: Bromberg, in what
´ ´
had been West Prussia, Upper Silesia, and Łodz. By the mid-1920s, the SudetenGerman social democrats managed to move beyond irredentism and vehement demands
for local political and cultural autonomy to emerge as a significant and indeed governing party in Prague. The German social democrats in Poland, however, played a minor
role in politics and society. A notable exception was the influence they wielded at the
local level in the multinational and, especially by contemporary Polish standards, heav´ ´
ily industrialized city of Łodz, where collaboration with the Polish Socialist Party (PPS)
and the Jewish Bund worked. The author devotes a great deal of attention to the repeated failures to create a united socialist movement at the national level. Attempts to
forge a “little International” consisting of Poles, Ukrainians, Germans, and Bundists
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invariably floundered. These failures are interpreted as evidence of the PPS’s excessive
nationalism, which, nota bene, is juxtaposed with the allegedly genuine internationalism of the German social democrats, who, it should be noted, did accept the Polish
state.
This sharp division between internationalism and nationalism, while perhaps understandable when refracted through the Austro-Marxist prism preferred by the German
social democrats in Poland themselves, is nonetheless distorting. To grasp this salient
fact, one need only look to the Weimar German social democrats’ use of practically
understood and pragmatically implemented internationalism to convince the major
West European socialist parties to support a revision of the Versailles borders in the
East. The shrinking influence of the German social democrats in Upper Silesia and
West Prussia must be viewed against the background of appeals for national solidarity
emanating both from within the German community in Poland as well as from the
German government in Berlin. These appeals drew on the carefully nurtured hope that
the German-Polish borders could, in fact, be redrawn. After the Nazi seizure of power,
´ ´
the ranks of German social democracy in Poland dwindled even further except in Łodz.
Multinational working-class coexistence there drew on a long history that extended
back well into the nineteenth century; moreover, the city had not been part of the Polish
lands controlled by Prussia and then Imperial Germany (here one could draw certain
parallels with the German social democrats in the First Czechoslovak Republic).
Blachetta-Madajczyk’s study is extremely detailed. It offers an exhaustive presentation and thorough analysis of the topic. A very impressive array of primary sources
complements its meticulous, chronologically organized discussion of such issues as the
regional differentiation among the German social democrats, their ideological development, relations with the PPS, the role of the Weimar German government, and the response to and impact of Nazism. All but the most dedicated readers will find it difficult
to wade through the thicket of factual detail, but the monograph can be mined selectively. To its credit, the work reclaims a heretofore obscured aspect of the history of the
German minority in interwar Poland at a time when Germany and Poland are transforming their relationship into an eastern counterpart of the Franco-German relationship as we know it today.
I would, however, insist on viewing working-class internationalism more from the
perspective of its historical tendency to serve German national interests. Internationalism in the interwar period was an influential force, though—to revisit Remarque—
talk of a world in which national borders would be rendered irrelevant was, at best,
premature and, at worst, rhetorical camouflage for the pursuit of very real national interests in a way that facilitated Europe’s division into a stable, western portion and an
eastern region in which German territorial revisionism was kept alive. The monograph
concludes with biographical sketches of the major German social democratic leaders
in interwar Poland. They, like many of their Polish counterparts, paid for their convictions with exile, as well as imprisonment, torture, and death at the hands of both Nazi
and Soviet persecutors. History was not kind to the democratic Left in interwar East
Central Europe. Precisely because of their more endearing qualities, all socialists, regardless of their nationality, suffered a fate that Remarque understood only too well.
William Lee Blackwood
Yale University
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Imagining the Balkans. By Maria Todorova.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. xi⫹257. $45.00 (cloth); $19.95 (paper).
Maria Todorova’s Imagining the Balkans is one of those books with which the reader
can argue. It reminded me a bit of reading Calvin’s Institutes, a book the reader is
tempted to dispute line by line. Imagining the Balkans is not quite so provoking, but it
certainly stimulates debate.
The book’s essential point is that Western observers, particularly those in the last five
years, have given the Balkans an undeserved bad rap. To illustrate her point, the author
follows three paths: (1) she traces the words “Balkan” and “Balkanization” as pejorative
terms, (2) she criticizes, at times even ridicules, those who use the terms in a pejorative
way, and (3) she stresses that the current difficulties plaguing Bosnia and rump Yugoslavia are neither Balkan-wide problems nor evidence of “ancient enmities” but the results
of evil men spreading fear and hatred for political and economic gain.
There is much here to please the postmodernist. Throwing in a few references to
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and David Lodge, she cites as her model the work
of Edward Said but points out that “Balkanism” is not Orientalism and should not be
confused with it. The Balkans, she notes, are neither the Near nor Middle East, are
Christian rather than Moslem, are a definable geographical area familiar to the West
rather than a nebulous concept, were not colonized by the West and therefore experienced no postcolonial character, and possessed peoples who found their own identity
not in opposition to the West but to the very Orientalism that Said writes about.
Her postmodern analysis is interesting, but for me the best chapters are those that
offer the evidence she uses to make her points. She notes that Western writing about
the Balkans in the early modern and modern eras began with polemical treatises about
the Turks as barbarian autocrats intent on subverting Christian Europe—treatises composed mostly by people who had never been to the Balkans and had probably never
seen a Turk. This kind of writing gave way in the eighteenth century to travel literature
that portrayed the Balkans as an exotic place, and in the early nineteenth century to
some truly scientific writing among French and German observers. The British (to
whom Todorova pays special attention in part because, in the current troubles, British
observers have influenced American journalists) divided in the nineteenth century into
Turkophile aristocrats, who supported Britain’s formal policy of supporting the Ottoman Empire against Russia, and philhellene bourgeois, who condemned the Turks as
butchers of Christians and oppressors of the poor and downtrodden generally.
In the early twentieth century, writing in the West—and here Todorova begins to
focus almost exclusively on the work of the British and Americans—became much
harsher because of the grisly acts of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, the brutal assassination of King Alexander and Draga Mashin of Serbia in 1903,
and, although the author omits it, the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand.
From then on, British and American writers used the terms “Balkan” and “Balkanization” as synonymous with violence, ethnic hatred, backwardness, and barbarism. Despite the West’s own descent into darkness in World War II, these terms have stuck.
Indeed, Todorova is especially scornful of those members of the Balkan intelligentsia
who have accepted this stigma, and of Polish, Hungarian, and Czech writers who tout
the term “Central Europe,” a false concept she regards as a ploy to distinguish their
countries from the Balkans.
As mentioned earlier, there are many points with which one can argue in this book.
I wish that Todorova had not overlooked the post–World War II era when the British
and Americans had a fairly benign view of the Balkans. The popular press then distin-
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guished among the Balkan states and peoples rather than lumping them all in one pot.
Journalistic motives may be suspect given the prevailing cold war ideology, but the
press did not present the Balkans as generally a dangerous and wicked place.
After 1948 the Americans and British had a favorable view of Tito and his Yugoslavia. Most who thought about such things at all imagined that the days of ethnic and
religious hatred in Yugoslavia were over, ended by Tito’s policies of silence on the subject and increasing material affluence (represented by getting as many refrigerators and
automobiles into the hands of the people as he could). Americans admired little Albania
for standing up to Nikita Khrushchev, although we were disturbed that its leadership
preferred the Chinese camp (Orientalism again) to ours. Americans even admired Romania: President Nixon visited it in 1969, and the Romanian team was wildly cheered
on its appearance at the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984. Only later did the general
public in the United States become aware of the horrors (Balkan?) of the Ceauşescu
regime.
The point is that I am not certain the general public in America thought much about
the Balkans or Balkanization one way or the other until 1991, when it watched in astonishment as Yugoslavia collapsed in bloodshed. It is true that Americans might lump
all of the Balkan peoples together, but not because we wallow in feelings of superiority
to the exotic, backward, superstitious other, but because we do not know any better.
And most of our journalists do not either. In one place, Todorova complains that Western journalists should “giv[e] phenomena their proper names and [have] a clear perspective of their repercussions” (p. 186). I wish our journalists would do that when
reporting on Washington, as well as on Sofia, Sarajevo, and Skopje.
This is a good book. It is provocative, interesting, and informative. I recommend it.
Karl A. Roider, Jr.
Louisiana State University
Ukrainian Futurism, 1914–1930: A Historical and Critical Study. By
Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj. Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies. Edited by
George G. Grabowicz et al.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Ukrainian Research Institute, 1997. Distributed
by Harvard University Press. Pp. xviii⫹413. $35.00 (cloth); $18.00 (paper).
An expanded and revised version of his Ph.D. dissertation defended at Harvard University in 1983, Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj’s monograph is an excellent introduction not only to
Ukrainian futurism but also to the dilemmas confronting intellectuals who aspire to
challenge the cultural hegemony of what they consider an alien national culture.
Ukrainian futurism appeared before the outbreak of the First World War. Led by
Mikhail’ (Mykhailo) Semenko (1892–1937), the most prominent futurists included Geo
Shkurupii, Oleksa Slisarenko, Iulian Spol, and Dmytro Buz’ko. A broadly based, heterogeneous avant-garde movement, Ukrainian futurism did not possess a single style.
Instead, it represented an attitude toward art; its “aesthetics” were novelty and surprise.
Seen in a broad context, Ukrainian futurism was part of the great twentieth-century
reaction against naturalism, realism, and representational art. Its appearance demonstrated that “Ukraine’s long process of withdrawal and disengagement from the imperial
cultural mainstream was now complete” (p. xii).
At the same time that Ukrainian futurists consciously differentiated themselves from
the Russian cultural mainstream, they also alienated themselves from those Ukrainian
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intellectuals who attempted to establish a new Ukrainian cultural norm that recognized
traditional and classical Europe as its preeminent cultural model. In their struggle
against provincialism and artistic backwardness, Ukrainian futurists attacked the traditional values and tastes revered by mainstream Ukrainian nationalist intellectuals.
Ukrainian futurists “set out to alter the course of Ukrainian culture, to bring it into the
twentieth century, if necessary, against its will” (p. 346). They abhorred cultural stagnation and in opposition to most of their colleagues they became fascinated by everything
“exotic, extreme, and innovative” (p. xii). Not surprising, this attitude left them at the
margins of Ukrainian intellectual life before and after the revolutionary period. Although the communist party began to support the futurists in the 1920s, party critics
accused the futurists of propagating pornography and Ukrainian nationalism by 1930.
After introducing us to the Ukrainian futurist movement and its principal representatives, Ilnytzkyj investigates the futurists within Soviet Ukrainian society in the 1920s
and their conflicts with other Ukrainian intellectuals and literary movements seeking to
become the mainstream under the Soviet umbrella. He then analyzes their experiments
with poetry, prose, and the visual arts.
Speed, dynamism, urban life, and technology characterized Ukrainian futurism. Its
poetry, prose, and visual experiments produced multiple interpretations, not a single
Ukrainian nationalist interpretation. But despite their prodigious output, the futurists
were more innovative in producing theories rather than art. Ilnytzkyj is clearly on the
mark when he suggests that futurism “served Ukrainians as a synonym for all of the
avant-garde, a fact also reflected in their post-avant-gardistic philosophy, which eschewed taking a narrow or restricted perspective on art” (p. 335).
Based on extensive research, Ilnytzkyj’s monograph is the first scholarly effort in any
language to describe the conflict between the Ukrainian avant-garde and the public as
well as to provide a comprehensive account of Ukrainian futurism as a literary movement. Carefully utilizing his sources, the author successfully reconstructs the Ukrainian
futurist movement’s past and resurrects its literary and political dynamics ex nihilo.
Concentrating only on the history and the literary works of this movement, however,
this book does not analyze how it intersected with the European and Russian avantgarde. That remains, as Ilnytzkyj admits, a future project.
George O. Liber
University of Alabama at Birmingham
The Russian Empire and the World, 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion
and Containment. By John P. LeDonne.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. xix⫹394. $45.00 (cloth); $22.95
(paper).
Until recently, tsarist diplomacy was a historiographical backwater, largely marginalized by the academy. Scholars of Imperial Russia preferred to focus on other topics,
while specialists in international relations tended not to look back beyond the Revolution of 1917. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union has revived interest in longerterm aspects of Russian foreign policy. Dramatically easier access to archives in
Moscow and St. Petersburg is one reason. More important, there is also a belated recognition that the pre-Soviet past bears some relevance to the post-Soviet present in understanding Russia’s role in the world.
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The first sign of the subject’s renaissance was a major conference at the Kennan
Institute in autumn 1990, which led to Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, edited by Hugh
Ragsdale (Cambridge, 1993). Two years later a professor at the Naval War College,
William Fuller, published the first English-language survey based on archival sources,
Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914 (New York, 1992). John LeDonne’s new
book, The Russian Empire and the World, 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion
and Containment is a major new contribution to this field.
LeDonne promises both a history and an interpretation of Russian diplomacy from
the early years of Peter the Great’s reign in 1700 through the collapse of the Romanov
dynasty in 1917. As the title suggests, his analysis is firmly rooted in geography, especially the ideas of the early twentieth-century British political geographer, Sir Halford
Mackinder. It was Sir Halford who introduced the notion of the “heartland,” the vast
center of the Eurasian landmass whose borders roughly coincide with those of the old
Russian empire. According to Mackinder’s schema, the heartland would inevitably try
to expand outward toward its perimeters on the European and Pacific coastlands. Although subsequently unfashionable because of their appropriation by such Nazi-era
geopolitical theorists as Karl Haushofer, Mackinder’s ideas have enjoyed something of
a revival in recent years.
Rather than presenting a straight chronology of tsarist wars and foreign policy,
LeDonne tells five stories. In the first part, he describes Russian expansion on its western, southern, and eastern frontiers, a process that led to the absorption of territories
formerly under the sway of such rivals as Sweden, Poland, Ottoman Turkey, Persia, and
China. A favorite tactic of Romanov tsars and tsarinas was “to support the rotting process [of decaying kingdoms and empires on their borders] in the name of dynastic legitism in order to obtain territorial and other concessions” (pp. 200–202).
Russia’s rulers were strikingly successful in expanding their realms. Around 1900, a
Prussian geographer calculated that the Russian empire had expanded by an average of
55 square miles a day over the previous four centuries. These advances also raised the
hackles of states more able to resist tsarist conquest, and the second part of the book
deals with Russia’s “containment” by the Germanic powers (Germany and Austria) and
the coastland powers (England and Japan).
As LeDonne sees it, Russian expansion and containment are phenomena largely determined by landscape, climate, relative military power, and other impersonal factors;
personality and chance are entirely secondary. Thus, “geography created definite corridors of expansion; a particular structure of human zones shaped by ecology predetermined the stages of the Russian advances; and the immense energy of the core area in
the fullness of youth kept challenging the resistance of core areas that had passed their
prime” (p. 351). The success of some powers in checking Russian conquests are similarly dictated by geopolitical logic: “The Heartland’s periphery imposed an ultimate
physical limit to Russian expansion, because it was the great divide between continental
and maritime civilizations” (p. 368).
LeDonne does an important service by urging us to think about Russia in these terms.
Like diplomatic history, geography has not been particularly popular on university campuses in the United States. Yet the discipline remains a valuable tool for understanding
the behavior of states. My only criticism is about style. LeDonne’s text is not easy to
digest. His prose is dense, as is the detail. There is talk of “political isobars,” “optimum
lines of conquest,” “flanking power alliances,” and the like. But persistent attention is
well rewarded. After making my way through the book’s four hundred pages, I emerged
with a much deeper and richer understanding of Russian geopolitical realities. Le-
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Donne’s latest study should be read by anyone curious about the growth of the Russian empire.
David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye
Brock University
Power and the Sacred in Revolutionary Russia: Religious Activists in the Village.
By Glennys Young.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Pp. xiv⫹307. $47.50.
Glennys Young’s book is a pioneering attempt to identify, characterize, and assess the
role of religion in the life of Russia’s twentieth-century peasants. It is predominantly a
study of confrontation and accommodation between the traditional peasant culture and
the militantly atheistic Communist state during the New Economic Policy (NEP) era
(1921–29), that is, before the total assault on all religions that began in 1929. I can
think of only one other recent publication, Religion and Society in Russia: The Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Centuries by Paul Bushkovich (Oxford, 1992), that has also attempted
a study of the Russian people’s religiosity. But the two books are separated by three
centuries and by their contingents: the nation as such in Bushkovich’s work; only the
peasants and rural clergy, faced by the state’s war against their spiritual culture, in
Young’s.
The first chapter deals with the dissemination of atheism, radicalism, and anticlericalism among peasants on the eve of the revolutions, mostly by seasonal factory workers, the new semi-peasant, semi-proletarian. The second chapter continues the subject
through the revolutions of 1917 and the Civil War. Referring to the authority of Orlando
Figes (Peasant Russia, Civil War: The Volga Countryside in Revolution, 1917–1921
[New York, 1989]), Young states that in that revolutionary turmoil many peasant assemblies “authorized” seizure of land “formerly held by the Church and the gentry” (p. 51).
This is undoubtedly true regarding gentry estates; however, neither the First Congress
of Peasant Soviets nor the radical-leftist All-Russian Congress of the Democratic
Clergy and Laity called for the confiscation of church lands.
Young’s observation that the prevalent attitude of sectarians to the Soviet system and
the Communist party was an uncompromising “no” needs some discernment, as, for
instance, the Evangelicals and the main-line Seventh Day Adventists were at first much
more positive than the Orthodox about Lenin’s regime. In Young’s view the Orthodox,
with their tradition of church-state simfonia, tried to adapt themselves to the new regime
as they did to all historical political systems, and to practice full civic loyalty while
retaining their religious traditions, rites, sacraments, and liturgy. By the way, the author
erroneously ascribes to Patriarch Tikhon a sudden political turnabout in 1925 (p. 207,
and n. 72). Already in 1918 in his address to Lenin on the occasion of the regime’s first
anniversary, the Patriarch, while condemning the terror and persecutions, recognized
the regime as given. Then in his encyclical of October 8, 1919, he forbade the clergy
to take sides in the Civil War and declared civic loyalty of the church to the Soviet state.
Finally, in 1922 the Patriarch offered the Soviet government his church’s full cooperation in combating the famine. Contrary to Young’s assertion, he did not resist the donation of church valuables. He appealed to the clergy and laity to give up everything
except the sacramental vessels. A propos, Young should have known that the letter to
Molotov of March 19, 1922, has not merely been attributed to Lenin by samizdat but
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was published in full in the official Communist Party of the Soviet Union archival journal, Izvestiia TsK KPSS (no. 4, April 1990) when its editor was Mikhail Gorbachev.
That letter presents conclusive evidence that Lenin’s concern was not how to feed the
hungry but how to use the famine as a weapon against the church by launching a massive propaganda campaign presenting the church as a merciless, greedy institution. This
brings us back to Young’s claim of a greater adaptability of the Orthodox peasants to
the system than that of some sectarian groups. The quandary here is that, at least on the
institutional level, the sectarians in the 1920s fared much better than the Orthodox.
While the latter were denied the right to publish periodicals and to organize agricultural
communes, youth organizations, or theological schools, all these rights were enjoyed
by the Protestant sects. While the 1930s saw a total assault against all religions, the
renewal of persecutions in the Khrushchev and post-Khrushchev years, as documented
in John Anderson’s recent Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and Successor
States (Cambridge, 1994), again hit the Orthodox much harder than the Protestants or
the Roman Catholics. The Orthodox Church, being so deeply rooted in the Russian
“soil,” as convincingly illustrated in Young’s study of Russia’s most “soil-bound” stratum, has always been seen by the Soviets as their main threat “on the religious front.”
As with most pioneering adventures, Young’s volume is not without faults. Her reliance on Soviet archives and antireligious publications has resulted in a rather grotesque
image of peasant religiosity, reducing it entirely to externalities, rituals, drunken festivities, and pagan superstitions. Surely there was all that, but not only that. The hundreds
of thousands, perhaps millions, of believers, including peasants, who died for their faith
did so for something greater than superstitions.
Nicholas V. Riasanovsky was once asked how good must be the Russian language of
a historian researching on Russia. He replied: as good as that of a specialist on Russian
literature. Alas, Young is not such a historian. Her language problems are numerous.
Encountering Russian city names in their adjectival form she habitually reduces their
endings to an impossible sk, thus: “Metropolitan of Kolomensk” from the Russian
Kolomenskii, that is, of Kolomna, the latter being the name of the city in the nominal
case. She should have checked city names in a Russian encyclopedia. Villages would
be more difficult to identify, but in any case not a single Russian village could have a
ko ending, so favored by the author. Their names could end in ka, no, vo, koe, kaia, but
never in ko. Both prikhodskoe popechitelstvo and prikhodskoi sovet she has translated
as parish council; this is correct for the latter, but the former is parish stewardship or
sponsorship. She confuses clergy with lay church servants (tserkovnosluzhiteli). Blagovestniks were lay preachers, an institution established by the 1917–18 Ecclesiastic
Council, not “church officials.” Contrary to her statement, the Gospel is never read in
Orthodox church services by laypersons. She treats “Iliin Den’” and Saint Elijah’s Day
as separate events, whereas Ilia is the Russian for Elijah. There are literally scores of
such errors as well as some inventions, for example, that Russians “often named their
churches after their tsars” (p. 34). Nonsense: Orthodox churches are named only after
saints or major Christian feast days. Since not a single Russian tsar has so far been
canonized, no church could bear a tsar’s name. Khleb is not only bread but also cereals
or grain in general. Her use of the term “bread” when meaning a payment in kind that
is measured in tons is absurd. Some strange ideological labels appear, such as when one
of Russia’s greatest reformers, Petr A. Stolypin, is labeled a reactionary; Archbishop
Evdokim, one of the leaders of the radical Renovationist Schism, is labeled a conservative bishop!
Her bibliography, glossary, and index are full of gaps. Yet, the volume is an important
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step in a heretofore relatively unexplored direction of research in Russian religious
studies.
Dimitry Pospielovsky
University of Western Ontario, Emeritus
Inside the Enigma: British Officials in Russia, 1900–1939. By Michael Hughes.
London: Hambledon Press, 1997. Pp. xi⫹336.
American Diplomats in Russia: Case Studies in Orphan Diplomacy, 1916–1919.
By William Allison. Praeger Studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Thought. Edited
by B. J. C. McKercher.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997. Pp. xi⫹190. $59.95.
William Allison’s American Diplomats in Russia: Case Studies in Orphan Diplomacy,
1916–1919 is a fascinating and highly readable account of the relatively small group
of American diplomats and consular officials stationed in Russia who found themselves
in the chaos of the Russian revolutions and subsequent outbreak of civil war in that
country. While it is generally known that U.S. President Woodrow Wilson largely ignored his professional diplomatic corps in favor of his circle of personal friends and
trusted advisers, the bald manner in which firsthand accounts, on-the-spot intelligence,
and recommendations from members of his own State Department were either ignored
or overridden is passionately brought to light in Allison’s book.
Through a combination of biographical sketches and a detailed examination of the
tenure of the three U.S. ambassadors who served in Russia between 1916 and 1919,
Allison paints a picture of pork-barrel appointment ambassadorships and the frustration
experienced by a diplomatic corps that chaffed under their stewardship. By far the most
damaging ambassador in Allison’s view was David R. Francis. A typical political appointee with no experience in diplomacy let alone with Russia, Francis compounded
his ignorance of the Russian situation with his frequent tendency to override the judgment of his professional staff. Moreover, the documented accounts of the ambassador’s
rather high-handed treatment of many of his high-ranking and knowledgeable staff in
Petrograd added to the inefficiency of the embassy, as mistrust and dislike of the ambassador were commonplace.
While subsequent ambassadors may have had more experience with Russian political
`
conditions and better working relationships with their staff, their situation vis-a-vis
Washington and the president remained frustrating. Wilson continued to rely on “special ambassadors” and “missions” to provide him with assessments of the Russian situation, much to the chagrin of both the State Department and the U.S. personnel in Russia.
Allison’s investigation provides a unique look into an important area of American
foreign policy during the early months of the Bolshevik regime in Russia. The question
of the role and importance of American diplomats and diplomatic staff in pursuing
various ad hoc policies toward Russia without Washington’s attention or confidence has
never been addressed before, and Allison’s work goes far to fill that gap. His research
is comprehensive and his conclusions are well documented. What makes this particular
diplomatic history even better is that Allison approaches his subject in a straightforward
manner and with a sensitivity that are rare today among historians. My only criticism
of the volume is that the individual vignettes could have been spun together a bit more
skillfully. Nonetheless, American Diplomats in Russia is highly readable account that
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will prove useful not only to students of diplomatic history but also to anyone interested
in the evolution of early U.S.–Soviet relations or the formulation of U.S. foreign policy
during the Wilson presidency.
In a similar vein, Michael Hughes’s book Inside the Enigma: British Officials in Russia, 1900–1939 presents an examination of the British diplomatic and consular personnel in Russia who observed and reported on the vast, often immediately incomprehensible changes that swept through that country between 1900 and 1939. Insofar as
Hughes does offer a prism through which one can witness the changes firsthand, his
work does indeed represent “a chronicle of Russian history as seen through the eyes of
British representatives” (p. ix). But it also goes much farther than that.
His approach to this filtered view of events in Russia is well organized and comprehensive. By laying the groundwork back at the turn of the century, Hughes establishes
the official British view of Tsarist Russia as a problem-laden country with a largely
decaying leadership. Through the extensive use of Foreign Office records, Hughes then
carefully traces the official British observations and responses to such major events as
the widespread strikes and disaffection of labor in Russia during the war years and,
ultimately, to the revolutions and rapid changes in government that plagued Russia in
1917. In many respects, Hughes’s work presents an interesting counterpoise to Allison’s
work insofar as the British Foreign Service representatives in Russia seemed to have
suffered the same experience of failing to carry the ear of either their government or its
military representatives in Russia—a situation that did not appear to improve despite
the normalization of relations after 1924.
Inside the Enigma is a wonderful volume chock-full of meaty details and analysis—
not only Russian internal events and conditions through the eyes of those who witnessed
their unfolding but also the inner workings and difficulties encountered by the various
representatives sent to represent H. M. government and report home. Hughes’s utilization of the available sources—ranging from official records to personal recollections—
is impressive. His treatment of the 1930s—when relations were strained and war began
to become a distinct possibility—is a unique and important contribution to the literature
in the field of Anglo-Soviet relations. My only criticism of this impressive volume is
that the turbulent decade of the 1920s received such fleeting attention. This minor complaint aside, Hughes’s book is a well-researched, finely written, and valuable addition
to the existing scholarship on Anglo-Russian relations during the first half of the twentieth century.
Christine A. White
Pennsylvania State University
Workers against Lenin: Labour Protest and the Bolshevik Dictatorship. By
Jonathan Aves. International Library of Historical Studies, volume 6.
London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1996. Pp. x⫹220.
This important study illuminates the social and political background to the New Economic Policy (NEP). The labor protests it chronicles were triggered by the policies of
War Communism and the dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party. It therefore offers more
than its title implies.
In 1920, the Party interpreted its successes on the battlefield as a sign that the coercive policies of War Communism were working. As a result, the pressure on workers
(and, for that matter, peasants and petty tradesmen) was increased even as the prospect
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of a Soviet defeat receded. Of course, some leading Bolsheviks and trade union officials
viewed “the militarization of labor”—including the subordination of the trade unions
to the Party, the implementation of one-man management, the elevation of the status of
“bourgeois specialists,” the introduction of subbotniki (unpaid labor for the state), and
the reliance on revolutionary tribunals to prosecute “deserters”—warily. After a spirited
and tortuous debate, however, the maximalists within the leadership essentially prevailed. In principle, no industry was spared the harsh new regimen; in practice, the
brunt of the pressure fell on railwaymen and munitions workers, whose performance
had the most immediate effect on the Red Army’s encounters with domestic and foreign enemies.
While the crackdown on labor discipline in 1920 initially had a salutary effect on
productivity, it triggered outbursts of unrest from a work force that was teetering on
the verge of starvation—itself a consequence of the regime’s ongoing battles with the
peasantry, which remained subject to draconian grain-requisitioning measures, and with
petty tradesmen, who played a vital role in the supply of urban centers. In Tula, the
workers at the munitions plant launched a strike that ended with a state of siege, mass
arrests, and a further tightening of labor discipline. In Moscow, printers and bakers put
forward their own leaders—for the most part, veteran male workers—and drew on their
own traditions of collective action to resist the Party’s assaults on both their democratically elected representatives and their semi-autonomous trade unions. Again, however,
the regime prevailed because the labor force was far from united. Long-standing tensions between male and female workers and between the skilled and the unskilled were
eagerly exploited by the authorities, as was the printers’ jealousy of the bakers’ privileged position in the hierarchy of supply and the metal workers’ envy of the textile
workers’ ability to sell the products of their labor on the private market.
Having weathered the outbreak of war with Poland and the turmoil on the nation’s
shop floors, the Party succumbed further to its coercive impulses during the second half
of 1920. Sowing committees were set up in the countryside to control the production
of grain, urban marketplaces were shut down so as to give the state a complete monopoly on trade, and renewed efforts were made to track down and punish workers who
had “deserted” their places of employment. Inevitably, the economy collapsed under
the burden of such policies. By the winter of 1920–21, the regime was confronted with
widespread unrest in the countryside and explosive moods in industry.
Faced with shortages of fuel and bread, sharp reductions in ration levels and the
involuntary idling of production lines, workers in Petrograd, Moscow, and other cities
resorted to collective action—strikes, mass meetings, and public demonstrations—in
February and March 1921. Alongside the demands for improved food supplies, a more
equitable wage structure, an easing of the restrictions on trade, and the abolition of
grain requisitioning were calls for free elections to the soviets and an end to the Party
dictatorship. Although the dynamics of the unrest, which Soviet commentators dismissed as a mere volynka, or go-slow, varied from region to region, the authorities
responded, in typical fashion, with a series of concessions (e.g., the abolition of requisitioning) and coercive measures (e.g., mass arrests) that gradually undermined lowerclass solidarity. Having won some of their economic demands, workers found that they
were still too disorganized and too divided along lines of gender, skill, and trade to
carry on the fight for their political demands. With the formal introduction of the NEP,
moreover, such divisions grew more acute.
This tightly focused study confirms that workers were profoundly alienated from the
regime and its coercive political and economic policies by the end of the Civil War, that
they continued to rely on traditional methods of collective action to defend their inter-
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ests, and that the labor unrest that triggered the Kronstadt revolt was both more widespread and more historically significant than has heretofore been acknowledged. (Aves
makes the important point that the abolition of grain requisitioning was announced at
the height of the Petrograd disturbances, which preceded Kronstadt by one week.)
While the author fails to prove that workers “were politically united in their opposition
to the Communist Party dictatorship” (p. 156), he persuasively demonstrates that their
protests confronted the regime with “a serious political threat” (p. 186).
Aves has restored the so-called volynka to its rightful place of significance in the
chronology of the Party’s decision to replace War Communism with the NEP. In the
process, he has reconstructed an important episode in Bolshevik politics and Russian
labor history. At the same time, he leaves important questions unanswered. Mainly this
is a consequence of the sources that were available when he carried out his research—
´
´
mostly memoirs, emigre journals, and Soviet newspapers. (Always judicious in his handling of the sources, Aves concedes that they are fragmentary at best and contradictory
at worst.) To that extent, the opening of the archives will enable others to fill in the
details. There are times, however, when the analysis itself falls short. For instance, the
author has a tendency to get trapped in the categories and assumptions of the period
when explaining (e.g., in chap. 4) who participated in strikes. In sum, however, this is
a first-rate piece of scholarship that will be of significant interest to specialists.
Jeffrey J. Rossman
University of California, Berkeley
Sex in Public: The Incarnation of Early Soviet Ideology. By Eric Naiman.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. Pp. x⫹307. $39.50.
Eric Naiman has written a very ambitious book. In its introduction he promises to alter
our understanding of Soviet Russia during the New Economic Policy (NEP) by introducing sex and the body as “major preoccupations” (p. 3) of a “profoundly anxious
time” (p. 6). According to Naiman, this anxiety stemmed from the way that NEP, with
its tolerance for petty capitalism, seemed a step backward after the heady days of War
Communism. Using the tools of literary analysis, Naiman turns his attention to various
texts from this period, arguing that “the perception of reality and the unfolding of history are not only inescapably discursive but rest to a significant extent on representational and rhetorical models developed in literature” (p. 19).
To set the stage, Naiman argues in his opening chapter that prerevolutionary Russian
intellectuals went to unusual extremes when they tried to make sense of sex. On one
hand, many writers on the Left and Right rejected sex because it interfered with either
revolutionary or spiritual purity. As the sex and as beings apparently tied to the body
rather than the mind, women—with their baggage of temptation and maternity—could
be nothing but trouble. Russian utopian visions often eliminated women entirely, relying on a collective body that had no gender but was implicitly male. On the other hand,
particularly during the letdown that followed the Revolution of 1905, some writers
glorified sex as the ticket to liberation. But part and parcel of this freedom for the (male)
individual involved sexual humiliation for women.
In his second chapter, Naiman turns to the Communist Party’s attempts to “penetrate”
(p. 79) Soviet society in the early 1920s. Fearful that the heterogeneity that marked
NEP would dilute the revolution beyond recognition, the Party strove to maintain social
cohesion by keeping sex and the body in the public eye. “By the mid-1920s,” writes

This content downloaded from 132.170.015.255 on November 05, 2019 07:03:14 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

784

Book Reviews

Naiman, “the Soviet press argued with increasing frequency that the life of the social
organism depended on the course assumed by the personal lives of its members” (p. 92).
Just as prerevolutionary editors published sensational stories to arouse the prurient interests and empty the pocketbooks of readers, the Soviet press “eroticized” items in the
news so that they could be “more effectively politicized” (p. 101).
Chapter 3, “The Discourse of Castration,” claims that asceticism also underlay much
Soviet thinking during NEP. This put good communists in the awkward position of
associating their sexual urges with bourgeois misbehavior. It is no wonder that castration, both figurative and literal, became a recurring theme. Naiman begins by describing
the case of a woman who cut off her husband’s penis and ends with a remarkable discussion of Soviet scientists and their attempts to fashion upright citizens with grafts of
animal parts and hormones designed to promote productive, not reproductive labor. As
he astutely points out, the scientists were so wedded to the equation between rejuvenation and sexual abstention that they never dreamed that hormone tampering might actually increase, not eliminate, sexual desire.
Naiman then suggests that the Gothic, a style well suited to an anxious time, marked
NEP-era writings. Naiman supplies several reasons for the resurgence of Gothic themes
in the 1920s, most of which centered around fear: fear of political legitimacy, of corruption, of desire, that the revolutionary working class had perished during the Civil War,
that bourgeois doodads would prove more compelling than communism, and that history would find a way to repeat itself instead of moving relentlessly forward, as Marx
had projected.
In Chapter 5, Naiman proceeds to examine the role of women in this light. Bringing
together much of what he has earlier implied, Naiman argues that women had no real
place in the ideology of revolution in Russia. As symbols of cultural backwardness, as
eager consumers, as creatures believed to be controlled by their reproductive organs,
and as threats to men’s sexual ascetic ideal, they could only be represented as enemies
of revolutionary change. Naiman analyzes a popular scientific text from the 1920s that
portrayed women as unhappy victims of raging hormones, and he articulates the terrifying implications of this theory: the author had introduced “a seriously destabilizing and
frightening element into the Marxist scheme of human progress” (p. 195). In light of
the hostility to women and what they represented, Naiman proposes that we refer to a
“New Soviet Being,” rather than a “New Soviet Woman” (p. 206).
A sixth chapter, “Revolutionary Anorexia,” argues that revolutionary asceticism also
demanded the cessation of yet another physical urge: eating. Naiman shows how emaciated, desexed females tended to figure as revolutionary heroines in NEP-era fiction, as
opposed to voluptuous and invariably corrupted women. To illustrate his point, he looks
closely at Aleksandra Kollontai’s 1923 “Vasilisa Malygina.” Disillusioned with NEP
and politically powerless after the failure of her Workers’ Opposition, Kollontai turned
to fiction that, according to Naiman, revealed her “ambivalent (or hostile) attitude toward femininity as a sign of an internally directed ideological suspicion that occasionally borders on self-hatred” (p. 242).
A final chapter brings together the previous themes. A 1926 gang rape in Leningrad
that inspired much publicity and hand-wringing serves, for Naiman, as a symbol of
all that plagued Soviet society during NEP. Naiman eloquently argues that this crime
highlighted all of the period’s contradictions. His provocative analysis illustrates both
the success and failure of his interdisciplinary approach. Like a good historian, Naiman
establishes a solid context for the unusual furor over the sexual assault, locating it in
the simultaneous debates over the fate of NEP within the upper reaches of the Communist Party. He skillfully shows how the rape, committed by several dozen male proletari-
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ans against a peasant woman, could be taken as a symbol of the anxieties at NEP’s very
base. Had proletarian collectivity run amok? Was this the true face of the workerpeasant alliance (smychka)? Did public revulsion in response to the rape mean that
Soviet society had finally “recoiled” from its misogynistic “ ‘childhood’ fantasies”
(p. 286)? Naiman does an excellent job of mining this incident for historical insights,
but, unlike a good historian, he appears satisfied that this one episode is sufficient evidence for myriad historical metaphors.
Naiman claims to have gotten the best out of both worlds: he lauds himself both for
bringing the tools of literary criticism to the study of history and for functioning as a
historian in the world of literature. Yet he never defines the limits of his source base,
thereby leaving the reader with no clear sense of the analysis’s breadth. Naiman acknowledges this problem in his introduction by referring to an “extreme discursive
centralization” (p. 20) for which a single language had emerged. But what of the texts
that did not fit into his investigation? To be sure, the mix of “second-rate scribblers” (p.
63), would-be scientists, moviemakers, Communist Party officials, and others on whom
Naiman concentrates are excellent targets for his discussion of misogyny and anxiety.
It might, however, be more accurate to place them within the context of a NEP-era
debate, where one person’s utopia was another’s hell. Naiman ignores the abundant
sources that evinced genuine optimism for gender equality and human perfection (e.g.,
by Soviet psychologists, science fiction writers, and city planners in the 1920s).
Naiman concludes his book by arguing that discursive terror faded when NEP ended.
“With the inception of the First Five Year Plan, the Gothic anxieties haunting Soviet
ideology began to evaporate like a mirage” (p. 289). Indeed, the dark imagery that
lurked in the sources he explored would disappear in the 1930s. But was this really
because ideological anxieties had dissipated or because literature had to meet more
restrictive requirements?
Laurie Bernstein
Rutgers University—Camden
Stalinism in a Russian Province: A Study of Collectivization and Dekulakization
in Siberia. By James Hughes. Studies in Russian and East European History and
Society. Edited by R. W. Davies and E. A. Rees.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Pp. xv⫹271. $65.00.
James Hughes’s study of collectivization and dekulakization in Siberia contributes to
the growing body of local and regional studies in Soviet history and demonstrates the
advantages of a regional focus. Drawing on recently available archival materials,
Hughes presents a multifaceted view of events from the grain crisis of 1928 to the “Uturn,” or retreat from the policy of forced collectivization, in 1930. These events are
examined from a variety of perspectives, encompassing the decisions and activities
of the regional leadership, local activists, and the peasants themselves, with frequent
reference to the larger context of Moscow and Stalin’s leadership. Thus, Hughes’s study
avoids a dichotomous top-down versus bottom-up model of political pressure and activity. Rather, initiative and pressure for change in the countryside emerges from diverse
levels of government and society, including middle-level officials and regional leadership, as well as peasant elements, local plenipotentiaries, and the political elites in
Moscow.
Hughes’s ability to incorporate a variety of sources and perspectives into a convinc-
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ing narrative is clear in his examination of the emergence and evolution, in 1928, of
the “Ural-Siberian method” of grain collection. Hughes shows how failed harvests in
the main Soviet grain-producing areas of Ukraine and the North Caucasus combined
with favorable harvests in Siberia to throw Siberia into the spotlight, creating opportunities for the Siberian leadership and cadres to display initiative in agricultural policy and
grain procurement strategy. Local activists were to lead the peasantry in a self-taxation
that used committees of poor and middle-level peasants to target the rich peasants (kulaks), who were to bear the brunt of taxation and grain deliveries. At all levels, the
Siberian officials implemented the method with enthusiasm. The peasants themselves
were, in many cases, willing to identify and isolate kulaks within the peasant community. Hughes understands the willing participation of peasant elements to be motivated
by a combination of rational economic individualism, leading peasants to maximize
their own economic well-being at the expense of kulak neighbors, and opportunities
for poor or middling peasants to enhance their individual power and prestige within the
village community.
With respect to the peasantry, one of the objectives of Hughes’s study is “to break
down the rigid paradigm of bipolarized state-peasant relations under Stalin, to deconstruct the orthodox image of peasant solidarity in the face of encroachment by the state”
(p. 6). He is successful insofar as he is able to show that peasants, motivated by possibilities for economic or social gain, were willing to participate in the process of identifying and isolating kulaks during the procurement and taxation drive of 1928. As long
as the state was able to harness the peasant’s economic and social self-interest and the
enthusiasm of local cadres, policies of dekulakization and grain procurement proceeded
successfully in Siberia. However, this interaction of various social and political forces
broke down with Stalin’s “Final Solution” of forced collectivization. With collectivization as the goal, peasant self-interest ceased to motivate cooperation with state goals, as
collectivization struck at the social and economic bases of peasant society. The peasant
´
mentalite did not necessarily pit the peasant community against the state: peasants were
willing to subject their community to dissent and division in pursuit of social and economic self-interest and demonstrated solidarity only when the basic social and economic values of the majority of peasants came under attack. Thus, in its “U-turn,” the
regime ultimately returned to the strategies of dekulakization, which had met with earlier success.
Hughes’s portrayal of peasant society is rich in anecdotal detail, as he draws on locallevel reports of peasant activities, resolutions from peasant meetings, and peasant letters and petitions. Regrettably, Hughes persists in presenting the economic divisions
of rich, poor, and middle peasant as fundamental to peasant society, thus following a
historiographical convention that ultimately derives from traditional Soviet models. His
village-level anecdotes of peasant life, such as the peasant who was identified as a kulak
because he had been married three times, suggest that wealth or poverty may have, in
many cases, had little to do with peasant decisions to identify and isolate “kulaks” in
their communities. Rather, village morality and social values, local struggles between
established notables and those aspiring to enhance their local prestige, and generational
conflicts may have been the mainsprings of alliance and division within the peasant
community. Hughes’s evidence further points to gender and ethnicity as sources of both
tension and solidarity between and within peasant social groupings. Hughes’s material
offers the scope for a deeper analysis and theoretical presentation of the multiplicity of
social and economic identities within the peasant community, and of how these forces
interacted with the political goals of local, regional, and central officials.
Hughes takes advantage of the opportunities inherent to a regional focus, presenting
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new and diverse evidence and a convincing narration of events in Siberia. Presenting a
fresh look at such pivotal initiatives as the Ural-Siberian Method, Stalinism in a Russian
Province succeeds in contributing a complex, multilayered view of political decision
making, pressure, and initiative.
James R. Harris
University of Teesside
How Life Writes the Book: Real Socialism and Socialist Realism in Stalin’s
Russia. By Thomas Lahusen.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997. Pp. xii⫹247. $29.95.
In The First Circle, whose action is set in the late 1940s, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn mentions a novel called Far from Us, which was all the rage in official literary circles at the
time. It concerned a construction project that had been carried out by labor camp inmates (zeks), but, Solzhenitsyn observed, neither camps nor zeks were ever mentioned.
“They were changed into Komsomols who were well dressed, well shod, and full of
enthusiasm.” Even worse, he charged, “the author himself knew, saw and touched the
truth: . . . he was lying with cold, glassy eyes” (p. 189).
The novel Solzhenitsyn lampooned was Far from Moscow, which received the Stalin
Prize in 1949, and its author was Vasilii Azhaev. The project it described was the construction of an oil pipeline from Okha, in northern Sakhalin, to Komsomol’sk, on the
Baikal-Amur railway line, part of the NKVD labor camp complex known as BAMLAG
(the Corrective Labor Camp of the Baikal-Amur Main Line). More than forty years
later, Thomas Lahusen not only reread the novel assiduously, in its various editions, but
also managed to uncover Azhaev’s personal archive, from which he learned much about
the writer’s motives in perpetrating the “glassy-eyed” lies of which Solzhenitsyn writes.
Like many of his appreciative readers, Azhaev was a young man from an insecure
and humble background. His father having remarried and abandoned his first family,
Vasilii spent his early youth in a Moscow factory. Arrested at the age of nineteen, he
was sent to the Far East, to BAMLAG, where he worked for a couple of years as an
inmate. His conviction was then quashed, but he was not permitted to return to Moscow: he had to work as a “free laborer” in the administration of the NKVD economic
projects.
A young man who dreamed of becoming a writer but unable to enroll at the Gor’kii
Literary Institute, Azhaev was in a vulnerable situation and a receptive state of mind.
His archive later revealed unpublished sketches in which a young writer discusses his
work with a senior NKVD official and is encouraged to compose something worthy of
an “exceptional construction project,” something “clear-cut” and “organized,” “mature,”
with emotion “filtered through the silvery filter of reason.” In this encounter, as Lahusen
says, some kind of transference took place; the young writer began to see the world
from the point of view of the “Big Other.” As a young man from an insecure background, anxious both to establish himself and to feel good about the society in which
he lived, he fixated on an authority figure and saw through those eyes only the ideal of
Project no. 15.
Lahusen is not the first to cite this psychological mechanism to explain the genesis
of the panegyric works of socialist realism. Czeslaw Milosz once gave a detailed diagnosis of this kind of traumatic socialization and ascribed it to what he called metaphorically the Pill of Murti-Bing. The ingestion of this miraculous but corrupting medication
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enabled the writer to put energy and conviction into his mendacious odes, while leaving
him with a gnawing sense of guilt (The Captive Mind [New York, 1953], chap. 1).
Lahusen’s scrupulous mining of Azhaev’s archive puts biographical flesh on the metaphor.
The reality of Project no. 15 was grim. The workers were slaves, ill and half-starved,
without proper equipment, “using their own hands to dig into the ice” (p. 200), the
components were of poor quality, the transport was unreliable, and the climate was
unremittingly harsh and forbidding. When Lahusen visited the region in the 1990s he
found a former camp guard who had started to read Azhaev’s novel but only managed
twenty pages of it. The pipeline, he asserted, had been “built on bones.”
As a result the pipes were inadequately welded and not buried deep enough, so that
they frequently burst, and huge quantities of oil were lost in the sea and overland. The
boiler houses and pumping stations worked only intermittently. The facilities for staff
were inadequate to nonexistent. In the 1960s, scarcely twenty years after completion, a
complete new pipeline had to be laid.
All this did not prevent some, especially perhaps the free laborers and officials, from
believing in the project, losing themselves in it as part of the glorious mission of building socialism. Treating life and literature as “one construction site,” Azhaev’s text envisages the Soviet Union as an organism in which the sacral heart, Moscow, pumps out
truth and energy to the limbs, of which the Far East is the most distant, and therefore
the most secret and exciting. The location is never specifically identified, perhaps for
reasons of military security, or perhaps because utopia is also u-topia, absence of location, and therefore the very place where the imagination can do the work of projecting
the Great Future and starting to make it possible.
At the same time, the names Azhaev assigned to his u-topia hint at a quite opposite
reading of its location. The river Amur becomes the Adun, suggesting Hell, Sakhalin
becomes Taisin, or the “island of secrecy,” Komsomol’sk is renamed Konchelan, the
“end,” and the site itself is situated in Ol’gokhta, which suggests Golgotha. Perhaps this
was the code that Azhaev intended to enable perspicacious readers, or those of later
generations, to discover an underlying meaning. But if that is the case, what price the
Komsomol enthusiasm? The names suggest not a deeper layer of meaning but a contradictory one. This was the side-effect of the Pill of Murti-Bing.
Occasionally Lahusen’s approach to Azhaev’s text is unduly reticent. He suggests at
one point that Solzhenitsyn’s reading of the labor camp experience is a “new code” for
understanding it (p. 193). Actually it is not a code at all: a code is a mere passive
mediator of semantic content. It is an interpretation—an entirely different matter—and
one much more appropriate to the reality Azhaev was only able to hint at in his use of
names. What Lahusen himself saw and heard—the botched pipeline, the later memories
of participants—all confirm that that puppy-like Komsomol enthusiasm represented a
very deficient understanding of reality, however excusable at the time.
When it comes down to it, too, it was not life that wrote the book, but Azhaev. Sometimes Lahusen comes close to denying Azhaev active agency and to renouncing for
himself any aim beyond the creation of yet another text about Project no. 15. Actually,
he has done something much more important, which is to provide a detailed account of
the creative processes underlying totalitarian art.
Geoffrey Hosking
University of London
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Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent,
1934–1941. By Sarah Davies.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xix⫹236. $59.95 (cloth); $19.95
(paper).
Probably the single most intriguing source to surface in the Russian archival gold rush
of the 1990s has been the intelligence reports on popular mood produced by the Soviet
secret police, the Communist party, and the press. These reports, culled from party
agitators’ notebooks, informer networks, and Soviet subjects’ letters to various authorities, are a rich vein for the study of Bolshevik surveillance practices as well as the
political attitudes and daily concerns of ordinary people. Prior to the opening of Russian/Soviet archives historians had few sources dealing with either of these areas. There
´
´
were some emigre memoirs, the postwar Harvard Interview Project with Soviet refugees, the Smolensk regional archive seized by the Wehrmacht, and a few others. Official
Soviet publications after the mid-1920s touched on popular opinion and intelligence
gathering only in very oblique fashion.
Sarah Davies’s Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia is the first book to make extensive
use of these intelligence reports to elucidate popular opinion and attitudes to authority.
The work is doubly important because it deals with Soviet society in the second half of
the 1930s, the period of the Great Terror and the regime’s putative retreat from revolutionary values. It is the most effective attempt to date to estimate the contribution of
popular anger against the party to the Terror, and to determine how different social
groups reacted to specific policies of the “Great Retreat.”
The terrain Davies charts is a broken field. To her credit, she does not smooth out the
rough spots. Attitudes toward the Party leaders, for instance, ranged from adoration of
Stalin, “Our Sun,” “creator of our happiness,” to virulent hatred. Individual Soviet subjects might approve of state socialism in general (particularly its welfare component)
while opposing specific Bolshevik policies. Davies uncovers widespread discontent
with Bolshevik policies even among factory workers, the regime’s declared base of
support. Many workers were unhappy with the end of rationing in January 1935, the
“Stakhanovite” campaign for the intensification of labor, and the end of admissions
preferences for proletarians in higher education. Less surprisingly, Davies also finds
that peasants reviled the collective farms and the Soviet regime in general.
The intelligence reports also demonstrate the persistence of “traditional” discourses
in popular oral culture, in spite of official attempts to eradicate them. Davies zeroes in
on expressions of antisemitism, religious faith, and prerevolutionary notions of social
justice (the virtue of those who worked with their hands and the depravity/parasitism
of those who did not). I was especially surprised by the apparent strength of popular
Russian Orthodox faith, even at the height of the Terror in 1937–38.
Davies adds to the growing body of evidence suggesting widespread popular approval of the Terror, at least that component targeted at Party officials. In this reading,
the Party leaders unleashed the Terror against mid-level apparatchiks in part to vent
popular fury at Communist privileges, official corruption, falling wages, and general
privation. The intelligence reports index this anger, and some record comments approving of the Terror as comeuppance for corrupt, oppressive Party bosses. Davies’s findings, however, do not imply widespread support for the regime but instead suggest that
Stalin and his lieutenants scapegoated middle-level Party officials to deflect popular
resentment of authority away from themselves. Manipulation of mass moods through
such scapegoating became a regular tool of Soviet governance. Part of the tragedy of
the Terror was the susceptibility of ordinary people to this strategy.
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There are obvious problems with using the intelligence reports as the basis for generalizations about popular opinion, and Davies is aware of these. Most important, the
reports themselves consist of anecdotal observations and excerpted comments, generally in the form of “Worker X, of factory Y, commented outside the factory gates that
Trotsky was a great military leader and the real victor of the Civil War.” Statistical data
are almost never included, so that there is no way to gauge the relative strength of
any given sentiment among the populace as a whole. Reporting institutions selected
comments hostile to the regime for excerpting, and this distorted the reports’ presentation of popular opinion. So too did the fact that Party officials set the agenda for the
reports, asking for information on popular attitudes with respect to this or that policy
or agitprop campaign. Issues covered reflected the priorities of the Party leadership, not
the Soviet “woman or man on the street.”
At points Davies makes generalizations that are too sweeping given that her evidence
is mostly anecdotal. For example, she claims that in late 1936 and early 1937 “popular
opinion was turning against the regime because of continued economic failure” (p. 38).
Yet her book includes plenty of examples of workers complaining about economic difficulties before 1936. Overall, however, Davies deals effectively with source limitations
by triangulating the intelligence reports with other evidence. Thus, she substantiates
the persistence of Russian Orthodox faith in the population by supplementing the reports with 1937 census results and data on church attendance.
Public Opinion in Stalin’s Russia is an open-ended work, pointing to as many historical problems as it resolves. Davies sets herself the task of recovering the suppressed
voices of ordinary Soviet subjects, but her work raises a whole series of questions about
the function and production of propaganda in the USSR. After reading the book, I wondered about the actual function of Stalinist propaganda. Was it to convince the masses
of the virtue of Soviet Power or simply to intimidate them? The intelligence reports
used by Davies reveal popular reception of regime propaganda to have been very unstable. Referring to the theoretical work of James Scott and Mikhail Bakhtin, she characterizes this instability as “resistance”—subversive counter-readings of official texts.
Clearly Soviet propagandists were unable to overcome this resistance and stabilize “politically correct” beliefs in the minds of the populace. But perhaps the function of Soviet
agitprop by the mid-1930s was not to generate internal conviction but to dominate the
discursive field and force its subjects to mouth official slogans and pay party leaders
public deference. As Lisa Wedeen has argued for the case of contemporary Syria, a
repressive one-party state that can get its subjects to use its language and participate in
its public rituals can regenerate its political power regardless of their internal convictions.1
In her conclusion, Davies urges scholars to examine “the impact of popular opinion
upon propaganda and policy” (p. 186). “How far,” she asks, “did the regime take account of and respond to popular opinion?” Party leaders are known to have requested
intelligence on popular feelings about particular issues and to have read them. Did they
or their subordinates adjust propaganda in accordance with this intelligence? What were
the routine mechanisms for making propaganda, and did they include the intelligence
reports on popular mood? The Soviet “propaganda state” (to borrow Peter Kenez’s
phrase), along with the system of gathering information on popular mood, emerged at
about the same time as “public relations,” polling, and state surveillance of mass opin-

1
Lisa J. Wedeen, “The Politics of Spectacle: Discipline, Resistance, and National Community in
Syria” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1995).
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ion developed elsewhere in Europe and the Americas.2 Scholars should aim to place it
in the context of an effort by elites worldwide to find new methods for managing mass
politics in the first decades of the twentieth century. In sketching the contours of popular
opinion in the USSR in the 1930s, Davies has made the first step in this direction.
Matthew Lenoe
University of Arkansas, Little Rock

2
On the development of state surveillance of mass opinion throughout Europe during World War I
and its aftermath, see Peter Holquist, “ ‘Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work’: Bolshevik Surveillance in Its Pan-European Context,” Journal of Modern History 69 (September 1997):
415–50.

This content downloaded from 132.170.015.255 on November 05, 2019 07:03:14 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

